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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Hardware Verification of System-on-Chip Designs
In present-day hardware design flow, one of the most challenging tasks is to guarantee that
designs are free of bugs. While design tools and technologies for system-on-chip (SoC)
and reusable Intellectual Property Components (IP cores) allow more complex hardware
systems to be designed effectively the verification methodologies are less effective. This
leads to an enlarging productivity gap between design and verification such that verifica-
tion can constitute about 70% of the total design effort. Therefore, there are increasing
demands on effective verification flows that can help to reduce the verification cost.
In verification practice, simulation is a broadly adopted technique for all verification
tasks. Although simulation can detect simple and easy-to-find bugs it often fails to find
corner-case bugs. Especially, when a design becomes large only a portion of the design
behavior can be triggered and be checked by applying input patterns (simulation stimuli)
to the design. Generating stimuli that make the design exhibit an interesting, corner-case
behavior is difficult. As a consequence, there are hard-to-detect bugs that escape from
being detected by simulation techniques. To detect such bugs, formal verification can be
used as an alternative to simulation techniques.
Formal verification analyzes a mathematical model of the design and proves that the
design exhibits the desired behavior for all possible input patterns. Hence, in principle,
formal verification can detect all bugs in the design model. Because of this advantage
with respect to simulation, formal verification plays an increasingly important role in
system-on-chip design. There are two main application domains of formal verification:
Equivalence Checking and Property Checking.
1.1.1 Equivalence Checking
Equivalence Checking is to verify the functional equivalence of two models of the same
design. The design models are functionally equivalent if they produce the same output
behavior for all possible input patterns. One of the two models serves as the original
model, which is assumed correct (golden design). The other model results from the former
1
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after several modification or optimization steps are applied. Those modifications and
optimization steps are done either manually by a designer or automatically by a synthesis
tool. This can introduce errors into the design because of human mistakes or due to bugs
of the automatic tools. Hence, it must be verified that the transformations of the design
have not changed the function of the design after each design step. The task of equivalence
checking is to guarantee the correctness of all automatic or manual transformation steps
that are applied to the design.
Formal equivalence checking techniques have been well studied and developed for
recent decades [Kun93, JMF95, Mat96, KK97, SWWK04]. One of the first successful
techniques is proposed by Kunz [Kun93] for combinational designs and is extended by
Stoffel [SWWK04] for sequential designs. This technique is based on the fact that there
are many similarities between the structures of the golden model and the modified model.
The similarities are exploited to analyze and to prove the equivalence between two mod-
els. The formal equivalence checking techniques are successfully applied to verify large
designs that consist of millions of gates. Now, they are standard components in most
industrial design flows.
1.1.2 Property Checking
Property Checking is used to verify the intended behavior of a design. At the beginning
of the design process, an initial model of the design is created from the informal specifi-
cation. From this specification a designer can also formulate properties that he wants the
design to fulfill. The properties are verified to be valid for the initial model of the design.
Property checking cannot only find bugs in the initial phase of the design process; it can
also help to avoid misunderstandings of the specification by the designer. Therefore, bugs
can be detected in an earlier phase of the design process with less cost.
Properties can be checked against the design models using theorem proving or model
checking. In contrast to theorem proving that needs human interaction, model checking is
a fully automated formal verification method. Hence, it requires less manual efforts than
theorem proving.
Because this thesis will focus on improvements in model checking, in the following,
the incoming data and the core algorithms of model checking will be described briefly.
Design Models and Property Languages
The two incoming data models for property checking algorithms are mathematical models
of the properties and the design.
The mathematical models of the design are used to describe the combinational or se-
quential behavior of the design. The combinational behavior of the design is the functional
relation among the inputs and outputs of the design at a certain time. The sequential be-
havior of the designs is the functional relation among the inputs and outputs of the design
over time. The combinational behavior can be described by propositional logic in terms
of input and output variables of the design. In a concrete hardware design, where input
2
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and output variables are encoded by Boolean signals, the theory of Boolean (switching)
algebra is often used. In order to describe the sequential behavior of the design, the finite
state machine (FSM) model is used. The FSM model of the design can be translated to a
state transition graph (STG) or a labeled STG, i.e., a so-called Kripke model.
In order to describe the ordering of desired events happening during the operation
of the design, the properties can be formulated as an automaton (for example, Bu¨chi
automaton) or in a temporal logic language such as Computation Tree Logic (CTL) defined
by Clarke and Emerson [CE81] or Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) defined in [Kur94].
Two typically desired types of properties are safety property and liveness property.
A safety property requires that the design never exhibit any bad behaviors. A liveness
property is to check that the design eventually exhibits an intended behavior.
Core Approaches
Model checking [CE81] is used to verify properties that are expressed in temporal logic
against a design described as a Kripke model. The method is an iterative fixed-point
computation which traverses the state transition graph of the Kripke model and checks
the property in each state of the graph until the whole graph is traversed, i.e., the fixed
point is reached. The algorithm calculates the set of reachable states of the design starting
from the initial states or from the property states, i.e., the states in which the property
is satisfied. As proposed by Clarke in [CE81], it is a graph traversal algorithm where
the state sets are enumerated and stored explicitly. This is obviously infeasible when the
number of states is large. In general, the state space to be traversed grows exponentially
with the number of state components in the design. This is a serious problem which is
known as state explosion problem. This problem limits the size of the design that can
be verified in practice. Therefore, efficient data structures of the mathematical models
as well as data manipulation operations are crucial for the success of model checking
approaches.
Data Structures and Decision Algorithms
Binary decision diagrams (BDDs), proposed by Bryant [Bry86], are efficient, canonical
representations of Boolean functions. In other words, many practically relevant Boolean
functions can be represented by compact BDDs and every distinct function has exactly
one unique BDD representation. Moreover, the manipulation operations on BDDs have
polynomial complexity in terms of the size of BDDs. Such properties make BDDs a
useful data structure for model checking approaches.
McMillan proposed Symbolic Model Checking (SMC) [McM93] where the sets of
states are calculated and stored implicitly by BDDs. Instead of enumerating state sets,
the characteristic functions of the sets of states as well as of the sets of transitions among
states are represented by BDDs symbolically. By introducing symbolic model checking,
larger designs with more than 1020 reachable states can be automatically verified. This
improvement in the capability of model checking enables it to be applied in real indus-
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trial verification flows. However, in some cases the size of BDDs is still exponential in
the number of state components. Therefore, in spite of intensive research in this area,
symbolic model checking can only handle designs with up to few hundred state vari-
ables. Many industrial-size designs remain too complex for symbolic model checking
techniques.
Recently, Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) has emerged as a promising reasoning approach
for model checking and formal verification. A SAT-instance (or a SAT-problem) is usually
given as a conjunctive normal form (CNF) of a Boolean function. A SAT-instance is
solved by searching a variable assignment under which the function evaluates to true. In
recent years, many advances in SAT-solvers [MMZ+01, ES03] have been developed so
that significantly larger SAT-problems with thousands of variables can be solved.
Biere et.al. proposed Bounded Model Checking (BMC) [BCCZ99] where the model
checking problem is mapped on a SAT-instance. In BMC, the design is modeled by an
iterative circuit model (or so-called time frame expansion) where the design is unrolled
for a certain number of time frames. The transition relation of the iterative model and an
LTL property are translated into the SAT-instance. The SAT-solver will solve the SAT-
instance to decide if there exists a run of the design, i.e., a sequence of states starting from
initial states that violates the property. BMC has been used successfully for finding bugs
in many industrial designs. However, BMC often fails to prove that the property holds in
the design where the complete proof requires the design to be unrolled for a large number
of time frames (the diameter of the FSM modeling the design).
Improvements in Model Checking
As mentioned above, symbolic model checking suffers from the state explosion prob-
lem while bounded model checking is only good for falsification. Many enhancements
have been proposed to overcome these limitations. Here, a few common approaches are
summarized.
Researchers suggested decomposition approaches to reduce the size of the problem
[BCL91, GB94, HKB96, CHJ+90, CM90, CCLQ97, CHM+96a, GDHH98]. The design,
its state space, and its transition functions can be divided into separate partitions, which
are considered individually. This results in many feasible problems, however, it may
also result in inaccurate solutions, i.e., approximation solutions. The precision of the
approximation is obtained by heuristic partitioning methods or by repeated analysis of
the partitions.
In contrast to decomposition, where all partitions of the design are considered, ab-
straction refinement approaches [CGJ+00,CGKS02,WLJ+06,CCK+02,MA03,GGYA03,
JKSC08] check only a small abstract model of the design against the property. The ab-
stract model is constructed conservatively such that if the property holds in the abstract
model it will also hold in the design. However, similar to decomposition approaches, inac-
curacy of the abstraction may lead to spurious falsification of the property (so-called false
negatives or false counterexamples). The spurious counterexamples are eliminated by re-
fining the abstract model. The refinement process is often guided by the counterexamples
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in well-known Counterexample-Guided Abstraction Refinement (CEGAR) approaches.
The incompleteness problem of BMC can be solved by induction proofs [SSS00]. In
induction proofs, the property is proven in two steps: base step and inductive step. In
the base step, the property is proven to hold for k time frames starting from initial states.
The inductive step proves that if the property holds for k time frames starting from any
arbitrary state, then it also holds for time frame k + 1.
Another SAT-based model checking technique called interval property checking (IPC)
is applied very successfully in industrial practice. It has its origin already in the mid 1990s
in the Siemens company and is commercially available [One09]. In the IPC methodology,
bounded behaviors of the design are specified using the so called Interval Language (ITL).
ITL properties are checked against the time frame expansion model of the design starting
from an arbitrary state.
1.1.3 Block-based Verification of SoC Designs
In spite of continuous progress in formal verification technology, a complete SoC de-
sign clearly remains beyond the capacity of a state-of-the-art formal property checker.
Therefore, formal property checking is usually applied at the block level (block-based
verification) and is used to achieve high quality IP blocks. In this way, also simulation
at the chip level becomes less expensive since it can concentrate on the global system
behavior and is relieved from hunting bugs in the individual SoC modules.
In an SoC design, IP blocks (modules) such as hardware accelerators, I/O controllers,
or programmable blocks such as digital signal processors and standard processor cores are
connected via sophisticated communication infrastructures. These communication struc-
tures usually use some standard protocols, e.g., ARM’s Advanced Microcontroller Bus
Architecture (AMBA) Advanced High-performance Bus (AHB) [ARM99]. These proto-
cols are used to create common interfaces between modules and ensure proper behavior
of the entire chip.
Consequently, verification of IP blocks can be divided into two different tasks: com-
putational verification and communicational verification.
Computational verification is to assure the correctness of individually intended be-
haviors of a module, for example, the module computes data correctly. Communicational
verification is to verify the communication interface of the IP block. When it comes to en-
suring system integrity, it is of great importance to verify that the components connected
to the system busses comply with the respective protocols. This certifies that the verified
IP block does not compromise the on-chip communication when connected to the on-chip
communication infrastructure. Communicational verification is also called protocol com-
pliance verification. Such a certification becomes especially important when IP blocks
from third-party vendors are used. While computational verification for arithmetic data
path has made fast progress recently [WSBK07], communicational verification is still a
major area of potential innovation in industrial SoC verification.
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1.2 Motivation and Thesis Overview
Even though the state-of-the-art in formal verification technology provides a rich set of
methods and tools to verify the interfaces between SoC modules formally, severe prob-
lems still occur in practice.
Since the control designs for standard SoC protocols typically contain thousands of
state variables all methods that rely on an exact traversal of the state space are pro-
hibitively expensive. More advanced methods are available that decompose the state
space and/or perform abstractions on it. However, most of these methods are of generic
nature and have been developed for a general spectrum of property checking applications.
Unfortunately, they tend to fail in industrial practice when being applied specifically to
the interfaces of modules. Either their state space approximation is too coarse resulting
in false negatives of the property checker, or they run out of computational resources.
BMC, in principle, can handle the complexity of SoC module interfaces, however, proofs
on bounded time intervals often remain incomplete when it considers the design starting
from initial states.
Provided enough resources, IPC can provide a complete proof of a property. It has
been proven very efficient for a wide range of computational verification tasks. However,
it has to cope with the problem of identifying reachability information while handling
communicational verification. Because IPC deals with the time frame expansion model of
the design, starting from arbitrary states it can produce false negatives. The false negatives
correspond to runs of the design starting from unreachable states. If this happens, the
model needs to be augmented with important reachability information in order to rule out
the spurious counterexamples. In the present-day IPC methodology flow, invariants have
to be identified manually by the verification engineer by analyzing the counterexamples
and the source code of the design. This requires tedious and time-consuming manual
effort, and, reduces the productivity of the formal verification process.
Additionally, in present-day verification methodology flows, verification engineers try
to construct a correct and complete set of properties. A property can be erroneous if it
specifies an unrealizable behavior of the design. An incomplete property set fails to cover
all indented behaviors of the design and then fails to identify bugs in uncovered behaviors.
Therefore, constructing a set of properties is also a challenging task, and reduces produc-
tivity of the formal verification process. However, protocol compliance verification has
some special characteristics when compared to general computational verification. In
principle, the properties for protocol compliance can be formulated independently of the
particular design under verification so that they can be re-used for other designs as well.
It is therefore beneficial to have a generic, reusable set of protocol compliance properties.
Because of the two problems being addressed above, applying formal property check-
ing still requires a significant amount of manual effort that sometimes hampers adoption
of the formal verification methodology flow by industry.
Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to improve the productivity of the industrial,
IPC-based formal verification methodology. First, this thesis proposes a decomposition-
based reachability analysis to solve the problem of identifying reachability information
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automatically. Second, this thesis develops a generic, reusable set of properties for pro-
tocol compliance verification.
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the reader into some fun-
damentals and terminology of graph algorithms and representation of Boolean functions
which are basic to the subject of this thesis.
Chapter 3 introduces the concepts of model checking and reviews some recent results
on model checking techniques.
Chapter 4 describes the interval property checking techniques and discusses the com-
mon property template in ITL. It will outline the problems that reduce the productivity of
the IPC-based verification methodology flow. This chapter also discovers an interesting
feature of the common property template and the corresponding hierarchical structure of
designs, namely the existence of a dedicated central finite state machine that controls the
overall behavior of the design. This central finite state machine is called main-FSM and
is used to formulate properties.
Chapter 5 develops a new decomposed FSM traversal algorithm to identify reachabil-
ity information, which is used to strengthen the models in the IPC-based methodology and
helps to eliminate the spurious counterexamples. The new algorithm exploits the main-
FSM to decompose the reachability analysis problem and to reduce the computational
complexity of the traversal algorithm. Experiments have been conducted to demonstrate
the effectiveness of this approach in increasing the productivity of the IPC-based method-
ology.
Chapter 6 develops a new verification methodology for protocol compliance that uses
a recorder finite state structure (FST) and a set of properties, which are generic and
reusable. It develops a systematic way to construct the recorder-FST from the informal
specification. The recorder-FST represents the bus protocol status. It is used to formulate
the generic set of ITL properties. It will be shown how recorder-FST and the property set
are checked against protocol implementation designs to assure that the designs comply
with the protocol standard. This can be done by using IPC-based methodology and the
FSM traversal algorithm. The chapter illustrates the usefulness of the proposed method-
ology by developing a representative recorder-FST and a property set for ARM AMBA
and by using them to verify several industrial designs.
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and plans some future directions of research.
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Chapter 2
Fundamentals
In the first section of this chapter, basic graph algorithms are reviewed because they serve
as primary algorithms from which most algorithms in this thesis are derived. In the sec-
ond section, the basic notations of Boolean functions and its common representations are
briefly introduced. The graph algorithms are summarized of graph chapters in [CLR94].
For a more detailed introduction into the Boolean functions and their representations, the
reader may refer to a standard textbook, e.g., [HS96].
2.1 Graphs and Graph Algorithms
2.1.1 Definitions
In formal verification of hardware designs, many problems can be modeled by graphs and
the algorithms on these problems are based on graph algorithms. For example, the circuit
of a design can be modelled as a directed graph whose vertices are electronic gates. The
sequential behavior of a design can be modeled as a state transition graph. Traversing a
circuit or analyzing the state transition graph of the design is a graph traversal. The con-
cepts of graphs and graph algorithms are fundamental to all subjects that will be presented
in this thesis.
Definition 2.1. (Graph) A graph G is a tuple (V,E), where
• V is a set of vertices (or nodes),
• E ⊂ V × V is a set of edges,
E is a binary relation on V . Each edge e ∈ E connects two nodes u, v ∈ V , i.e.,
e = (u, v). If the edge set E consists of unordered pairs of vertices, G is an undirected
graph, otherwise G is a directed graph. 2
In a directed graph, given an edge e = (u, v), the node u is the immediate predecessor
of v, and the node v is called the immediate successor of u. The set of all immediate
successors of a given node u is also referred to as the fanout of the node, which is denoted
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by FanOut(u). Similarly, the set of all immediate predecessors of a node u are called its
fanin being denoted by FanIn(u).
A path of length k from a vertex u to a vertex u′ in a directed graph G is a se-
quence (v1, v2, . . . , vk) of vertices such that u = v1, u′ = vk and (vi, vi+1) ∈ E for
i = 1, 2, . . . , k− 1. If there is a path p from u to u′, we say that u′ is reachable from u via
p, which is denoted as u p;u′. In this case, u is called a predecessor of u′ and u′ is called
a successor of u.
In a directed graph, a path (v1, . . . , vk) forms a cycle if v1 = vk and the path contains
at least one edge. A directed graph with no cycles is called directed acyclic graph (DAG).
A directed graph is strongly connected if every two vertices are reachable from each
other. The strongly connected components (SCCs) of a graph are the equivalence classes
of vertices under the “are mutually reachable” relation. In other words, a strongly di-
rected component of a directed graph G is a maximal set of vertices U ⊂ V such that for
every pair of vertices u, v ∈ V , we have both u ; v and v ; u; that is, vertices u and v
are reachable from each other.
2.1.2 Graph Algorithms
Breadth-first Search Algorithm
The breadth-first search (BFS) algorithm is one of the basic algorithms for traversing a
graph. It can be considered as the archetype of reachability analysis algorithms, which
will be represented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5.
Given a graph G = (V,E) and a distinguished source vertex s, breadth-first search
iteratively moves along the edges of G to visit all vertices that are reachable from s. The
key idea of breadth-first search is to expand the set of reachable nodes systematically
across the breadth of the traversed node. That is, the algorithm traverses all nodes at
distance k from s before visiting any nodes at distance k + 1. The frontier between
distance k and k + 1 in the graph is marked by coloring the discovered and undiscovered
nodes with different colors. A queue is used to store the nodes that are at the frontier,
i.e., at distance k. These nodes will be considered while visiting nodes at distance k + 1.
Figure 2.1 shows the breath-first search algorithm as being presented in [CLR94].
Depth-first Search Algorithm
The depth-first search (DFS) algorithm explores the longest path in the graph whenever
possible, i.e., as deeply as possible. A node v is marked as “visited” if all immediate
successors u of v have been visited. Therefore, in order to visit the node u, the algorithm
visits all its immediate successors recursively. The algorithm as shown in Figure 2.2
timestamps each node. Each node v has two timestamps: the first timestamp d[v] records
when v is first visited, and the second timestamp f [v] records when v is marked as “vis-
ited”.
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1: BFS(V,E, s) {
2: for each u ∈ V ∧ u 6= s {
3: color[u] ← WHITE;
4: d[u] ←∞;
5: pi[u] ← ∅;
6: }
7: color[s] ← GRAY;
8: d[s] ← 0;
9: pi[s] ← ∅;
10: Q ← {s};
11: while Q 6= ∅ {
12: u ← head[Q]; {
13: for each v ∈ Adj[u] {
14: if color[v] = WHITE {
15: color[v] ← GRAY;
16: d[v] ← d[u] + 1;
17: pi[v] ← u;
18: ENQUEUE(Q, v);
19: }
20: }
21: DEQUEUE(Q);
22: color[u] ← BLACK;
23: }
24: }
Figure 2.1: Breadth-first search algorithm
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1: DFS(V,E) {
2: for each u ∈ V {
3: color[u] ← WHITE;
4: pi[u] ← ∅;
5: }
6: time ← 0;
7: for each u ∈ V {
8: if color[u] = WHITE {
9: DFS VISIT(V,E, u);
10: }
11: }
12: }
13: DFS VISIT(V,E, u) {
14: color[u] ← GRAY;
15: d[u] ← time ← time + 1 {
16: for each v ∈ Adj[u] {
17: if color[v] = WHITE {
18: pi[v] ← u;
19: DFS VISIT(V,E, u);
20: }
21: }
22: color[u] ← BLACK;
23: f [u] ← time ← time + 1;
24: }
Figure 2.2: Depth-first search algorithm
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Strongly Connected Components
Another important graph algorithm that will be used in this thesis is decomposing a di-
rected graph into its strongly connected components (SCCs). This decomposition can be
done using two depth-first searches on the directed graph G and on its transpose graph
GT . The transpose of a graph G = (V,E) is a directed graph GT = (V,ET ), where
ET = {(u, v) : (v, u) ∈ E}. The algorithm to identify SCCs of a graph is shown in
Figure 2.3.
1: SCC(V,E) {
2: Compute finishing times f [u] ← DFS(V,E)
3: Compute ET ;
4: Call DFS(V,ET ), but in the main loop of DFS
5: consider the vertices in order of decreasing f [u];
6: For each vertex u in the main loop of DFS (line 7)
7: output reachable vertices of u
7: as vertices in one SCC corresponding to u;
8: }
Figure 2.3: Strongly connected component algorithm
2.2 Representations of Boolean Functions
2.2.1 Boolean Functions
We consider the two-valued Boolean algebra that is composed by a Boolean set B =
{0, 1}, the operations of conjunction (AND), disjunction (OR) and complementation
(NOT). The elements 0 and 1 of B are called Boolean values or Boolean constants.
Boolean variables, denoted by lower case letters, for example x, y, v, can be assigned
a Boolean value.
An n-variable vector of Boolean variables, denoted by an upper case letter, e.g., X =
〈x1, . . . , xn〉, can be assigned an element of the n-dimensional Boolean space Bn. A point
in the n-dimensional Boolean space Bn can be called an assignment to the Boolean vector
X and is denoted as A(X) = 〈a1, . . . , an〉. Given an assignment A(X) of a Boolean
vector X , the value of a variable xi ∈ X is denoted by A(xi) = ai.
An n-variable Boolean function f , f : Bn 7→ B maps a point in the n-dimensional
Boolean space to a Boolean value. The set of points of the Boolean space that are mapped
to 1(0) is the on-set(off-set) of the Boolean function f , respectively.
A vector of Boolean functions F : Bn 7→ Bm consists of m individual Boolean
functions F = 〈f1, . . . , fm〉.
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Given two Boolean functions f, g, a new function h can be obtained by applying
Boolean operators to f and/or g. These applications of Boolean operators AND, OR,
NOT and XOR are denoted by h = AND(f, g) = f ∧ g, h = OR(f, g) = f ∨ g,
h = NOT (f) = f , h = XOR(f, g) = f ⊕ g, respectively.
In addition to the standard Boolean operators such as AND, OR, NOT, etc., we are
interested in other operators, which will be used in this thesis.
Definition 2.2. (Implication) Given two Boolean functions f, g, the implication operator
being denoted as f → g is defined by: h = f → g = f ∨ g 2
The implication operator has some important properties which will be used later in
this thesis.
Lemma 2.1. Let f, g, h be Boolean functions. If f → g = 1 and g → h = 1, then
f → h = 1.
Lemma 2.2. Let f, g, h be Boolean functions. If f → g = 1, then f ∧ h → g ∧ h = 1.
Lemma 2.3. Let f, g, h be Boolean functions. If f∧g = 0 and h → f = 1, then h∧g = 0.
Proof. Lemmas 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 hold according to the implication definition and proper-
ties of Boolean operations.
Definition 2.3. (Cofactor) Given an n-variable Boolean function f(x1, . . . , xn), the pos-
itive cofactor fxj and the negative cofactor fxj of f with respect to a variable xj are:
• fxj = f(x1, . . . , xj−1, 1, xj+1, . . . , xn).
• fxj = f(x1, . . . , xj−1, 0, xj+1, . . . , xn). 2
Based on the cofactors of a Boolean function, we can define its quantification as fol-
lows:
Definition 2.4. (Existential Quantifier) Given an n-variable Boolean function f(x1, . . . , xn),
the existential quantifier operator being applied to f with respect to a variable xj is:
∃xjf = fxj ∨ fxj
2
Given a Boolean function f(V ), we can apply the existential quantifier with respect
to a sub-vector of V , X = 〈x1, x2, . . . , xn〉 ⊆ V as follows:
∃Xf(X,V \X) = ∃x1(. . . (∃xn−1(∃xnf(V \X)))) (2.1)
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Lemma 2.4. Let f be a Boolean function and X be a vector of variables. Then f →
∃Xf = 1.
Proof. Lemma 2.4 holds according to the quantifier definition and properties of Boolean
operations.
The cofactors can be generalized to apply to a function f with respect to another
function g as defined below:
Definition 2.5. (Generalized Cofactor) Given two n-variable functions f : Bn 7→ B
and g : Bn 7→ B. Let the distance between two points A1, A2 ∈ Bn be given by
D(A1, A2) =
i=n∑
i=1
2n−i · (A1(xi) + A2(xi)) mod 2.
Then the generalized cofactor of F with respect to g being denoted by f ↓ g is:
f ↓ g(X) = f(µg(X))
where µg(X) : Bn 7→ Bn maps each point A1 ∈ Bn to its nearest neighbor A2 ∈ Bn
according to D(A1, A2) such that g(A2) = 1. 2
The generalized cofactor of a function f with respect to g is a function that equals to
f when g = 1. In other word, if we interpreted the pair (f, g) as an incompletely specified
function whose onset is f ∧ g and don’t care set is g, the generalized cofactor can be
considered as a heuristic to select a representative of the incompletely specified function
(f, c). Note that the generalized cofactor doesn’t need to be uniquely determined.
Definition 2.6. (Support Set) The support set of an n-variables Boolean function f : Bn 7→ B
is
supp(f) = {xj ∈ X|fxj 6= fxj}
For all x ∈ supp(f), we say f depends on x. 2
Boolean functions can be represented by combinational circuits, truth tables, disjunc-
tive normal forms (DNFs), conjunctive normal forms (CNF), or reduced ordered binary
decision graphs (ROBDDs). In the following, a few of these representations are briefly
described.
2.2.2 Combinational Circuits
Definition 2.7. (Syntax of Combinational Circuits) A combinational circuit, (a combi-
national network, or a circuit gate netlist), is a DAG (I ∪O ∪G,E,Op), where
• The set of vertices is partitioned in the following way:
– The set of primary inputs I ⊆ V is a set of nodes without predecessors, i.e.,
FanIn(i) = 0,
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– The set of primary outputs O ⊆ V is a set of nodes without successors. Every
primary output has only one fan-in, i.e., FanOut(o) = 0 and |FanIn(o)| =
1,
– The set of internal gates G,
• E is the set of edges connecting two gates, and edges are called signals,
• Op : V 7→ Ops is the labeling function that maps gates to gate types:
Ops = {PI, PO,AND,NAND,OR,NOR,NOT,XOR, . . .}
The labeling function Op is defined such that:
• For all inputs i ∈ X , Op(i) = PI ,
• For all outputs o ∈ O, Op(o) = PO,
• For all gates g ∈ G, Op(g) ∈ Ops \ {PI, PO}. 2
Definition 2.8. (Semantics of Combinational Circuits) Given a combinational circuit
(V,E,Op) and a vector of Boolean variables X = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉, where n = |I|. Each
gate g ∈ V is associated with a Boolean function f g : (Bn 7→ B) which is defined
recursively as follows:
• if g ∈ I , then there exists only one x ∈ X such that f g = x,
• if g ∈ O and FanIn(g) = g1, then f g = f g1 ,
• if g ∈ G, and FanIn(g) = {g1, g2, . . . , gk} then
f g = Op(g)(f g1 , f g2 , . . . , f gk).
2
A combinational circuit is displayed as a directed graph in which gates are depicted
differently according to their gate types. Table 2.1 illustrates some standard gate types
and their corresponding operations being applied to the Boolean functions.
An example of a combinational circuit is shown in Figure 2.4. In the example, primary
inputs i1, i2, i3 are associated with Boolean variables x1, x2, x3, respectively. For gate
g3 with Op(g3) = OR and FanIn(g3) = {g1, g2}, the associated Boolean function is
f g3 = g1 ∨ g2. Applying Definition 2.8 recursively results in the function associated with
the primary output o f o = (x1 ∧ x2) ∨ (x1 ∧ x3)
The combinational circuit representation of Boolean functions is used in several im-
portant algorithms like Automatic Test Pattern Generation (ATPG), structural equiva-
lence checking [Kun93], structural FSM traversal [SWWK04], circuit-based satisfiability
solver [KGP01].
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Gate symbol Name Boolean operator Characteristic function as CNF
h
f
g
AND h = f ∧ g (vh ∨ vf ) ∧ (vh ∨ vg)∧
(vh ∨ vf ∨ vg)
h
f
g
OR h = f ∨ g (vh ∨ vf ) ∧ (vh ∨ vg)∧
(vh ∨ vf ∨ vg)
f h
INVERTER h = f (vh ∨ vf ) ∧ (vh ∨ vf )
h
f
g
XOR h = f ∧ g ∨ f ∧ g = f ⊕ g (vh ∨ vf ∨ vg) ∧ (vh ∨ vf ∨ vg)∧
(vh ∨ vf ∨ vg) ∧ (vh ∨ vf ∨ vg)
h
f
g
NAND h = f ∧ g (vh ∨ vf ) ∧ (vh ∨ vg)∧
(vh ∨ vf ∨ vg)
h
f
g
NOR h = f ∨ g (vh ∨ vf )∧
(vh ∨ vg) ∧ (vh ∨ vf ∨ vg)
h
f
g
XNOR h = f ∧ g ∨ f ∧ g = f ⊕ g (vh ∨ vf ∨ vg) ∧ (vh ∨ vf ∨ vg)∧
(vh ∨ vf ∨ vg) ∧ (vh ∨ vf ∨ vg)
Table 2.1: Standard gates and corresponding Boolean operators, CNFs
g1
g0
i1
i2
i3
o
g3
g2
Figure 2.4: Example of a combinational circuit
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2.2.3 Reduced Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams
Bryant [Bry86] introduced reduced ordered binary decision diagrams (ROBDDs) that are
canonical representations of Boolean functions. The canonicity of the representations is
very important in many applications, especially in formal verification.
The ordered binary decision diagram (OBDD) representation of a Boolean function is
constructed recursively based on Shannon’s expansion theorem. Each node v ∈ V of the
graph is associated with a Boolean input variable in the vector X = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) or a
Boolean value value(v) ∈ B. If a node is associated with a Boolean value, it is called a
leaf node. For each non-leaf node v, there are two edges from v to two “children” low(v)
and high(v).
Definition 2.9. (Syntax of OBDDs) Given a vector of Boolean variables X = 〈x1, x2, . . . , xn〉,
an OBDD is a labeled DAG (V ∪ L,E, var, val), where:
• V is a set of n nodes,
• L is a set of leaf nodes,
• E is a set of edges such that
– leaf nodes do not have immediate successor,
– each node v ∈ V has only two immediate successor low(v) and high(v),
which are called two “children” of v,
• var : V 7→ X is an attribute function which maps a node v ∈ V to a Boolean
variable such that if var(v) = xj , var(low(v)) = xk and var(high(v)) = xl, then
j > k and j > l,
• val : L 7→ B is a value function which maps a leaf v ∈ L to a Boolean value. 2
Definition 2.10. (Semantics of OBDDs) Given an OBDD and its labeling variables X ,
each node v ∈ V ∪L is associated with a Boolean function f v which is defined recursively
as follows:
• if v ∈ L, then f v = val(v),
• if v ∈ V with var(v) = xj and two children low(v), and high(v), then
f v = (xj ∧ f
low(v)) ∨ (xj ∧ f
high(v)).
2
An OBDD can be reduced to obtain a ROBDD such that it contains no node v with
low(v) = high(v), nor any nodes v, v′ ∈ V such that the subgraphs rooted in v and v′ are
isomorphic, i.e., f v = f v′ .
Bryant developed effective algorithms for Boolean manipulations using ROBDDs.
For example, Boolean operations such as AND, OR, XOR, etc., being applied to functions
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f1 and f2 can be calculated in polynomial time in the sizes of ROBDDs representing f1
and f2, i.e., O(|f1| · |f2|). Such ROBDD operations are implemented in the well-known
package CUDD [Som].
A combinational circuit of Boolean functions can be translated into ROBDD repre-
sentations by traversing the transpose graph of the gate netlist using depth-first search
algorithm. In the algorithm shown in Figure 2.2, when a gate is marked as “visited”, the
corresponding ROBDD of the Boolean function that is associated with this gate is calcu-
lated by applying ROBDD operations on the ROBDDs of the intermediate successor.
The OBDD and ROBDD for the combinational circuit in Figure 2.4 is shown in Fig-
ure 2.5. In the figure, the edge from a node v to its low(v) is denoted by a dotted line.
x1
x2
x3
0 1 0 1
f  = x1 x2 x1 x3
f = x2
f = x3
(a) OBDD
x1
x2
x3
0 1
f  = x1 x2 x1 x3
f = x2
f = x3
(b) ROBDD
Figure 2.5: Example of the OBDD and the ROBDD for the circuit in Figure 2.4
2.2.4 Conjunctive Normal Forms
Definition 2.11. (Conjunctive Normal Forms) Conjunctive Normal Forms (CNFs) rep-
resent Boolean functions as conjunctions of clauses, each clause is a disjunction of liter-
als, and each literal is a Boolean variable or its negation. 2
A CNF of Boolean functions that are represented as a combinational circuit is a con-
junction of all CNFs representing nodes of the circuit. Table 2.1 shows in the last column
the CNF representing the corresponding gate. The CNF representing a combinational cir-
cuit can be constructed by conjoining CNFs of all gates in the circuit. For the circuit in
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Figure 2.4, the corresponding CNF is:
CNFo(x1, x2, x3, g0, g1, g2, g3, o) =(x1 ∨ g0) ∧ (x1 ∨ g0)
(g1 ∨ g0) ∧ (g1 ∨ x2) ∧ (g1 ∨ g0 ∨ x2)
(g2 ∨ x1) ∧ (g2 ∨ x3) ∧ (g2 ∨ x1 ∨ x3)
(g3 ∨ g1) ∧ (g3 ∨ g2) ∧ (g3 ∨ g1 ∨ g2)
(o ∨ g3) ∧ (o ∨ g3)
(2.2)
The most important algorithm which operates on CNFs is the satisfiability algorithm.
Given a CNF F , a SAT-solver finds a value assignment A to the variables of the CNF for
which F evaluates to 1.
Most SAT-solvers are developed from the basic DPLL algorithm [DLL62]. Recent
advances in SAT-solvers such as VSIDS decision heuristic, lazy two-literal watching
scheme [MMZ+01], conflict-driven learning [MSS99] have enabled SAT-solvers to han-
dle significant larger CNFs.
SAT-solvers can be modified to identify all satisfying assignments (all minterms) to
the variables of F as proposed in [McM02]. The modified SAT-solvers, which are called
ALLSAT-solvers continue to search for new solutions instead of terminating whenever
a satisfying assignment is found. The assignments that have been found are ruled out
by so-called Blocking Clauses. The blocking clause, which is in conflict with the sat-
isfying assignment, is identified by analyzing the implication graph and added to the
SAT-instance.
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Model Checking
This chapter introduces the concepts of model checking and reviews some recent results
on model checking techniques. The first section defines the models which are used to de-
scribe the sequential behavior of a design and the model checking problem. In the second
section, basic symbolic model checking based on BDDs is briefly described. The third
section will review some related works that propose improved algorithms for symbolic
model checking. Bounded model checking methods are presented in the last section.
3.1 Models and Properties of Sequential Systems
3.1.1 Models of Sequential Systems
Finite State Machines
In Section 2.2.2, it has been shown that Boolean functions can be represented by combi-
national circuits whose primary outputs correspond to Boolean functions. In other words,
the Boolean functions can be considered as the mathematical model of the combinational
circuits.
A sequential system, whose values of outputs depend not only on the present values
of inputs but also on the past values of inputs, is often modeled as a finite state machine
(FSM).
Definition 3.1. (Finite State Machine) A Finite State Machine (FSM) of Mealy-type is a
6-tuple (I, S, S0, δ, O, λ), where:
• I is the input alphabet, i.e., a finite, non-empty set of input values,
• S is the (finite, non-empty) set of states,
• S0 ⊆ S is the set of initial states,
• δ : S × I 7→ S is the next-state function,
• O is the output alphabet,
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• λ : S × I 7→ O is the output function. 2
For a Moore-type FSM, the output function λ : S 7→ O does not depend on the present
inputs.
In order to implement and represent an FSM in two-valued Boolean algebra, its input
alphabet, output alphabet, and set of states S are encoded by a vector of primary inputs
(PIs) X = 〈x1, x2, . . . , xn〉, a vector of primary outputs (POs) Y = 〈y1, y2, . . . , ym〉, and
a vector of Boolean state variables V = 〈v1, v2, . . . , vp〉, respectively. This results in an
encoded FSM being defined as follows:
Definition 3.2. (Encoded Finite State Machine) A Boolean encoded finite state machine
is a 6-tuple (I, S, S0, ∆, O, Λ), where
• I ⊆ Bn is the input alphabet,
• S ⊆ Bp is the state set,
• the next-state function ∆ = 〈δ1, δ2, . . . , δp〉 is a vector of Boolean functions, where
δj ∈ ∆ is the next-state function for the next state variable v′j , i.e., v′j = δj(V,X),
• O ⊆ Bm is the output alphabet,
• the output function Λ = 〈λ1, λ2, . . . , λm〉 is a vector of Boolean functions, where
λj ∈ Λ is the output function for the primary output yj , i.e., yj = λj(V,X). 2
In an encoded FSM, a state s ∈ S (an input letter i ∈ I , an output letter o ∈ O) is
given a unique encoding. We can use the same notation s (i, o) for the state (the input
letter, the output letter) and its encoding value. The value of a state variable vj ∈ V at
a state s ∈ S is denoted by s(vj). For a sub-vector U = 〈vj, vj+1, . . . , vk〉 of V and a
state s ∈ S, we use the notation s(U) to denote the projection of s on the state variables
v ∈ U . Furthermore, with ∆U = (δj . . . , δk) we denote the Boolean functional vector
of next-state functions for state variables in U . Similarly, the value of a primary input
xj ∈ X (a primary output yj ∈ Y ) in an input (output) letter i ∈ I (o ∈ O) is denoted by
i(xj) (o(yj)).
The FSM can be implemented as a sequential circuit which contains a set of memory
elements (latches) and a combinational circuit. The latches are used to remember the val-
ues of state variables and to connect next-state variables v′j ∈ V ′ with the corresponding
state variables vj ∈ V . The combinational circuit represents the vector of next-state func-
tions and the vector of output functions. The input vector of the combinational circuit is
X ∪ V , where v ∈ V is called a pseudo input (PSI). The output vector is Y ∪ V ′, where
v′ ∈ V ′ is called a pseudo output (PSO). Figure 3.1 shows a Mealy-type FSM being
implemented as a sequential circuit.
An FSM without outputs can be viewed as a finite state transition structure (FST):
(I, S, S0, ∆). With an FST we focus on modeling how the underlying sequential system
changes its states in response to input symbols. Such state transitions of an FST are
represented by the transition relation T being defined as follows:
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x1
Latch rp
xn
v1
vp
y1= (V,X)
ym= m(V,X)
v'1= 1(V,X)
v'p= p(V,X)
Latch r1
(V,X)
(V,X)
Figure 3.1: Sequential circuit implementing a Mealy FSM
Definition 3.3. (Transition Relation) The transition relation of an FST (I, S, S0, ∆) is a
triple T ⊆ S × I × S such that T = {(s, i, s′)|s′ = ∆(s, i)}. 2
Note that in case the inputs are not of interest the transition relation can be quantified
with respect to the inputs. This leads to a simplified transition relation as follows:
T = {(s, s′)|∃i ∈ I : s′ = ∆(s, i)}
In the sequel, if T is denoted as the function in terms of a pair of states this means the
simplified transition relation.
Definition 3.4. (State Transition Graph) An FST can be viewed as a labeled directed
state transition graph (STG) (S,E, L), where
• the set of states S of the FST is the set of vertices,
• E = {(s, s′)|∃i ∈ I : s′ = ∆(s, i)} is the set of edges,
• L(s,s′) = {i ∈ I|s
′ = ∆(s, i)} is the label of the edge (s, s′) ∈ E. 2
A behavior of the sequential system can be expressed as a path (or a run) of the FSM,
which is defined as:
Definition 3.5. (Path of FSM) Let (S,E, L) be the STG of an FSM, a path (or a run) of
the underlying FSM is an infinite sequence of states, pi = (s1, s2, . . .) such that for j ≥ 1,
(sj, sj+1) ∈ E. If the starting state s1 ∈ S0 we say that the path is initialized. 2
We denote the j-th state sj in the path pi by pi(j) and by pij = (sj, sj+1, . . .) the suffix
of pi starting from state sj .
Definition 3.6. (Diameter of FSM) Consider an FSM M , the diameter rd(M) is the
length of the longest shortest path from an initial state to any reachable states in the STG
of M . 2
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Kripke Structures
Definition 3.7. (Kripke Structure) Given a set of atomic Boolean propositions AP , a
Kripke structure is defined as a 4-tuple M = (S, S0, T, L), where
• S is the set of states,
• S0 ⊆ S is the set of initial states,
• T ⊆ S × S is the transition relation between states,
• L : S 7→ 2AP is the function that labels each state with a set of atomic
propositions. 2
A Kripke structure can be derived from an FSM by taking a Cartesian product of S,
I , and O as the set of states in the Kripke structure. In case the inputs and the outputs are
not of interest the transition relation can be identical to the transition relation of the FSM.
We also use pi = (s1, s1, . . .) to denote a path of the Kripke structure, where for j ≥ 1
it is (sj, sj+1) ∈ T .
3.1.2 Property Languages
While sequential systems are described by Kripke structures the intended properties to be
proven are usually formulated in temporal logic. There are two main types of temporal
logic: Computation Tree Logic (CTL) and Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) that are both
sub-logics of a more expressive computation tree logic CTL*.
For a Kripke structure M and an initial state, a computation tree is constructed by
unwinding the structure into an infinite tree with the initial state as the root. The compu-
tation tree represents all possible initialized paths of the Kripke structure from the given
initial state.
Formulas in CTL* describe properties of the computation tree. CTL* formulas con-
sist of Boolean variables, Boolean operators and additional path quantifiers and temporal
operators. The path quantifiers A (“for all computation paths”) or E (“for some computa-
tion path”) are used to specify that a property is considered in all paths or in some paths
of the tree. The temporal operators are used to select the states along a path of the tree at
which a property is considered. Given a path, the basic temporal operators are:
• X specifying that a property is considered at the second state of the path,
• F specifying that a property is considered at some states of the path,
• G specifying that a property is considered at all states of the path,
• U specifying that a property is considered at all states from the beginning of the
path to the state at which another property is true,
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• R specifying that a property is considered at all states from the beginning of the
path to the state at which another property is false.
In practice, CTL or LTL are often used. In the sequel, the two languages will be briefly
described.
Computation Tree Logic
Definition 3.8. (Syntax of CTL) Let AP be a set of atomic propositions. State or path
formulas in CTL are constructed by applying the following syntax rules recursively.
1. Each atomic proposition φ ∈ AP is a CTL state formula.
2. If φ, ψ are state formulas, then φ ∨ ψ, φ ∧ ψ, φ are also state formulas.
3. If φ, ψ are state formulas, then X φ, F φ, G φ, φU ψ, φR ψ are path formulas.
4. If φ is a path formula, then A φ, E φ are state formulas. 2
Properties of a Kripke model are state formulas in CTL. They are always interpreted
with the Kripke structure M . The notation M, s |= φ means that a state formula φ holds
(or is true) in state s in the Kripke structure M . From the syntax definition of CTL, there
are ten basics operators occurring in CTL state formulas which are AX , EX , AF , EF ,
AG , EG , AU , EU , AR , ER . Each of the ten operators can be expressed in terms of three
operators EX , EG , E U . Therefore, we define the semantics of these basic operators as
follows:
Definition 3.9. (Semantics of CTL)
• M, s |= φ iff φ ∈ L(s)
• M, s |= φ iff M, s 6|= φ
• M, s |= φ ∨ ψ iff M, s |= φ or M, s |= ψ
• M, s |= φ ∧ ψ iff M, s |= φ and M, s |= ψ
• M, s |= EX φ iff there exists a path pi = (s0, s1, . . .) such that M, s1 |= φ
• M, s |= EG φ iff there exists a path pi = (s0, s1, . . .) such that for all j ≥ 0,
M, sj |= φ
• M, s |= E φU ψ iff there exists a path pi = (s0, s1, . . .) and j ≥ 0 such that for all
0 ≤ k < j, M, sk |= φ and M, sj |= ψ 2
The remaining CTL operators are determined as follows:
• AX φ = EX φ
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• EF φ = E [True U φ]
• AG φ = EF φ
• AF φ = EG φ
• A [φU ψ] = E [φ U (φ ∧ ψ)] ∧ E G ψ
• A [φRψ] = E [φU ψ]
• E [φRψ] = A [φU ψ]
Linear Temporal Logic
LTL only has one path quantifier, A . Hence, the path quantifier is omitted from formulas.
The syntax of LTL is very similar to the syntax of CTL, where atomic propositions φ, ψ ∈
AP are LTL formulas, φ ∨ ψ, φ ∧ ψ, φ are LTL formulas, X φ, G φ, F φ, φU ψ are LTL
formulas.
Since LTL does not express the branching time behaviors of the system the semantics
of LTL is defined along paths of the Kripke structure. The notation M,pi |= φ meaning
that φ holds on pi = (s0, s1, . . .) is defined as follows:
Definition 3.10. (Semantics of LTL)
• M,pi |= φ iff φ ∈ L(s0)
• M,pi |= φ iff M,pi 6|= φ
• M,pi |= φ ∨ ψ iff M,pi |= φ or M,pi |= ψ
• M,pi |= φ ∧ ψ iff M,pi |= φ and M,pi |= ψ
• M,pi |= X φ iff M,pi1 |= φ
• M,pi |= G φ iff for all j ≥ 0, M,pij |= φ
• M,pi |= F φ iff there exists j ≥ 0 such that M,pij |= φ
• M,pi |= φU ψ iff there exists j ≥ 0 such that for all 0 ≤ k < j, M,pik |= φ and
M,pij |= ψ 2
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3.2 Symbolic Model Checking
3.2.1 Introduction of Model Checking
Definition 3.11. (Model Checking) Given a Kripke structure M = (S, S0, T, L) and a
CTL formula φ, the model checking problem is the problem of finding a set of states in
which the property φ holds (Sφ = {s|M, s |= φ}) and checking if this set includes all
initial states, i.e., S0 ⊆ Sφ. 2
The set Sφ can be referred to as the set of states satisfying the formulas φ. In the
sequel, if it is clear from the context, we use the property formula to denote the set of
property states. The set of states φ can be calculated recursively as follows:
• if φ is an atomic proposition φ = {s|φ ∈ L(s)}.
• EX φ = Pre(T, φ) = {s′|∃s ∈ φ : (s′, s) ∈ T}
• EF φ = µZ.(φ ∨ EX Z)
• EG φ = νZ.(φ ∧ EX Z)
• E [φU ψ] = µZ.(ψ ∨ (φ ∧ EX Z))
where µ and ν are least and greatest fixed-point operators, respectively. Figure 3.2 shows
the procedure to calculate EF φ as the least fixed-point computation. For the other opera-
tors, readers are referred to [CGP99].
1: EvalEF (M,φ) {
2: Z ← φ;
3: Z ′ ← Z ∪ Pre(T, Z);
4: while Z ′ 6= Z {
5: Z ← Z ′;
6: Z ′ ← Z ∪ Pre(T, Z);
7: }
8: return Z;
9: }
Figure 3.2: Backward reachability analysis to evaluate EF φ
The fixed-point algorithm in Figure 3.2 can be considered as the BFS algorithm which
operates on the STG of the Kripke model. The algorithm starts with the set of states sat-
isfying the formula Z = φ and iteratively visits predecessor states of Z by the preimage
computation Pre(T, Z). Therefore, the algorithms evaluating CTL formulas can be con-
sidered as a backward reachability analysis on the STG of the Kripke model.
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As a special case, a safety property AG φ, where φ is an atomic formula, can be
checked using forward reachability analysis instead of backward reachability analysis.
The algorithm shown in Figure 3.3 checks the formula AG φ by traversing the STG of
the Kripke model M from the initial states. The algorithm starts with the set of initial
states Z = S0 and the set of “bad” states bad, in which φ fails, i.e., φ holds. Then, it
iteratively visits successor states of Z by the img computation Img(T, Z) = {s′|∃s ∈
Z : (s, s′) ∈ T}. At every image computation during the reachability analysis, the set of
reachable states is checked against the set of “bad” states whether there is any bad state
in the current set of reached states.
1: CheckAG (M,φ) {
2: Z ← S0;
3: bad ← φ;
4: Z ′ ← Z ∪ Img(T, Z);
5: if Z ′ ∩ bad 6= ∅ return fails;
6: while Z ′ 6= Z {
7: Z ← Z ′;
8: Z ′ ← Z ∪ Img(T, Z);
9: if Z ′ ∩ bad 6= ∅ return fails;
10: }
11: return holds;
12: }
Figure 3.3: Forward reachability analysis to check AG φ
The core computation steps of both algorithms, shown in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3,
are image and preimage computations which calculate the immediate successors and pre-
decessors of a set of states. Explicit model checking performs directly on the Kripke
structure, i.e., on the explicit STG of the Kripke structure. This is done by considering
all edges connecting the current set of states to the other states as in lines 13 − 20 in the
graph BFS algorithm in Figure 2.1. This is very complex and the major bottleneck in
model checking. An effective way to perform the image computation is crucial in model
checking. In the next subsection, we will discuss symbolic model checking where the
image computations are performed using BDD manipulation.
3.2.2 Symbolic Model Checking
In symbolic model checking [McM93], the set of states as well as the transition rela-
tion are represented by BDDs. As consequence, the image computations are evaluated
implicitly in a more effective way.
As mentioned in Section 3.1.1, the state sets are encoded by a vector of Boolean
variables V . A state s ∈ S is represented as a Boolean assignment A = 〈a1, a2, . . . , ap〉,
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where aj ∈ B is the Boolean value being assigned to variable vj ∈ V . Therefore, a set
of states S ⊆ Bn can be considered as a set of Boolean assignments whose characteristic
function is defined as follows:
Definition 3.12. (Characteristic Function of Set) Let a set of states S ⊆ Bp be encoded
by a p-variable Boolean vector V = 〈v1, v2, . . . , vp〉. The characteristic function of S is
a unique Boolean function χS : Bp 7→ B such that:
χS(s) =
{
1 if s ∈ S
0 otherwise (3.1)
2
Similarly, the transition relation can also be represented by its Boolean characteristic
function. For an FSM with the vector of transition functions ∆ = 〈δ1, δ2, . . . , δp〉, the
transition relation can be calculated by conjoining the transition relations for all state
variables as in the following equation:
χT (V,X, V
′) =
j=p∧
j=1
(v′j ≡ δj(X,V )) (3.2)
In the above equation, Tj = (v′j ≡ δj(X,V )) is called a bit relation and T is a monolithic
transition relation.
In the sequel, the notations of sets and their characteristic functions are used inter-
changeably.
If the transition relation of an FSM is given, it is straightforward to compute the image
or preimage of a state set using the Boolean existential quantifier as follows:
Z ′(V ′) = Img(T, Z) = ∃X ,∃V T (V,X, V
′) ∧ Z(V ) (3.3)
Similarly, the preimage of the set of states Z ′ can be calculated as:
Z(V ) = PreImg(T, Z ′) = ∃X ,∃V ′T (V,X, V
′) ∧ Z ′(V ′) (3.4)
By using Equation 3.3 and Equation 3.4, immediate successor or predecessor states
are visited in one calculation step instead of being visited individually as in explicit model
checking.
3.2.3 State Space Explosion Problem
Model checking has the well-known state space explosion problem. This problem is
caused by the fact that the state space of the system is of exponential size in the size of the
system description. Hence, even relatively small systems can have huge Kripke structures
which cannot be constructed. If the system is represented as a sequential circuit with p
state variables the state space of the corresponding Kripke structure has up to 2p states.
29
Chapter 3. Model Checking
Symbolic model checking does not construct Kripke structures explicitly but repre-
sents them symbolically. Therefore, it can handle larger systems than explicit model
checking. However, for many industrial systems symbolic model checking still faces the
state space explosion problem. Several techniques were proposed to solve this problem.
In the following section, two major methods will be described: decomposition and ab-
straction refinement.
3.3 Improvements of Symbolic Model Checking
There is a large amount of literature on previous work dealing with partitioning, approx-
imation or abstraction in order to overcome the limitations of symbolic model checking
when large designs need to be handled. This section outlines three types of techniques.
3.3.1 Improvement of Image Computation
As the first attempt, researchers try to improve the performance of the image computations
as well as to reduce the size of the BDDs during the computations. It is done by partition-
ing techniques that decompose the characteristic functions of the state set and the tran-
sition relation into partitions which are small enough for symbolic representation. There
are two main partitioning techniques: i) conjunction based techniques [BCL91, GB94,
HKB96] and ii) splitting based techniques [CHJ+90, CM90, CCQ96, CCLQ97, NIJ+97,
QCC96]. In addition, a hybrid technique that uses both partitioning techniques has been
proposed in [MKRS00]. In the following, the underlying formulas of these techniques
will be described shortly. For more details, the readers are referred to [MKRS00].
Conjunction based techniques do not calculate the monolithic transition function as
in Equation 3.2 before quantifying the inputs and the present state variables as in Equa-
tion 3.3. Instead, the partitioned transition relation for groups of state variables are con-
joined step by step followed by early quantification. For a group of state variables Vj , the
conjunction step conjoins the transition relation Tj(W ) for Vj with the transition relation
Tk(U,W ) for the state variables that have been considered before. Before conjunction, all
variables U that appear only in Tk(U,W ) but not in Tj(W ) can be quantified:
∃U(Tk(U,W ) ∧ Tj(W )) = ∃U(Tk(U,W )) ∧ Tj(W ) (3.5)
Splitting based techniques decompose the image computation by means of input and
output splitting. In input splitting, the image computation is decomposed with respect to
an input variable or a present state variable v ∈ V ∪X as by the following equation:
∃X∃V
i=p∧
i=1
Ti(V,X, V
′) ∧ Z(V ) =∃X∃V
i=p∧
i=1
Ti(V,X, V
′)v ∧ Z(V )v∨
∃X∃V
i=p∧
i=1
Ti(V,X, V
′)v ∧ Z(V )v
(3.6)
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On the other hand, output splitting decomposes the image computation with respect
to a next state variable v′j ∈ V ′ as follows:
∃X∃V
k=p∧
k=1
Tk(V,X, V
′) ∧ Z(V ) =v′j ∧ ∃X∃V
k=p∧
k=1
Tk(V,X, V
′)v′j ∧ Z(V )∨
v′j ∧ ∃X∃V
k=p∧
k=1
Tk(V,X, V
′)v′j ∧ Z(V )
(3.7)
Equation 3.7 can be further simplified by using the generalized cofactor of Tk with
respect to δj and Z(V ):
∃X∃V
k=p∧
k=1
Ti(V,X, V
′) ∧ Z(V ) =v′j ∧ ∃X∃V
k=p,k 6=j∧
k=1
((Tk(V,X, V
′) ↓ Z(V )) ↓ δj)∨
v′j ∧ ∃X∃V
k=p,k 6=j∧
k=1
((Tk(V,X, V
′) ↓ Z(V )) ↓ δj))
(3.8)
3.3.2 Approximate FSM Traversal
Even though in practice the above described decomposition is shown to improve the ef-
ficiency of the image computation it may still suffer from the explosion problem for the
size of BDDs. Therefore, researchers proposed approximate computations.
Cho et al. presented an approximative FSM traversal method based on state space
decomposition [CHM+96a]. In this approach, the approximate set of reachable states is
calculated as the conjunction of subsets that can be represented by BDDs. The basic idea
is to partition the original FSM into several sub-FSMs and to perform a symbolic traversal
for each individual sub-FSM.
Definition 3.13. (Sub-FSMs) Given an FSM M = (I, S, S0, ∆, Λ) and a sub-vector
of state variables U = 〈vj . . . , vk〉 ⊆ V , the sub-FSM corresponding to U is M˜ =
(I˜ , S˜, S˜0, ∆˜, Λ˜), where
• I˜ = I ×Bp−k+j−1 is the set of input symbol and is encoded by input variables and
state variables which do not belong to U , i.e., X˜ = X ∪ (V \ U).
• S˜ ⊆ Bk−j+1 is the set of sub-states.
• S˜0 ⊆ S˜ is the set of initial sub-states.
• ∆˜ = 〈δj, . . . , δk〉 is the sub-vector of the next state functions of the original FSM.
• Λ˜ = Λ is the output function. 2
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The sequential circuit of the sub-FSM is obtained from the sequential circuit of the
original FSM by removing the latches corresponding to state variables W = V \ U . Also
the portions of the combinational circuit on which only the next state functions of W
depend are removed. Figure 3.4 illustrates the construction of the sequential circuit of the
sub-FSM for the sub-vector U .
x1
Latch rU
xn
W
U
y1= (V,X)
ym= m(V,X)
W'= W(V,X)
U'= U(V,X)
Latch rW
(a) original FSM
x1
Latch rU
xn
W
U
y1= (V,X)
ym= m(V,X)
U'= U(V,X)
(b) sub-FSM
Figure 3.4: Construction of the sequential digital circuit for the sub-FSM
Definition 3.14. (Dependency of Sub-FSMs) Consider two sub-FSMs M˜k and M˜l cor-
responding to two vectors of state variables Vk and Vl. M˜k depends on M˜l if there is at
least one state variable v ∈ Vl and at least one state variable vj ∈ Vk such that δj ∈ ∆k
depends on v. In other words, ∃vj ∈ Vk such that Vl ∩ supp(δj) 6= ∅. 2
Given a partition of the vector of state variables (V1, . . . , Vh), we can traverse the
corresponding sub-FSMs (M˜1, . . . , M˜h) to compute the over-approximate sets of reach-
able states S˜1, . . . , S˜h. Each sub-FSM M˜l, where 1 ≤ l ≤ h, is traversed separately
to compute the set of reachable sub-states. In the traversal algorithm, the pseudo inputs
V \ Vl can be treated as free primary inputs. However, these pseudo inputs can also be
constrained to model the interaction among sub-FSMs. This will lead to a more precise
approximation if the correct constraints are imposed properly to the pseudo inputs. The
authors of [CHM+96a] proposed a number of algorithms to traverse the sub-FSMs and
to model the interaction among them. There are two main algorithms i) Machine By Ma-
chine (MBM) and ii) Frame By Frame (FBF). The latter has two variants called Reached
FBF (RFBF) and To FBF (TFBF).
Machine By Machine Approximate FSM Traversal
The MBM algorithm as shown in Figure 3.5 processes the sub-FSMs serially and itera-
tively. It starts with a coarse approximation of the S˜l, which consist of all states of the
sub-FSM M˜l, for all 1 ≤ l ≤ h. It means that all states are assumed to be reachable. Then,
it tries to refine the approximation by traversing the sub-FSMs iteratively. Before a sub-
FSM M˜l is traversed the pseudo inputs are constrained by the sets S˜k for all 1 ≤ k ≤ h.
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This is done by evaluating the generalized cofactor of the transition relation T˜l with re-
spect to the sets S˜k. Then, the BFS Traversal algorithm is used to calculate the set of
reachable states S˜l for M˜l. The BFS Traversal algorithm is similar to the algorithm in
Figure 3.3 except that it returns the set of reachable states and it does not check reachable
states against bad states. An event traversel is used to drive the traversal algorithm. The
sub-FSM M˜l is traversed again when traversel = true. This happens only if the sets S˜k
of the sub-FSMs M˜k on which M˜l depends are changed. The algorithm finishes when the
S˜l sets do not shrink any more, i.e., traversel = false for all 1 ≤ l ≤ h.
1: MBM Traversal(〈V1, . . . , Vh〉, S0) {
2: for each l ∈ 1 . . . h {
3: S˜l ← 1;
4: S˜l0 ← ∃V \V˜lS0;
5: traversel ←true;
6: }
7: converged ← false;
8: while ( not converged ) {
9: for each l ∈ 1 . . . h {
10: if traversel {
11: old S˜l ← S˜l;
12: T˜l ← T˜l ↓
∧k=h
k=1 S˜k;
13: S˜l ← BFS Traversal(M˜l);
14: traversel ← false;
15: if old S˜l 6= S˜l {
16: for each k ∈ 1 . . . h {
17: if M˜k depends on M˜l
18: traversek ← true;
19: }
20: }
21: }
22: converged ← not
∨k=h
k=1(traversek);
23: }
23: return {S˜l|1 ≤ l ≤ h}
24: }
Figure 3.5: Machine by machine approximate FSM traversal
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Frame By Frame Approximate FSM Traversal
In contrast to the MBM algorithm, which traverses each sub-FSM completely before pro-
cessing the next sub-FSM, the FBF algorithm handles all sub-FSMs in parallel. The
generic FBF algorithm as shown in Figure 3.6 iteratively calculates the immediate succes-
sor states of the set constraintl for sub-FSMs. Before image computation is performed
for the sub-FSM M˜l, the transition relation T˜l is constrained by the sets constraintk for
all 1 ≤ k ≤ h by the generalized cofactor. After image computation is done for all sub-
FSMs, the results tol of image computation are used to update the sets of reachable states
S˜l, the sets constraintl and to check the convergence of the algorithm. Two algorithms
RFBF and TFBF are derived from the generic FBF algorithm by specifying how to update
the sets constraintl and how to perform the convergence check.
1: FBF Traversal(〈V1, . . . , Vh〉, S0) {
2: for each l ∈ 1 . . . h {
3: S˜l0 ← ∃V \V˜lS0;
4: S˜l ← S˜l0;
4: constraintl ← S˜l0;
6: }
7: converged ← false;
7: j ← 0;
8: while ( not converged ) {
9: for each l ∈ 1 . . . h {
12: T˜l ← T˜l ↓
∧k=h
k=1 constraintk;
13: toj+1l ← Img(T˜l, constraintl);
14: S˜l ← S˜l ∪ toj+1l ;
21: }
21: Update Constraints;
21: j ← j + 1;
21: converged ← Convergence Check;
23: }
23: return {S˜l|1 ≤ l ≤ h}
24: }
Figure 3.6: Frame by frame approximate FSM traversal
The algorithm RFBF uses the sets of reachable states S˜l as the sets constraintl. It
converges when the sets of reachable states do not change.
The algorithm TFBF uses the sets tol as the sets constraintl. It converges when
the conjunction of the sets tol is repeated. Formally, the algorithm converges at the jth
iteration if there exists a previous iteration k such that
∧l=h
l=1 to
j
l =
∧l=h
l=1 to
k
l , where to
j
l ,
tokl denote the sets tol at iteration j and k, respectively.
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The FBF algorithms often result in a more precise approximation than the MBM al-
gorithm. However, they need more image computations to converge. In [MKSS99], ex-
tensions were made to improve the convergence of the RFBF algorithm by proposing the
Least fixed-point Machine By Machine (LMBM) algorithm.
Partitioning the Design into Sub-FSMs
Before the approximative FSM algorithms can be used, sub-FSMs of the design need to be
identified. A good partition will improve the accuracy of the algorithms. In [CHM+96b],
Cho et al. proposed methods to automatically determine good partitions of the design.
Another method to partition the design using overlapping projections was presented in
[GDHH98].
3.3.3 Abstraction Refinement
While approximative reachability analysis traverses all sub-FSMs of the system inde-
pendently of properties to be proven, abstraction refinement checks a specific property
against only one abstract model which is, in special cases, one sub-FSM of the system.
This abstraction is also an approximate model of the system and is relevant to proving the
property. In addition, the abstraction will be refined if the approximation does not contain
sufficient information to prove the property.
Abstraction refinement concepts were comprehensively described in [ME99, Kur94].
Here, the conceptual definitions and the framework for abstraction refinement algorithms
will be shortly described.
An abstraction function h for a Kripke model M = (S, S0, T, L) is a surjection h :
S 7→ Sˆ, which maps a concrete state sj ∈ S to an abstract state sˆk = h(sj) ∈ Sˆ. Given
an abstract state sˆk ∈ Sˆ, the set of concrete states corresponding to sˆk is denoted by
h−1(sˆk) = {s ∈ S|h(s) = sˆk}.
Definition 3.15. (Minimal Abstraction) [CCK+02] The minimal abstract model Mˆ =
(Sˆ, Sˆ0, Rˆ, Lˆ) corresponding to a Kripke model M = (S, S0, T, L) and an abstraction
function h which is defined by:
1. Sˆ = {sˆ|∃s ∈ S : h(s) = sˆ}
2. Sˆ0 = {sˆ|∃s ∈ S0 : h(s) = sˆ}
3. Tˆ = {(sˆ1, sˆ2)|∃(s1, s2) ∈ T : h(s1) = sˆ1 ∧ h(s2) = sˆ2}
4. Lˆ(sˆ) =
⋃
h(s)=sˆ L(s) 2
Given an abstraction function h, an atomic formula φ is called to respect h if ∀s ∈
S : h(s) |= φ. The following theorem is fundamental to all abstraction refinement frame-
works.
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Theorem 3.1. (Abstraction Preservation) [ME99] Let Mˆ be an abstract model of M
corresponding to the abstraction function h and φ be a propositional formula that respects
h. Then, Mˆ |= AG φ ⇒ M |= AG φ 2
According to Theorem 3.1, if a property holds in the abstraction of a concrete model,
then the property also holds in the concrete model. However, the converse of the theorem
is not true. If the property fails in the abstract model, it may still hold in the concrete
model. In this case, the counterexample for the property in the abstract model is a spurious
counterexample, i.e., a false negative because it does not correspond to a path in the
concrete model. The abstraction function is not sufficient to prove the property and needs
to be refined.
Definition 3.16. (Refinement) [ME99] An abstraction function h′ is a refinement for the
abstraction function h and M if:
1. ∀s1, s2 ∈ S : h′(s1) = h′(s2) ⇒ h(s1) = h(s2)
2. ∃s1, s2 ∈ S : h(s1) = h(s2) ∧ h′(s1) 6= h′(s2) 2
design
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Figure 3.7: Abstraction refinement verification methodology flow
The basic verification methodology flow of abstraction refinement methods is pre-
sented in Figure 3.7. In the flow, first the initial abstract model is generated. Then the
property is checked against the abstract model. If the property fails in the abstract model,
the abstract counterexample is validated against the concrete model to check if it is a real
counterexample or a false negative. If the counterexample is spurious, the abstract model
is refined. The two steps of model checking and refinement are repeated until the prop-
erty is proven to hold or a real counterexample is found. In the following, techniques for
abstraction and refinement will be described.
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Abstraction
Generally, creating a minimal abstraction for a concrete model M and an abstraction func-
tion h is often too expensive or even impossible [ME99]. There are two main techniques
to derive an approximative abstract model, i.e.:
1. localization reduction,
2. predicate abstraction.
If the model is given as an encoded FSM, a minimal abstract model can be approximated
by the localization reduction method [ME99,Kur94]. In localization reduction, the vector
of state variables is partitioned into sets of visible(V) and invisible (I) state variables. The
abstract model Mˆ is the sub-FSM corresponding to the vector of visible state variables V .
Given the vector of visible state variables V = 〈v1, . . . , vk〉 ⊆ V , the abstraction function
being defined in localization reduction is h(s) = s(V).
In predicate abstraction [GS97, TR01, ECW03, JKSC08], the abstraction function is
defined by a set of predicates. These predicates are the Boolean propositions that label the
concrete and abstract states. Given a set of predicates AP = {P1, . . . , Pq}, the abstract
state space Sˆ is encoded by a vector of abstract state variables Vˆ = {vˆ1, . . . , vˆq}, where
each abstract state variable vˆj corresponds to a predicate Pj . Given a concrete state s,
the valuation of the set of predicates is a Boolean vector A = 〈P1(s), . . . , Pq(s)〉, where
Pj(s) = 1 iff s |= Pj . This vector A encodes the abstract state sˆ to which the concrete
state s is mapped by abstraction function h. More formally, the abstraction function
corresponding to a given set of predicates AP is:
h(s) = {sˆ ∈ Bq|
j=q∧
j=1
sˆ(vˆj) ≡ Pj(s)} (3.9)
From Equation 3.9, the abstract transition relation of the abstract model Mˆ is defined
as follows:
Tˆ = {(sˆ1, sˆ2)|∃s1, s2 ∈ S :
j=q∧
j=1
sˆ1(vˆj) ≡ Pj(s1) ∧ T (s1, s2) ∧
j=q∧
j=1
sˆ2(vˆ
′
j) ≡ Pj(s2)}
In [ECW03,JKSC08], the abstract transition relation is approximated by enumerating
all possible pairs (sˆ1, sˆ2) by identifying all satisfying assignments of the SAT-instance in
the following Equation 3.10, and then projecting the satisfying assignments to the abstract
current and next state variables Vˆ , Vˆ ′.
j=q∧
j=1
sˆ1(vˆj) ≡ Pj(s1) ∧ T (s1, s2) ∧
j=q∧
j=1
sˆ2(vˆ
′
j) ≡ Pj(s2) (3.10)
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Here, T (s1, s2) is the SAT-instance representing the concrete transition relation. In
order to reduce the complexity of the expensive ALLSAT procedure, the set of predicates
is partitioned into clusters, i.e., small sets of predicates [JKSC08]. The abstract models
are, then, calculated for all clusters, which are then conjoined to construct monolithic
abstract transition function. This will lead to a coarser abstraction.
Refinement
In the refinement step, the counterexample-guided refinement approach [CGJ+00] is used.
The abstract counterexample is checked if it has a corresponding concrete counterexam-
ple. If it does not have one, it is analyzed to refine the abstraction. Here, it will be briefly
described how to analyze an abstract counterexample which is a path of abstract states
pˆi = (sˆ1, . . . , sˆk). The reader is referred to [CGJ+00] for a more detailed framework to
analyze abstract counterexamples which include loops.
For an abstract path pˆi, the set of corresponding concrete paths denoted by h−1(pˆi) is
defined by the following equation:
h−1(pˆi) = {(s1, . . . , sk)|
j=k∧
j=1
h(sj) = sˆj ∧ S0(s1) ∧
j=k−1∧
j=1
T (sj, sj+1)} (3.11)
The set of concrete paths can be considered as a sequence of sets Sj consisting of
concrete states corresponding to the abstract state sˆj . Sj is calculated by the image com-
putation as follows:
Sj = Img(T, Sj−1) ∩ h
−1(sˆj) (3.12)
sj-1 sj sj+1
h-1 sj-1
h-1 sj
h-1 sj+1
Sj-1
B Sj,B
D Sj,B
Figure 3.8: Sets of dead-end and bad states corresponding to spurious abstract transition
(sˆj, sˆj+1)
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If h−1(pˆi) is empty, the abstract counterexample is spurious and there exists a minimal
j (1 ≤ j ≤ k) such that Sj+1 = ∅. The set of concrete states h−1(sˆj) consists of two
different sets of i) dead-end states and ii) bad states. Figure 3.8 illustrates the concept of
dead-end states and bad-states.
• The states in the set Sj are dead-end states because there isn’t any concrete transi-
tion from a state in Sj to a state in h−1(sˆj+1).
• Since the transition (sˆj, sˆj+1) exists, there must be a concrete transition from a state
in h−1(sˆj) to a state in h−1(sˆj+1) even though there is no transition from Sj to
h−1(sˆj+1). The states in h−1(sˆj) whose next states are in h−1(sˆj+1) are called bad
states. The set of bad-states Si,B can be calculated by the preimage computation as:
Si,B = PreImg(T, h
−1(sˆj+1)) ∩ h
−1(sˆj)
The set Si,B is considered as the reason of the spurious counterexample. Therefore,
refining the abstract model to eliminate the counterexample becomes separating the bad-
states from the dead-end states. This is done by making some invisible variables visible in
case of localization reduction or by adding some predicates in case of predicate abstrac-
tion.
Because the minimum separation problem is known to be NP-hard [CGJ+01], many
heuristic approaches based on SAT or BDD have been proposed to find a small set of
invisible state variables [CCK+02, CGKS02, WLJ+06]. For predicate abstraction, the
authors of [JKSC08] proposed to calculate weakest preconditions and then to use them as
predicates to be added.
3.4 Bounded Model Checking
Bounded Model Checking (BMC) based on SAT-solvers was proposed by Biere [BCCZ99]
and has been used as a complementary technique to SMC. While SMC handles the com-
plete STG of the system, BMC only works on a bounded iterative model of the system.
Consequently, BMC aims at searching for bugs in the runs of the system, where the length
of these runs is bounded by some integer k. In other words, BMC handles only a portion
of the STG consisting of the states that are at distance k from the initial states. This
portion of the STG is modeled by the time frame expansion of the considered FSM.
Definition 3.17. (Time Frame Expansion Model) Given an FSM M and k ≥ 0, the k
time frame expansion of M is a Boolean function:
[[M ]]k =
j=k−1∧
j=0
T (sj, ij, sj+1) (3.13)
where sj, sj+1 ∈ S are states and ij ∈ I is input letter of the FSM M . 2
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Consider an encoded FSM being implemented as a sequential circuit, the time frame
expansion of the encoded FSM is represented as an iterative circuit model, which is con-
structed from the sequential circuit by making k copies of the combinational circuit repre-
senting the transition function and the output function. Each copy represents the behavior
of the original circuit at a specific time. The output values of the original circuit at time
frame j are produced in the iterative circuit at the outputs Y j and are computed based
on state variables V j and inputs Xj . The combinational circuit representing transition
functions are concatenated such that the next-state variables V ′j of the j-th copy are the
present-state variables V j+1 of the (j + 1)-th copy. Figure 3.9 illustrates the iterative
circuit model expanded for the k time frames. For the iterative circuit model shown in
Figure 3.9, Equation 3.13 becomes:
[[M ]]k =
j=k−1∧
j=0
T (V j, Xj, V j+1) (3.14)
Here, V j, Xj, V j+1 denote the copies of the state variables, the inputs at time frame j,
and the state variables at time frame j + 1.
T(V 0,X 0,V 1)
V 0
X
0
T(V 1,X 1,V 2)
V 1
X
1
Y
1
T(V k-1,X k-1,V k)
V k-1
X
k-1
Y
k-1
V 2
Y
0
V k
Figure 3.9: Iterative circuit of an encoded FSM
[[M ]]k is a Boolean function of variables Xj, V j for all 0 ≤ j < k and can be consid-
ered as a characteristic function of the set of paths pi = (s0, s1, . . . , sk), whose length is
k +1. In order to represent the set of initialized paths the constraint of the initial states S0
is added to the time frame expansion model, which results in:
[[M ]]0k = S0(V
0) ∧
j=k−1∧
j=0
T (V j, Xj, V j+1) (3.15)
In order to prove a property φ being specified in LTL, the inverted property ψ = φ is
translated into a Boolean proposition [[ψ]]k that constrains the set of paths pi to fulfill ψ, i.e.,
to violate φ. The translation is described in detail in [BCCZ99] and can be summarized
by the following definitions.
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Definition 3.18. ((k, l)-loop Path) For k ≥ l ≥ 0, a path pi = (s0, . . . , sl, . . . , sk) is a
(k, l)-loop path if there is a state transition from sk to sl. In other words, pi is a (k, l)-loop
if T (V k, Xk, V l) = 1. Therefore, the set of (k, l)-loop paths is constrained by:
lLk = T (V
k, Xk, V l)
2
Definition 3.19. (Paths with Loop) For k ≥ 0, a path pi consists of at least a loop if there
exists 0 ≤ l ≤ k such that pi is (k, l)-loop. pi is called a k-loop path. The set of k-loop
paths is constrained by:
Lk =
l=k∨
l=0
lLk
2
Definition 3.20. (Successor in a Loop) For k ≥ l, i ≥ 0, the successor succ(i) of i in a
(k, l)-loop path pi is:
succ(i) =
{
i + 1 if i < k
l if i = k
2
Definition 3.21. (Translation of an LTL Formula for a Loop) Given an LTL formula
ψ, the set of paths with loop satisfying ψ is constrained by a Boolean proposition being
defined recursively as follows:
• if ψ is an atomic proposition, l[[ψ]]ik = ψ(V i)
• if ψ is an atomic proposition, l[[ψ]]ik = ψ(V i)
• l[[ψ ∧ φ]]
i
k =l [[ψ]]
i
k ∧l [[φ]]
i
k
• l[[ψ ∨ φ]]
i
k =l [[ψ]]
i
k ∨l [[φ]]
i
k
• l[[X ψ]]ik =l [[ψ]]
succ(i)
k
• l[[G ψ]]ik =l [[ψ]]ik ∧l [[G ψ]]
succ(i)
k
• l[[F ψ]]ik =l [[ψ]]ik ∨l [[F ψ]]
succ(i)
k 2
Definition 3.22. (Translation of an LTL Formula Without a Loop) Given an LTL for-
mula ψ, the set of paths without a loop satisfying ψ is constrained by a Boolean proposi-
tion being defined recursively as follows:
• Inductive Case: ∀i ≤ k
– if ψ is an atomic proposition, [[ψ]]ik = ψ(V i)
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– if ψ is an atomic proposition, [[ψ]]ik = ψ(V i)
– [[ψ ∧ φ]]ik = [[ψ]]
i
k ∧ [[φ]]
i
k
– [[ψ ∨ φ]]ik = [[ψ]]
i
k ∨ [[φ]]
i
k
– [[X ψ]]ik = [[ψ]]i+1k
– [[G ψ]]ik = [[ψ]]ik ∧ [[G ψ]]i+1k
– [[F ψ]]ik = [[ψ]]ik ∨ [[F ψ]]i+1k
• Base Case: [[ψ]]k+1k = 0 2
Definition 3.23. (Translation of an LTL Formula) Given an LTL formula ψ and a
Kripke structure M , the set of paths satisfying ψ is constrained by:
[[ψ]]k =
((
Lk ∧ [[ψ]]
0
k
)
∨
l=k∨
l=0
(
lLk ∧ l[[ψ]]
0
k
)) (3.16)
2
From Equation 3.15 and Equation 3.16, the characteristic function for the set of ini-
tialized paths that fulfill the property ψ is:
[[M,φ]]k = S0(V
0)∧
j=k−1∧
j=0
T (V j, Xj, V j+1)∧
((
Lk ∧ [[ψ]]
0
k
)
∨
l=k∨
l=0
(
lLk ∧ l[[ψ]]
0
k
)) (3.17)
To check the property φ, the characteristic function [[M,ψ]]k is converted into a SAT-
instance. If this SAT-instance is satisfiable the satisfying assignment corresponds to the
path that fulfills the property ψ. This path is the counterexample violating the property φ
within the bound k. If the SAT-instance is unsatisfiable, we can conclude that there are no
violating k-state paths. Yet, we can not conclude that the property is proven. Normally,
the satisfication of [[M,ψ]]k is repeatedly checked for increasing values of k until either
a counterexample is discovered or k equals to the reachability diameter of the Kripke
structure or the computing resources (memory, runtime) is exceeded.
In practice, calculating the reachability diameter is a very expensive task. Hence, the
reachability diameter is often unknown. Moreover, the reachability diameter is often large
such that BMC often terminates because of running out of resources. Therefore, BMC is
practically considered as an incomplete method: it is able to disprove a property but is not
able to prove the property.
Induction based BMC [SSS00] can be used to prove a safety property G φ. To prove
the property by inductive proof with depth n, the SAT-solver is used to check the satisfi-
cation of two Equations [[M,φ]]base and [[M,φ]]induc.
[[M,φ]]base = S0(V ) ∧
j=n−1∧
j=0
T (V j, Xj, V j+1) ∧
∧
0≤i<j≤n
(V i 6= V j) ∧
j=n∨
j=0
φ(V j) (3.18)
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[[M,φ]]induc =
j=n∧
j=0
φ(V j)∧
j=n∧
j=0
T (V j, Xj, V j+1)∧
∧
0≤i<j≤n
(V i 6= V j)∧ φ(V n+1) (3.19)
In order to improve the performance of BMC, one can use an approximate set of
reachable states to prune the search space of the SAT-instance as proposed in [GGW+03,
CNQ04]. The approximate set of reachable states are computed by the reachability anal-
ysis algorithms in Section 3.3.2. This set is then translated into CNF which is added to
the SAT-instance. This can result in faster run time of the SAT-solver as in [CNQ04] or in
smaller depth n of the inductive proof as in [GGW+03].
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Interval Property Checking
In this chapter, the interval property checking methodology for protocol compliance ver-
ification will be presented. In the first section, the common template that is often used
to formulate properties in protocol compliance verification is presented. In the second
section, interval property checking is described. The section will discuss how false neg-
atives which occur when properties are checked using the IPC-based methodology can
be eliminated by reachability invariants. In the present-day IPC-based methodology flow
these invariants can only be identified manually, which requires a lot of efforts.
4.1 Properties in Interval Property Checking
4.1.1 Operational Interval Properties
In Chapter 3, it is assumed that the desired behavior of a system can be described by
formulas in CTL or LTL. However, such a property often leads to a complex problem
for property checkers. Hence, in practice, properties are often formulated in a restricted
format, for example, as a safety property G φ. In this section, a special property format
which is very common in SoC verification will be considered.
In practical SoC verification we want to verify a piece of the design behavior where
certain conditions of the environment occur and the design is at certain internal states.
These input and state conditions are specified in safety properties together with the desired
behavior in the implication format as follows:
φ = G (a → c) (4.1)
These properties specify that the system exhibits the desired behavior described in c
whenever the external input and internal states of the system fulfill the constraints de-
scribed in a. In the following, a and c are called the assumption and the commitment of a
property, respectively.
This work focuses on specifying and verifying the correctness of SoC modules and
their interfaces at the register transfer level (RTL). At the RTL, designers very commonly
45
Chapter 4. Interval Property Checking
adopt an operational view of the system where the desired behavior is described clock tick
by clock tick within a certain time interval. Consequently, the properties needed to verify
this behavior can be specified by an assumption a and a commitment c describing a finite
behavior of the system. This finite behavior can be specified in a restricted version of
LTL. In this restricted version, only a finite number of instances of the temporal operator
X is used. It results in a special style of writing properties that is very common in SoC
verification. In this style, the finite behavior is specified as conjunctions of propositions
for the inputs and the outputs of the design at time j, as follows:
a = as(V ) ∧
j=n−1∧
j=0
X j(aj(X)) (4.2)
c =
j=n−1∧
j=0
X j(cj(X,Y )) ∧ X n(ce(V )) (4.3)
In these formulas,
• n denotes the number of clock cycles that the design needs to perform a specific
operation,
• aj(X) is a Boolean proposition and specifies certain input conditions at time point
j,
• cj(X,Y ) is a Boolean proposition and specifies certain output conditions at time
point j,
• as(V ), ce(V ) are Boolean propositions and specify a starting assumption and an
ending commitment in terms of the state variables of the design,
• X nφ is defined by X nφ = X X n−1φ for n > 0 and X 0φ = φ.
Let us consider the process of setting up properties to describe the finite behaviors
in more detail. Usually, when inspecting the design to set up properties, as a first step,
the designer identifies a set of important control states which serve as an orientation in
the overall verification methodology. For each operation two important control states are
chosen as its starting and its ending state. In the property this is reflected by the starting
assumption as(V ) and the ending commitment ce(V ). The time window between the
starting and the ending state is called inspection interval which has finite length n. For
example, when verifying a processor the decode and the write-back phase of an instruction
could be chosen to define the inspection interval of an operation. During the inspection
interval the correct input/output behavior is described by specifying the input conditions
aj(X) and output conditions cj(X,Y ). The input and output conditions can be given by
an arbitrary relation specifying the functional operation of the system. These conditions
can be derived from the system specification. Besides the starting and ending states, in
practice, a property may also relate to some intermediate states. This may sometimes
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be required to further constrain the behavior. On the other hand, since such additional
state information can be tedious to derive the verification engineer will prefer to limit the
state specifications of an operational property to the important control states whenever
possible.
property operation property is
assume:
at t: as(V );
at t: a0(X);
at t+1: a1(X);
(...);
at t+n-1: an−1(X);
prove:
at t: c0(X,Y );
at t+1: c1(X,Y );
(...);
at t+n-1: cn−1(X,Y );
at t+n: ce(V );
end property;
Figure 4.1: ITL operational property (= ‘interval property’)
Since this style of writing properties leads to an intuitive methodology and is quite
popular among industrial designers commercial property checkers support this by propri-
etary languages. In the proprietary interval language (ITL) [BJW04, WSFT04] the above
property looks as shown in Figure 4.1. ITL, in practice, allows to express more complex
Boolean conditions aj, cj . For example, it allows us to include internal gates of the circuit
into the property specification. It also allows to use the temporary variables which store
the values of gates at different time points in the Boolean propositions aj, cj . However,
by tracing the predecessors of these gates it is always possible to generate an equivalent
property in the above scheme. In addition, as long as the maximum duration of an oper-
ation is bounded it is also possible to express behaviors of variable length by disjunction
of commitments for different time points. ITL supports such specifications by providing
additional syntactic features such as a temporal operator within[ta, tb]. In this thesis, for
sake of simplicity, only the property template mentioned above is considered. However,
it does not limit the proposed method in being applied to other properties in ITL.
The important control states provide an intuitive way of setting up a property suite by
linking the individual properties by their starting and ending states. In most cases, the
important control states of a design are specified by only constraining a few state bits of
the global state vector. For example, when verifying the instructions of a processor only
the state variables related to important control information such as opcode or certain status
bits need to be specified. Nothing is said about the other state bits such as the pipeline
buffers. The important control states of a design are typically related to a small set of
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case CurrentState is
when idle ⇒
if (d en = 1) then
NextState ⇐ wait; StartCnt ⇐ 1;
else NextState ⇐ idle;
end if;
when wait ⇒
if (cnt = n) then
NextState ⇐ ready; end ⇐ 1;
else NextState ⇐ wait;
end if;
when ready ⇒
NextState ⇐ idle;
(...);
end case;
(a) main-code
idle
wait
ready
d_en=1
StartCnt=1
cnt n
end=0
cnt=n
end=1
(b) main-STG
Figure 4.2: Example of the RTL code and the STG of a main-FSM
state variables. As the verification engineer moves along the important control states of a
design he traverses an abstract machine whose states are given by the important control
states and whose transitions correspond to the operations that are verified. This abstract
machine in the following will be called main-FSM and plays a key role in the proposed
approximative reachability analysis.
Fortunately, complex control structures often expose hierarchical structures and a
main-FSM can be identified easily. For reasons to be explained in Section 4.2 such a
main-FSM is mostly used in the context of protocol compliance verification. The fol-
lowing section will present how to exploit this hierarchy and will describe a scheme for
protocol compliance checking where as and ce can be defined based on the states of a
main-FSM in the design.
4.1.2 Interval Properties Based on the Main-FSM
In common design styles for implementing standard protocols the overall behavior of a
design is controlled by a dedicated FSM. This FSM can be used as the main-FSM to
identify the important control states and to formulate properties in the template presented
in the previous section.
Although the main-FSM in protocol implementations is usually quite small it plays a
very important role in the design. As an example, in an RTL description we may find a
piece of code as illustrated in Figure 4.2(a) which implements the main-FSM. The main-
FSM is encoded by a small sub-vector Vˆ = (vp, . . . , vq), with 1 ≤ p < q ≤ m, of the
overall state variable vector V . It can be represented by a state transition graph (STG)
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where the vertices represent the main-states Sˆ and the edges indicate main-transitions Tˆ ,
as shown in Figure 4.2(b). The size of the main-FSM is usually small so that its STG can
be represented explicitly.
When the design performs a specific functionality its main-FSM is supposed to go
through a certain sequence of main-states pisˆ = (sˆ1, . . . , sˆn+1). From this sequence the
verification engineer can derive the following starting assumption and ending commit-
ment for the corresponding property:
as =
∧q
i=p(vˆi ≡ sˆ1(vˆi))
ce =
∧q
i=p(vˆi ≡ sˆn+1(vˆi))
(4.4)
In short notation, we also write:
as = (Vˆ ≡ sˆ1)
ce = (Vˆ ≡ sˆn+1).
(4.5)
We obtain the template in Equation 4.6 for operational properties based on the main-
FSM. In ITL, the property is shown in Figure 4.3.
φ = G
[(
(Vˆ ≡ sˆ1) ∧
j=n−1∧
j=0
X j(aj(X))
)
→
(j=n−1∧
j=0
X j(cj(X,Y )) ∧ X n(Vˆ ≡ sˆn+1)
)]
(4.6)
property operation s1 to sn is
assume:
at t: Vˆ ≡ sˆ1;
at t: a0(X);
at t+1: a1(X);
(...);
at t+n-1: an−1(X);
prove:
at t: c0(X,Y );
at t+1: c1(X,Y );
(...);
at t+n-1: cn−1(X,Y );
at t+n: Vˆ ≡ sˆn+1;
end property;
Figure 4.3: Property template based on main-states in ITL
For illustration of this template consider again the STG depicted in Figure 4.2(b).
In order to check that the timing for a data transfer is met the verification engineer
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may specify that output signal end will be asserted n clock cycles after the data trans-
fer has been enabled (d en = 1) provided that the design has been in the idle state.
During execution of this transfer the main-FSM will traverse the following path in its
STG (idle, wait, . . . , wait, ready). In the idle state, the main-FSM enables an external
counter to count the number of transferred blocks by setting the corresponding enable
signal StartCnt of the counter. The output cnt of the counter will be evaluated in the
wait state of the main-FSM to decide whether or not the transfer is complete. If the trans-
fer is complete the main-FSM will make a transition into state ready. Without looking
at the details of the counter and by only inspecting the code of the main-FSM the above
property template can be used to specify this operation as follows:
f = G
[(
(Vˆ ≡ idle) ∧ (d en ≡ 1)
)
→
(
X n(end ≡ 1) ∧ X n+1(Vˆ ≡ ready)
)]
(4.7)
property exTemplate is
assume:
at t: Vˆ ≡ idle;
at t: d en ≡ 1;
prove:
at t+n: end ≡ 1;
at t+n+1: Vˆ ≡ ready;
end property;
Figure 4.4: Example of property in proposed template
The corresponding ITL template is given in Figure 4.4. Note that the starting and
ending states are main-states and no other state information is specified in the property.
Section 4.2 will elaborate how, in general, as and ce need to be refined in order to check
this kind of property without a complete reachability analysis of the design.
4.2 Interval Property Checking
This section will describe how to verify operational properties that are formulated in ITL.
The approach is based on combining a bounded circuit model with certain invariants.
Similar to BMC, in order to verify the property in Equation 4.6, the inverted property
is translated into a Boolean proposition that represents the set of k-state paths which
violate the property. Let us consider the inverted property ψ of φ being written by using
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the duality of LTL operators and De-Morgan’s laws as follows:
ψ = φ = F
[(
(Vˆ ≡ sˆ1) ∧
j=n−1∧
j=0
X j(aj(X))
)
∧
(j=n−1∨
j=0
X j(cj(X,Y )) ∨ X n(Vˆ 6≡ sˆn+1)
)]
(4.8)
First, we consider the set of paths with length k = n and without a loop fulfilling ψ.
This set of paths is constrained by the proposition that is translated from the LTL formulas
as follows:
Definition 4.1. (Translation of an LTL Formula for IPC) Given an LTL formula ψ
in the format in Equation 4.8, the set of paths satisfying ψ is constrained by a Boolean
proposition being defined recursively as follows:
• if ψ is an atomic proposition, [[ψ]]i = ψ(V i)
• if ψ is an atomic proposition, [[ψ]]i = ψ(V i)
• [[ψ ∧ φ]]i = [[ψ]]i ∧ [[φ]]i
• [[ψ ∨ φ]]i = [[ψ]]i ∨ [[φ]]i
• [[X ψ]]i = [[ψ]]i+1
• [[F ψ]]i = [[ψ]]i 2
When Definition 4.1 is applied to a safety property in ITL, it leads to a much simpler
proposition than the translation of an LTL property in the traditional BMC. The translation
for the property in Equation 4.8 is:
[[ψ]] =(Vˆ ≡ sˆ1) ∧
j=n−1∧
j=0
(aj(X
j)) ∧
(j=n−1∨
j=0
(cj(Xj, Y j)) ∨ (Vˆ
n 6≡ sˆn+1)
)
(4.9)
In the conventional BMC method, the set of paths with length k without a loop ful-
filling ψ at at least one state st (where 0 ≤ t ≤ k) is represented by the following
proposition:
[[M,ψ]]kBMC =S(V
0) ∧
j=k+n−1∧
j=0
T (V j, Xj, V j+1) ∧
t=k∨
t=0
[[ψ]]t (4.10)
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In Equation 4.10, [[ψ]]t constrains the state st of the path pi to satisfy ψ, that is defined
by:
[[ψ]]t =(Vˆ
t ≡ sˆ1) ∧
j=n−1∧
j=0
(aj(X
t+j)) ∧
(j=n−1∨
j=0
(cj(X t+j, Y t+j)) ∨ (Vˆ
t+n 6≡ sˆn+1)
)
(4.11)
The proposition in Equation 4.10 is translated into a SAT instance that is solved by
a SAT-solver to find a path that fulfills ψ, and, hence, violates φ. In the conventional
method, k starts at 0 and increases until a counterexample is found or the diameter of
the design is reached. Normally, huge values of k are required so that the resulting SAT
instances, in most cases, would grow beyond the capacity of the solver. In order to over-
come this problem we consider only a single instance of ψt and replace the constraints for
the initial state by an invariant I. This leads to a simplified proposition as follows:
[[M,ψ]]tIPC = I(V
t) ∧
j=n∧
j=0
T (V t+j, X t+j, V t+j+1) ∧ [[ψ]]t (4.12)
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Figure 4.5: Circuit representing the set of paths with length n fulfilling the property ψ
This proposition consists of only a single translation [[φ]] of the property and of a time
frame expansion model for n cycles. Note that n only results from the length of the
property and does not depend on the diameter of the design. It is also different from k in
BMC. Furthermore, the state vector V t for the starting states of the time frame expansion
are constrained by the invariant I. The proposition is represented as the iterative circuit
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being connected with the circuits that represent the assumption a, the commitment c, and
the invariant I. Figure 4.5 illustrates this circuit.
In Equation 4.12, the invariant I includes the initial states and is closed under the
image computation. It is defined as follows:
Definition 4.2. (Invariant) Given an encoded FSM M = (I, S, S0, ∆, O, Λ), an invariant
I of M is a Boolean proposition that fulfills the following conditions:
• S0 → I = 1
• I = Img(T, I) = ∃X ,∃V T (V,X, V
′) ∧ I(V ) 2
Lemma 4.1. Let I be an invariant. Then, for any t
S0(V
0) ∧
j=t−1∧
j=0
T (V j, Xj, V j+1) → I(V t) = 1
Proof. The lemma can be proven by induction.
• Base case: It is from Definition 4.2, S0 → I = 1
• Inductive case: If it is:
S0(V
0) ∧
j=t−1∧
j=0
T (V j, Xj, V j+1) → I(V t) = 1
Then, according to Lemma 2.2, it is:
S0(V
0)∧
j=t−1∧
j=0
T (V j, Xj, V j+1)∧T (V t, X t, V t+1) → I(V t)∧T (V t, X t, V t+1) = 1
According to Lemma 2.4, it is:
I(V t) ∧ T (V t, X t, V t+1) → ∃X∃V tI(V
t) ∧ T (V t, X t, V t+1) = 1
According to Lemma 2.1 and Definition 4.2, we have:
I(V t) ∧ T (V t, X t, V t+1) → I(V t+1) = 1
Hence, it is:
S0(V
0) ∧
j=t∧
j=0
T (V j, Xj, V j+1) → I(V t+1) = 1
Lemma 4.2. If [[M,ψ]]tIPC = 0, then [[M,ψ]]kBMC = 0 for every k.
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Proof. [[M,ψ]]tIPC = 0 means that, for any t, it is:
I(V t) ∧
n∧
j=0
T (V t+j, X t+j, V t+j+1) ∧ [[ψ]]t = 0
According to Lemma 4.1, and Lemma 2.3 , we can replace I(V t) by
S0(V
0) ∧
j=t−1∧
j=0
T (V j, Xj, V j+1)
to have:
S0(V
0) ∧
j=t−1∧
j=0
T (V j, Xj, V j+1) ∧
n∧
j=0
T (V t+j, X t+j, V t+j+1) ∧ [[ψ]]t = 0
Or it is:
S0(V
0) ∧
j=t+n−1∧
j=0
T (V j, Xj, V j+1) ∧ [[ψ]]t = 0
Let
j=k+n−1∧
j=t+n
T (V j, Xj, V j+1)
be “anded” to the above equation, we finally have:
S0(V
0) ∧
j=k+n−1∧
j=0
T (V j, Xj, V j+1) ∧ [[ψ]]t = 0
Consider all t = 0 . . . k for the above equation, and sum up the results, we have:
[[M,ψ]]kBMC = S(V
0) ∧
j=k+n−1∧
j=0
T (V j, Xj, V j+1) ∧
t=k∨
t=0
[[ψ]]t = 0
Theorem 4.1. If [[M,ψ]]tIPC is unsatisfiable, then M |= φ.
Proof. According to Lemma 4.2, if [[M,ψ]]tIPC is unsatisfiable, [[M,ψ]]kBMC is also un-
satisfiable for any value of k. Hence, we can not find any k such that M |= ψ. It means
that M |= ψ. And, therefore, it is M |= φ.
Theorem 4.1 states that an unbounded proof of the original property in Equation 4.6
can be done by checking the satisfiability of [[M,ψ]]tIPC. This formulates the concept of
Interval Property Checking (IPC).
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As another aspect, IPC can be elaborated as invariant checking [BCL+94]. The set of
“bad” states that violates φ is represented by:
j=n∧
j=0
T (V t+j, X t+j, V t+j+1) ∧ [[ψ]]t
Therefore, checking φ is equivalent to choosing an invariant I and checking that I and
the set of “bad” states are disjoint.
Depending on what invariant I is chosen in Equation 4.12 a false counterexample may
be generated based on some state for V t that is not reachable in the system. Hence, the
quality of the invariant I is crucial for the success of this method.
Fortunately, for most standard cases of SoC module verification the trivial invariant
I = 1 is sufficient. This may be surprising at first glance but becomes intuitive if we re-
alize that the iterative circuit model itself contains a lot of local reachability information
which is sufficient for many interval properties. As a rule of thumb, we may state that veri-
fying modules for computation like hardware accelerators or processor cores usually does
not require sophisticated invariants. This only changes when communication modules are
considered. Here, global dependencies between state information over long time windows
exist and require significant effort to provide an invariant I of sufficient strength. This is
the reason why this proposed approach is developed with a focus on protocol compliance
verification.
Due to the nature of the iterative circuit model, even in the case of communication
modules the required invariants are much weaker than we would expect from other prop-
erty checking formulations. Moreover, they are often intuitive to the designer. Therefore,
in the case of communication modules it is common practice to manually inspect the code
and to define invariants that are appropriate for proving properties of the type described
above.
This is illustrated by means of the example in Figure 4.2. The design uses a counter
to keep track of time. The output cnt of the counter is evaluated whenever the design is
in state wait and a transition from wait to state ready is performed if and only if cnt =
n. However, when the property in Equation 4.7 is constructed, the verification engineer
does not know anything about how the main-states are related to the states in other parts
of the design. Determining this information by manual code inspection is very tedious
and should be avoided whenever possible. Therefore, the verification engineer initially
chooses the invariant I = 1. If the resulting proposition in Equation 4.12 is proven
to be unsatisfiable this implies that the property holds and the verification engineer has
identified a piece of proper behavior. However, the proof of the property in Equation 4.7
fails and a counterexample is generated when Equation 4.12 is set up with the invariant
I = 1. This counterexample, however, turns out to be a false negative. For example, the
property checker may claim that (Vˆ ≡ idle ∧ cnt ≡ 1) leads to (end ≡ 1) after n − 1
cycles rather than n cycles. The obvious reason for this false negative to appear is that
the value of the counter at the beginning of the considered transaction is neither defined
by the property nor defined by the invariant I. Anyhow, inspecting the design reveals
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that the counter will always take the value cnt = 0 at this point in time. Specifying this
in the property would violate our template because the counter is not part of the main-
FSM. Note that the missing constraint is independent of the property and results from
reachability in the overall design. Therefore, this information is taken into account by a
refinement of the invariant I. The new invariant becomes:
I(V t) = ((Vˆ t ≡ idle) → (cntt ≡ 0)) (4.13)
This leads to a strengthened ITL property as in Figure 4.6. The implicative structure
of the invariant required in this example is a typical representative for the invariants usu-
ally required when following the above methodology. Since each property based on the
proposed template assumes a concrete state sˆ for the main-FSM it is usually sufficient to
restrict the values for certain non main-state variables (i.e., sub-FSM state variables) such
that the encoded states are reachable simultaneously with the main-FSM state sˆ. This
results in the invariant of the following form:
I(V t) =
(
(Vˆ ≡ sˆ) → asˆ), (4.14)
where asˆ is a Boolean expression which has to be satisfied by the values of the sub-FSM
variables that occur whenever the main-FSM is in state sˆ.
Taking into account such reachability constraints is very important to avoid false neg-
atives when using IPC based on Equation 4.12. Note that the validity of reachability
constraints obtained from manual analysis must be proven by writing additional proper-
ties.
property strengthenedProperty is
assume:
at t: Vˆ ≡ idle;
at t: d en ≡ 1;
at t: cnt ≡ 0;
prove:
at t+n: end ≡ 1;
at t+n+1: Vˆ ≡ ready;
end property;
Figure 4.6: Example of the property strengthened with reachability constraints.
The IPC-based methodology for verifying protocol implementations in SoCs is sum-
marized in Figure 4.7. The main-FSM is usually determined manually in the RTL code
of the design by identifying a set of important control states, as described before. More-
over, commercial tools such as [Sof09] are available that can be used to automatically
extract a main-FSM from the RTL description and to visualize its state transition graph.
By inspecting the RTL code and by seeking explanations in the specification the verifi-
cation engineer formulates properties that link implementation and specification. Using
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Figure 4.7: IPC-based verification flow
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the templates proposed in the previous section properties are written which specify func-
tional operations of the design corresponding to a sequence of states in the main-FSM.
Inspecting only the main-FSM of a design requires a lot less effort than analyzing the
entire source code. On the other hand, properties based on only the main-FSM are likely
to produce false negatives because reachability constraints linking main-states to other
states in the design are ignored. As explained above, false negatives may occur and it is
industrial practice to derive reachability constraints manually. This increases the verifica-
tion effort drastically because it requires detailed inspection of larger parts of the source
code in addition to that of the main-FSM.
In the next chapter, it will be described how to reduce this effort by the Transition-by-
Transition (TBT) FSM traversal for approximative reachability analysis.
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In this chapter, the proposed reachability analysis algorithms are described. The reach-
ability analysis is tailored to providing IPC with the essential invariant I such that false
negatives can be avoided. As the properties are set-up based on transitions of the main-
FSM, it is natural to explore the main-FSM to identify the invariant I. In this chapter,
we will see how the the existence of the main-FSM can be exploited systematically in
reachability analysis and how to partition both the transition relation and the state space
such that the computational complexity is reduced drastically.
This chapter, in the first section, will first present an exact reachability analysis which
decomposes the state space and the transition relation using the main-FSM. Then, in the
second section, an approximative algorithm will be described. The SAT-based implemen-
tation of the algorithms is represented in the third section. The fourth section will compare
the proposed method with previous work represented in Chapter 3. Finally, experimental
results of the application of the proposed algorithms in the IPC-based verification method-
ology are reported.
5.1 Decomposition of State Space and Transition Rela-
tion
5.1.1 Definition of the Main-FSM
The main-FSM has been introduced conceptually in the previous chapter. It plays an
important role in the system since it controls the overall behavior of the system. First, let
us define the main-FSM of an encoded FSM formally.
Definition 5.1. (Main-FSM) Let T be the transition relation of an encoded FSM M =
(I, S, S0, ∆, O, Λ). Let V and Vˆ ⊆ V be the vectors of state variables and main state
variables of M . The STG of the main-FSM of M is a triple (Sˆ, Sˆ0, Tˆ ) where
• Sˆ = {sˆ ∈ B|Vˆ ||∃s ∈ S : s(Vˆ ) = sˆ} is the set of main-states
• Sˆ0 = {sˆ0 ∈ Sˆ|∃s0 ∈ S0 : s0(Vˆ ) = sˆ0} is the set of initial main-states
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• Tˆ = {(sˆ1, sˆ2) ∈ Sˆ
2|∃s1, s2 ∈ S ∧ ∃i ∈ I : (s1, i, s2) ∈ T ∧ s1(Vˆ ) = sˆ1 ∧ s2(Vˆ ) =
sˆ2} is the main-transition relation. 2
In other words, the triple (Sˆ, Sˆ0, Tˆ ) describes the behavior of the isolated main-FSM.
The states in Sˆ are encoded solely by the state variables belonging to the main-FSM such
that an encoded main-state is a sub-vector of the entire state vector V .
Given a main state variable vˆj ∈ Vˆ , the next state function of vˆj is denoted by δˆj . The
vector of next state functions corresponding to the main state variable Vˆ is denoted by
∆ˆ = ∆Vˆ .
Even though the main-FSM as defined above is a sound abstraction of the system, in
contrast to other model checking techniques with abstraction, this approach does not rely
on proving properties in the abstract machine. In fact, an abstract machine that would
allow us to prove properties of the format given in the previous section would be signif-
icantly more complex than the main-FSM. Such an abstraction would not only contain
the main-states but also many other states representing the input/output behavior of the
concrete system. Instead, the main-FSM is used only to derive a decomposition of the
concrete system and to conduct an approximative reachability analysis.
The main-FSM of the system can easily be extracted from the RTL description. Note
that the extraction technique must yield a main-FSM conforming to Definition 5.1, i.e.,
all main-states must be identified and no state may be missed. Since the main-FSM is
very small, in practice, this is easy to guarantee.
The finite state machine of the FSM M can be viewed as the product machine of all
FSMs in M , including the main-FSM. The main-FSM and the sub-FSMs often communi-
cate via a request/acknowledge mechanism. The main-FSM enters a main-state and sends
a request to a sub-FSM which performs the required task. The main-FSM waits in that
main-state until it receives the acknowledge from the sub-FSM, and then goes to another
main-state. Please observe that the state space of the design is much smaller than the
Cartesian product of two sets of states of the main-FSM and the sub-FSM.
In the example design shown in Figure 4.2, when the main-FSM is in states idle or
ready the sub-FSM remains in state cnt = 0. The value of cnt only changes when the
main-FSM is in state wait. Therefore, the state space of the design has only n + 2 states
instead of 3 ∗ n states as resulting from the Cartesian product.
5.1.2 Decomposition Using the Main-FSM
The state space of the system can be partitioned into sets of system states corresponding
to main-states. Whenever the main-FSM is in one of its states, the other FSMs in the
system may each be in one of many different states. Each single state of the main-FSM
therefore corresponds to a set of states of the complete FSM M :
Definition 5.2. (Constrained Set of States) Let sˆ ∈ Sˆ be a main-state of an FSM M .
The set of states corresponding to sˆ is
Ssˆ = {s ∈ S|s(Vˆ ) = sˆ}
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2
In the same way, we can describe the transitions of the complete FSM M in terms of
transitions of the main-FSM. When the main-FSM moves from one of its states, sˆ1, to
another state, sˆ2, the FSM M correspondingly moves from a state in Ssˆ1 to another state
in Ssˆ2 . By considering all possible transitions between such states corresponding to sˆ1
and sˆ2, we define the transition relation of the system corresponding to a transition of the
main-FSM:
Definition 5.3. (Constrained Transition Relation) Let (sˆ1, sˆ2) ∈ Tˆ be a main-transition
of an FSM M . The transition relation corresponding to (sˆ1, sˆ2) is
Tsˆ1→sˆ2 = {(s1, i, s2) ∈ T |s1 ∈ Ssˆ1 ∧ s2 ∈ Ssˆ2}
2
Given this definition of the transition relation Tsˆ1→sˆ2 , we define image computation
corresponding to a transition sˆ1 → sˆ2 of the main-FSM.
Definition 5.4. (Constrained Image Computation) Let (sˆ1, sˆ2) ∈ Tˆ be a main-transition
of an FSM M . The constrained image computation corresponding to (sˆ1, sˆ2) of a set of
states Z ∈ S is
imgsˆ1→sˆ2(T, Z) = {s2 ∈ S|∃s1 ∈ Z ∧ ∃i ∈ I ∧ (s1, i, s2) ∈ Tsˆ1→sˆ2}
2
The following two lemmas show how the STG of an FSM M can be explored based
on single transitions of its main-FSM.
Lemma 5.1. The set of states of an FSM M can be decomposed into disjoint sets of states
corresponding to main-states:
S =
⋃
sˆ∈Sˆ
Ssˆ
Proof. We prove the lemma in three steps:
1. Consider a main-state sˆ1 and a state s1 ∈ Ssˆ1 . By Definition 5.2 it is s1 ∈ S.
Therefore, it is ⋃
sˆ
Ssˆ ⊆ S
2. Consider a state s2 ∈ S, since Vˆ ⊆ V there exists a main-state sˆ2 ∈ Sˆ such that
s2(Vˆ ) = sˆ2. Hence, it is s2 ∈ Ssˆ2 and
S ⊆
⋃
sˆ
Ssˆ
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3. Next we prove that Ssˆ1 ∩ Ssˆ2 = ∅ for all sˆ1 6= sˆ2. Suppose that there exists a state
s ∈ Ssˆ1 ∩ Ssˆ2 then, by Definition 5.2 it is sˆ1 = s(Vˆ ) = sˆ2.
From (1), (2) and (3), the lemma is proven.
Lemma 5.1 states that the states of the FSM can be computed implicitly and exactly
as the union of states corresponding to main-states.
Lemma 5.2. Let Zsˆ1 be a set of states corresponding to a main-state sˆ1. The next-states
of Zsˆ1 can be calculated as:
img(T, Zsˆ1) =
⋃
∀sˆ2:(sˆ1,sˆ2)∈Tˆ
imgsˆ1→sˆ2(T, Zsˆ1)
Proof. The lemma is proven in two steps:
1. Consider a main-transition (sˆ1, sˆ2) ∈ Tˆ and a state s2 ∈ imgsˆ1→sˆ2(T, Zsˆ1). By
Definition 5.4 there exist a state s1 ∈ Zsˆ1 and an input i ∈ I such that (s1, i, s2) ∈
Tsˆ1→sˆ2 . By Definition 5.3 it is (s1, i, s2) ∈ T . Hence, it is s2 ∈ img(T, Zsˆ1).
Therefore it is ⋃
∀sˆ2:(sˆ1,sˆ2)∈Tˆ
(imgsˆ1→sˆ2(T, Zsˆ1)) ⊆ img(T, Zsˆ1)
2. If we consider a state s2 ∈ img(T, Zsˆ1) then there exist a state s1 ∈ Zsˆ1 and an
input i ∈ I such that (s1, i, s2) ∈ T . By Definition 5.1 there exists a transition
(sˆ1, sˆ2) ∈ Tˆ such that s1(Vˆ ) = sˆ1 ∧ s2(Vˆ ) = sˆ2. By Definition 5.3 it is s2 ∈
imgsˆ1→sˆ2(T, Zsˆ1). Therefore, it is
img(T, Zsˆ1) ⊆
⋃
∀sˆ2:(sˆ1,sˆ2)∈Tˆ
(imgsˆ1→sˆ2(T, Zsˆ1))
From (1) and (2), the lemma is proven.
By Lemma 5.2 the next-states of a set of states corresponding to a main-state can be
calculated using the constrained image computation for every outgoing transition of the
corresponding main-state.
This is the basis of the proposed transition-by-transition FSM traversal algorithm.
Note that TBT traversal does not only create a partition of the state set but also partitions
the transition relation of the design.
The algorithm in Figure 5.1 calculates reachable states of an FSM by decomposing the
state space and the transition relation based on the main-FSM. The procedure tbt traversal
takes the transition relation, the set of initial states and the main-FSM of the FSM as
inputs. It returns the sets of reachable states corresponding to main-states.
At the beginning of a procedure call, the sets of states corresponding to the main-
states are empty except for the sets of states corresponding to the initial main-states which
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0: procedure tbt traversal(T, S0, Sˆ, Tˆ , Sˆ0) {
1: queue ← Sˆ0;
2: for each sˆ ∈ Sˆ {
3: if (sˆ ∈ Sˆ0) Ssˆ ← {s0 ∈ S0|s0(Vˆ ) ≡ sˆ};
4: else Ssˆ ← ∅;
5: }
6: while (queue 6= ∅){
7: sˆ ← dequeue(queue);
8: for each sˆ′ where (sˆ, sˆ′) ∈ Tˆ {
9: Ssˆ→sˆ′ ← imgsˆ→sˆ′(T, Ssˆ);
10: Ssˆ′ ← Ssˆ′ ∪ Ssˆ→sˆ′ ;
11: if (Ssˆ′ changes) enqueue(sˆ′, queue);
12: }
13: }
14: return({Ssˆ});
15: }
Figure 5.1: TBT traversal algorithm.
contain the given initial states. A queue is used to keep track of the main-states that need to
be processed next. First, the queue contains the initial main-states. A main-state sˆ is added
to the queue if and only if its corresponding set of states changes. In this case, the sets of
states corresponding to the next-states of sˆ have to be recalculated. For a main-state sˆ in
the queue, the algorithm considers all its next-states. The set of states Ssˆ→sˆ′ corresponding
to a transition (sˆ, sˆ′) is calculated by the constrained image computation. The set of states
Ssˆ′ corresponding to main-state sˆ′ is extended by Ssˆ→sˆ′ . If new states are added to Ssˆ′
by this computation, sˆ′ is entered into the queue. Procedure tbt traversal implements a
fixed-point calculation for the sets of reachable states corresponding to main-states. The
fixed-point is reached if and only if the queue is empty.
The algorithm is illustrated in Figure 5.2 where the main-FSM of the FSM consists
of four main-states sˆ0, . . . , sˆ3. We want to calculate the sets of states Ssˆ0 , . . . , Ssˆ3 corre-
sponding to the main-states.
At the beginning, in Figure 5.2(a), the set of states Ssˆ0 contains the initial state s0. The
other sets of states are empty and the queue consists of sˆ0.
Next, in Figure 5.2(b), the main-state sˆ0 is removed from the queue. The algorithm
calculates the sets of states S0→1 and S0→2 corresponding to the outgoing transitions
(sˆ0, sˆ1) and (sˆ0, sˆ2) of sˆ0 applying the constrained image computation. S0→1 and S0→2
are united with the old sets Ssˆ1 and Ssˆ2 , respectively, to obtain the new sets Ssˆ1 and Ssˆ2 .
Because Ssˆ1 and Ssˆ2 change, the main-states sˆ1 and sˆ2 are added into the queue.
In Figure 5.2(c), sˆ1 and sˆ2 are removed from the queue. Similarly, the sets of states
S1→3 and S2→3 corresponding to the outgoing transitions (sˆ1, sˆ3) and (sˆ2, sˆ3) are calcu-
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(a) queue = {sˆ0} (b) queue = {sˆ1, sˆ2}
(c) queue = {sˆ3} (d) queue = ∅
Figure 5.2: Example of TBT traversal algorithm
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lated. S1→3 and S2→3 are added to Ssˆ3 . Because Ssˆ3 changes we add sˆ3 into the queue.
In Figure 5.2(d), we remove sˆ3 from the queue and calculate S3→0 corresponding to
the transition (sˆ3, sˆ0). S3→0 is then added to the old Ssˆ0 to obtain the new Ssˆ0 . Let us
assume that Ssˆ0 does not change because S3→0 does not contain any new states. There-
fore, sˆ0 is not entered into the queue. Now, because the queue is empty the algorithm
terminates.
Theorem 5.1. Procedure tbt traversal calculates all reachable states of the FSM exactly.
Proof. Consider a main-state sˆ in the queue, the for loop in lines 6 − 12 iterates over
all outgoing transitions of sˆ. Therefore, it calculates all next-states for the set of states
corresponding to sˆ according to Lemma 5.2. This means that all next-states of the set of
states corresponding to a main-state in the queue are visited by the loop. Let state s′ be a
newly visited next-state and let it be added to the set of states corresponding to main-state
sˆ′. It changes the set Ssˆ′ and state sˆ′ is written into the queue. Therefore, the next-states of
s′ are visited later when sˆ′ is read from the queue. At the beginning the queue contains the
initial main-states with the corresponding sets of states containing all initial states. Thus,
all next-states of the initial states are visited. Recursively, all reachable states of the FSM
are visited by the procedure. According to Lemma 5.1, the calculated reachable states are
partitioned into sets of states corresponding to the main-states.
According to Theorem 5.1, the tbt traversal algorithm is an exact reachability analysis
algorithm. Even though the proposed decomposition strategy helps to reduce the compu-
tation complexity the algorithm is still not able to handle industrial designs. Hence, we
need to further decompose the design to calculate the approximate set of reachable states
as described in the next section.
5.2 Decomposing Using Sub-FSMs
The previous section outlined how to partition the traversal of an FSM using the tran-
sitions of a main-FSM. As a next step, we study how the main-FSM can be used for
automatically decomposing the FSM into sub-FSMs to be individually traversed. The
individual traversals are performed following the hierarchy of the sub-FSM. This reacha-
bility analysis for the overall design is approximative because we may miss correlations
between sub-FSMs.
5.2.1 Partitioning the Design into Sub-FSMs
The design is partitioned into sub-FSMs in three steps:
1. For each next-state function δi the support set is calculated under the constraints
imposed by main-FSM transitions.
2. Based on the constrained support sets, a variant of the latch dependency graph is
built and decomposed into strongly connected components.
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3. The latches within each strongly connected component are grouped together and
treated as a sub-FSM. The hyper-graph of strongly connected components each
representing a sub-FSM is a DAG and can be levelized. This results in a hierarchy
for the sub-FSM.
For the remainder of this subsection, these steps will be described with the definitions of
the required notations and procedures.
Functional Dependencies of Latches
The goal of the first step is to determine functional dependencies between the design
registers under the individual transitions of the main-FSM. The support set of a Boolean
function has been defined in Chapter 2. In this section, only the latches in the support set
of the next-state functions are considered; the primary inputs are ignored.
Definition 5.5. (Latch Support Set) Let V be the set of state variables of an encoded
FSM M = (I, S, S0, ∆, O, Λ). The latch support set of a state variable vj ∈ V is:
supp(vj) = supp(δj) ∩ V
2
As a next step we further constrain the support set by considering a specific main-
transition (sˆ1, sˆ2) ∈ Tˆ .
Definition 5.6. (Constrained Latch Support Set) Let V be the set of state variables of
an FSM M = (I, S, S0, ∆, O, Λ). Let (sˆ1, sˆ2) ∈ Tˆ be a main-transition of the main-FSM
of M . The constrained latch support set of a state variable vj ∈ V corresponding to
(sˆ1, sˆ2) is:
suppsˆ1→sˆ2(vj) = supp(δj ↓ (Vˆ ≡ sˆ1) ↓ (∆ˆ ≡ sˆ2)) ∩ V
2
Note that by definition, the generalized cofactor of δj with respect to (∆ˆ ≡ sˆ2) is not
uniquely determined. Hence, the constrained latch support set of a latch is not uniquely
determined. However, as it turns out, small constrained latch support sets are beneficial to
partition the FSM into sub-FSMs. Section 5.3 will describe a SAT-based implementation
to approximate a minimal constrained latch support.
Constrained Latch Dependency Graph
In the second step, the constrained latch support sets are used to build a constrained latch
dependency graph as follows:
Definition 5.7. (Constrained Latch Dependency Graph) Let Tˆ be the main-transition
relation of an FSM M . The constrained dependency graph of the state variables is a
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directed graph G(V,E) where the set of vertices is given by the set of state variables V .
The set of edges E is defined as
E = {(vi, vj) ∈ V
2|vi ∈
⋃
(sˆ1,sˆ2)∈Tˆ
suppsˆ1→sˆ2(vj)}.
2
Note that the constrained latch dependency graph differs from the usual latch depen-
dency graph based on the standard support set computation where the edges are defined
by
E ′ = {(vi, vj) ∈ V
2|vi ∈ supp(δj)}.
The difference of the non-constrained versus the constrained latch dependency graph
is illustrated by means of an example. Consider an FSM with a main-FSM encoded by
a single state variable vˆ. Further, let the FSM have two non-main-state variables v1, v2.
Finally, the transition functions for vˆ and v2 shall be given by v′2 = v1 ∧ vˆ and
vˆ′ =
{
vˆ, if v1 ≡ 0
vˆ else.
In this case, it is v1 ∈ supp(δ2). On the other hand, v1 is constant under any transition of
the main-FSM and therefore will not be element of any constrained support set.
Partitioning Designs into Sub-FSMs
The constrained latch dependency graph is partitioned using the SCC algorithm repre-
sented in Chapter 2 to identify strongly connected components (SCC). Each SCC corre-
sponds to a sub-FSM. The graph of sub-FSMs is a directed acyclic graph which can be
levelized by a depth-first search algorithm. The level of each sub-FSM k is denoted by
level(k).
main FSM
(level 0)
sub-FSM3
(level 2)
sub-FSM4
(level 2)
sub-FSM5
(level 2)
sub-FSM1
(level 1)
sub-FSM2
(level 1)
Figure 5.3: Partitioned structure of an FSM
An example of the hierarchical structure of the FSM after being partitioned is shown
in Figure 5.3. The FSM consists of one main-FSM and five sub-FSMs. The sets of state
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variables of the main-FSM and the five sub-FSMs are Vˆ , V1, . . . , V5, respectively. Sub-
FSMs 1 and 2 are on level 1, the other sub-FSMs are on level 2. As shown in Figure 5.3,
the SCC decomposition produces uni-directional interaction among the sub-FSMs of the
FSM. The control information stored in the state variables is only passed in one direction
from the lower-level sub-FSMs to the higher level sub-FSMs. Note that a non-constrained
decomposition into SCCs is generally not useful for industrial designs because this type
of decomposition often produces only large SCCs. If, however, the dependency graph is
constrained by the transitions of the main-FSM the situation is different and many small
SCCs can often be identified.
5.2.2 Traversing Sub-FSMs
0: procedure tbt subFSM(T, S0, Sˆ, Tˆ , Sˆ0, Vk, {S˜sˆ,l|∀sˆ ∈ Sˆ,∀l < k}) {
1: queue ← Sˆ0;
2: for each sˆ ∈ Sˆ {
3: if (sˆ ∈ Sˆ0) S˜sˆ,k ← {∃V \Vk\Vˆ s0 ∈ S0|s0(Vˆ ) ≡ sˆ};
4: else S˜sˆ,k ← ∅;
5: }
6: while (queue 6= ∅){
7: sˆ ← dequeue(queue);
8: T˜sˆ,k ←
∧
vi∈{Vˆ ∪Vk}
(v′i ≡ δi) ↓
∧
l<k S˜sˆ,l(Vl);
9: for each sˆ′ where (sˆ, sˆ′) ∈ Tˆ {
10: S˜sˆ→sˆ′,k ← imgsˆ→sˆ′(T˜sˆ,k, Ssˆ);
11: S˜sˆ′,k ← S˜sˆ′ ∪ S˜sˆ→sˆ′;
12: if (S˜sˆ′ changes) enqueue(sˆ′, queue);
13: }
14: }
15: return({S˜sˆ});
16: }
Figure 5.4: Approximative TBT traversal algorithm for a sub-FSM k
For the individual traversal of the sub-FSMs determined in the previous section we
consider the corresponding state vectors V1, . . . , Vr. Without loss of generality we may
assume that these vectors are topologically sorted with respect to the SCC graph, i.e.,
level(j) < level(k) for 1 ≤ j < k ≤ r. For each sub-FSM k = 1, . . . , r together with the
main-FSM, an abstract model Mk is generated by applying localization abstraction to the
state variables vj /∈ Vˆ ∪Vk. In other words, in Mk only the state variables of the sub-FSM
Vk and the main-FSM Vˆ are considered as state variables. All other state variables are
treated as pseudo-inputs. Similarly to the machine-by-machine approach of [CHM+96a]
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the individual abstract machine Mk is traversed separately. When the sub-FSM is tra-
versed, the pseudo-inputs V1, . . . , Vk−1 are constrained with the sets of reachable states
that have been calculated for the corresponding sub-FSMs in previous runs. Because the
TBT algorithm calculates only the sets of reachable states that correspond to main-states,
the transition relation T˜sˆ1,k of the sub-FSM k corresponding to a main-state sˆ1 is con-
strained by the reachable states S˜sˆ1,l of all lower level sub-FSMs l < k as follows:
T˜sˆ1,k =
∧
vi∈{Vˆ ∪Vk}
(v′i ≡ δi(X,V )) ↓
∧
l<k
S˜sˆ1,l(Vl). (5.1)
Consequently, the tbt traversal algorithm in Figure 5.1 is modified to approximate
the set of reachable states of a sub-FSM k. The modified algorithm tbt subFSM being
presented in Figure 5.4 takes the transition relation, the set of initial states, the main-
FSM, a vector of state variables Vk for a sub-FSM k and the sets of reachable states for
sub-FSMs l < k as inputs. It calculates an approximative sets of reachable states for
sub-FSM k. The only difference from the tbt traversal algorithm is that the transition
relation is constrained in line 8 by the set of reachable states of the lower level sub-
FSMs as described above. Furthermore, this constrained transition relation is used in the
constrained image computation to calculate the set of next states corresponding to each
main-transition.
0: procedure approx tbt(T, S0, Sˆ, Tˆ , Sˆ0) {
1: (V,E) ← Constrained Dependency(T, Tˆ );
2: 〈V1, V2, . . . , Vr〉 ← SCC(V,E);
3: for each Vk {
4: {S˜sˆ,k} ← tbt subFSM(T, S0, Sˆ, Tˆ , Sˆ0, Vk, {S˜sˆ,l|∀sˆ ∈ Sˆ,∀l < k});
5: }
6: return({S˜sˆ,l|∀sˆ ∈ Sˆ,∀1 ≤ l ≤ r};
7: }
Figure 5.5: Approximative TBT traversal algorithm for all sub-FSMs
Procedure approx tbt() as depicted in Figure 5.5 approximates the set of reachable
states of the overall design using the procedure tbt subFSM. The procedure takes the
transition relation, the initial states, and the main-FSM as its input parameters. First,
it calls the procedure Constrained Dependency which constructs the constrained latch
dependency graph based on Definition 5.7. The dependency graph is then partitioned
into strongly connected components using the standard SCC procedure. Each SCC con-
tains state variables of a sub-FSM. Next, all sub-FSMs are traversed by the procedure
tbt subFSM in topological order. Because of the uni-directional communication among
sub-FSMs the next-state function of a sub-FSM k only depends on the state variables in
sub-FSMs l with level(l) < level(k). Due to the topological ordering of the sub-FSMs it
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is l < k. This justifies why, in contrast to the MBM approach in [CHM+96a], we do not
repeat the traversal for lower-level sub-FSMs l < k using the reachability constraints S˜k.
Up to now the general theory of the exact and the approximative version of our TBT
traversal algorithm have been discussed. The following sections will present some rele-
vant implementation details for a SAT-based version of the algorithm.
5.3 SAT-based Implementation of TBT
The discussions of the previous subsections revealed that the constrained image and the
constrained support set computations are key for an efficient implementation of the (ap-
proximative) TBT traversal algorithm. This subsection provides some details on how
these computations can be implemented using a SAT solver. Max Thalmaier has imple-
mented the proposed algorithm based on BDDs. The readers are referred to [NTW+08]
for details of the BDD-based implementation.
5.3.1 SAT-based Constrained Image Calculation
Within a SAT solver the transition relation as well as the characteristic function for a
set of states Z are represented as CNF. The same applies for the reachability constraints
obtained by the traversal of subordinate sub-FSMs.
First, let us consider the constrained transition relation corresponding to a main-
transition relation (sˆ1, sˆ2). This constrained transition relation defined in Definition 5.3
can be represented by the following CNF:
CNFsˆ1→sˆ2 = CNFT ∧
∧
vi∈Vˆ
{li} ∧
∧
v′i∈Vˆ
′
{l′i} (5.2)
In the above equation, we have:
• CNFT is the CNF representing the transition relation T of FSM M
• li is a literal representing the value of the main-state variable vi ∈ Vˆ that encodes
main-state sˆ1. li is defined by:
li =
{
vi if sˆ1(vi) ≡ 0
vi if sˆ1(vi) ≡ 1 (5.3)
• l′i is a literal representing the value of the next main-state variable v′i ∈ Vˆ ′ that
encodes main-state sˆ2. l′i is defined by:
l′i =
{
v′i if sˆ2(vi) ≡ 0
v′i if sˆ2(vi) ≡ 1 (5.4)
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Then, a simple ALL-SAT approach is used to enumerate all possible assignments of
the next-states variables. In the current implementation, states are stored in disjunctive
normal form (DNF) with each main-state.
Procedure img in Figure 5.6 calculates the next-states of the set of states Z corre-
sponding to a main-transition (sˆ1, sˆ2). First, the SAT instance CNF is calculated from the
transition relation, the main-states sˆ1, sˆ2 and the set of states Z. A satisfying assignment
A of the SAT instance is then found by the SAT solver. The values of the next-state vari-
ables encoding the next-state s′ are extracted from A as a partial assignment. State s′ is
added to the set of next states Z ′sˆ2 . In addition, similarly to the approach in [McM02], a
blocking clause CNFs′ preventing the next-state variables from being reassigned is added
to the SAT instance. The blocking clause CNFs′ of s′ is defined by:
CNFs′ =
∨
v′i∈V
′
l′s′,i (5.5)
where
l′s′,i =
{
v′i if s′(v′i) ≡ 0
v′i if s′(v′i) ≡ 1 (5.6)
The SAT instance is solved again to find another assignment. The procedure finishes
when the SAT instance becomes unsatisfiable, i.e., A ≡ ∅.
0:procedure img(sˆ1, sˆ2, Z, T, V ) {
1: Z’sˆ2 ← ∅;
2: CNF ← CNFT ∧
∧
vi∈Vˆ
{li} ∧
∧
v′i∈Vˆ
′{l′i} ∧ CNFZ ;
2: A ← SAT solve(CNF);
3: while (A 6= ∅){
5: s′(V ′) ← A(V ′);
6: Z’sˆ2 ← Zsˆ2 ∪ s′;
7: CNFs′ ←
∨
v′i∈V
′ l′s′,i;
8: CNF ← CNF ∧ CNFs′ ;
4: A ← SAT solve(CNF);
9: }
10: return(Zsˆ2);
11:}
Figure 5.6: Constrained image computation
Procedure img is illustrated by the following example. Let the main-state variables
be v1, v2 and the other state variables be v3, v4. Consider a main-transition sˆ1, sˆ2. In the
main-state sˆ1 the values of state variables v1 and v2 are 0. In the main-state sˆ2 the values
of next-state variables v′1 and v′2 are 0 and 1, respectively. The set of states corresponding
to the main-state sˆ1 is S1(v3, v4) = {00, 10}. We want to calculate the set of next-states
corresponding to the main-state sˆ2. The CNFs are calculated as:
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1. CNFsˆ1→sˆ2 = CNFT ∧ {v1} ∧ {v2} ∧ {v′1} ∧ {v′2}.
2. CNFZ = CNF(v3 ∧ v4 ∨ v3 ∧ v4).
Solving the SAT instance we get an assignment of the next-state variable A(v′3, v′4) =
01. Therefore, a next-state is s′ = 01. We add a blocking clause to the SAT instance,
CNFs′ = v′3 ∨ v′4. The SAT instance is given to the solver again. However, the solver
proves the instance to be unsatisfiable. Consequently, the set of next-states corresponding
to the main-transition (sˆ1, sˆ2) is S1→2 = {01}.
Last but not least, note that the constraints obtained from the main-FSM transition
prune the search space such that the enumeration of next states becomes feasible. More-
over, the incremental SAT interface of the underlying solver [ES03] turned out to be bene-
ficial. It should be mentioned that more sophisticated methods for ALL-SAT as proposed
in [GGA04] could further improve the efficiency of this enumeration.
5.3.2 SAT-based Constrained Support Set Calculation
In Chapter 2, the support set of a Boolean function has been defined. When a function is
represented as a combinational circuit, the support set can be approximated by calculating
the cone of influence of the output of the circuit. The cone of influence of an output of
a combinational circuit, which can be called the syntactic support set, is the set of all
inputs that are reachable from the output in the transpose graph of the circuit. This set
can be determined by a structural traversal of the circuit. Obviously, the cone of influence
may include pseudo-dependencies that do not exists. This pseudo-dependencies can be
illustrated by an example shown in Figure 5.7(a). In the figure, the combinational circuit
representing the function δ1(x1, (v1, v2)) = v1 ∨ x1 ∧ v2 ∨ v2 ∧ x1 is shown. Analyzing
the combinational circuit, we can see that the cone of influence of δ1 includes v2 while the
support set of δ1 does not.
When computing the constrained support set suppsˆ1→sˆ2(vj) the complete, concrete
design is considered. Since the syntactic cone of influence of a next-state variable v′j
usually includes most other state variables an exact analysis for calculating suppsˆ1→sˆ2(vj)
is prohibitively expensive. Given a main-transition (sˆ1, sˆ2) ∈ Tˆ , the combinational circuit
is used to approximate this constrained support set as illustrated in Figure 5.8.
First, the state values sˆ1 and sˆ2 are assigned to the main-state variables Vˆ and the
main-next-state variables Vˆ ′, respectively. These Boolean constraints are then propa-
gated to identify constant nodes in the circuit network. Next, the support set of δj under
the constraint of main-transition (sˆ1, sˆ2) is approximated by tracing the circuit structure
backwards from the next-state variable v′j to the primary inputs or the state variables using
a modified graph traversal algorithm. This modified procedure traverses the transposed
graph of the circuit network. Whenever it reaches a constant node tracing for this path is
stopped. All state variables vi reached during this analysis are added to the constrained
support set approximation that is returned by the backtracing procedure.
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5.4 TBT Traversal in IPC-based Verification Flow
In this section, we will consider integrating the proposed TBT FSM traversal algorithm
into the IPC-based verification flow. The TBT algorithm can be used as a preprocessing
phase to identify the invariant I for IPC. The TBT algorithm analyzes the design and its
main-FSM to approximate the sets of reachable states corresponding to the main-states.
The characteristic functions of these sets are translated into macros in ITL of the IPC-
based tool. These macros are then used as additional propositions in the assumption parts
of the properties. When the property in Figure 4.3 is proven it is strengthened with the
characteristic function representing the set of reachable states corresponding to sˆ1, i.e.,∧
∀k S˜sˆ1,k. The strengthened property is formulated in ITL as shown in Figure 5.9. Since
both the property and the sets of reachable states correspond to the main-states, only one
individual reachability constraint is used in the property. It helps to reduce the complexity
of the SAT-instance for the property. Moreover, note that the automatically identified
invariants need not to be proven in the properties unlike the manually found invariants.
property strengthened operation s1 to sn is
assume:
at t: Vˆ ≡ sˆ1;
at t:
∧
∀k S˜sˆ1,k;
at t: a0(X);
at t+1: a1(X);
(...);
at t+n-1: an−1(X);
prove:
at t: c0(X,Y );
at t+1: c1(X,Y );
(...);
at t+n-1: cn−1(X,Y );
at t+n: Vˆ ≡ sˆn+1;
end property;
Figure 5.9: Strengthened property template based on main-states in ITL
In short, the modified IPC-based verification flow is shown in Figure 5.10. The TBT
traversal algorithm is added as the preprocessing phase to the methodology flow, which is
displayed as grey boxes in the figure. The ultimate goal of the modified flow is to avoid
false negatives completely so that time-consuming code inspections of design source code
beyond the main-FSM are no longer needed. In other words, the manual process of iden-
tifying reachability constraints, which is displayed as dotted boxes in the figure, can be
removed from the verification flow.
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Figure 5.10: IPC-based verification flow with TBT traversal
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5.5 Comparison with Previous Work
5.5.1 Comparison with Improvements in Image Computation
Section 3.3.1 describes some methods to decompose the image computation. The pro-
posed TBT reachability analysis algorithm uses a special set of state variables, namely
main-state-variables, as splitting variables. Since the main-FSM controls the other state
variables of the design the complexity of the image computation is reduced more ef-
fectively. Moreover, the proposed algorithm does not calculate the disjunction in Equa-
tion 3.8 explicitly but it decomposes the image computation according to main-transitions.
5.5.2 Comparison with Approximative Reachability Analysis Meth-
ods
In Section 3.3.2, the previous approximative FSM traversal algorithms have been pre-
sented. The approximative algorithm proposed in this thesis explores the main-FSM to
partition the design into sub-FSMs which are level-ordered strongly connected compo-
nents of a refined dependency graph of state variables. This will result in two improve-
ments compared to the previous approximation methods:
1. The approximated sets of reachable states are more exact and more suitable for the
intended verification methodology.
2. The proposed algorithm terminates earlier since it does not need to search for a
fixed point when it traverses the sub-FSMs.
5.5.3 Comparison with Abstraction Refinement Methods
There are several differences between the proposed methodology in this thesis and the
abstraction refinement methodology being described in Section 3.3.3.
First, even though in the proposed methodology, the main-FSM of the system can
be understood as an abstract model, the main-FSM is not used to prove the considered
properties as in the abstraction refinement methodology. It is due to the fact that the
main-FSM is not sufficient as an abstraction to prove the properties. Therefore, the main-
FSM is only used to decompose the state space of the concrete model, and the property is
verified against the concrete model using IPC.
Second, the abstraction employed in IPC with invariants, in general, cannot be ex-
pressed efficiently by a single partitioning of the state set in abstract and concrete state
variables. The properties proven in IPC may relate to a large number of state variables. If
all these state variables were concretized the resulting model would become prohibitively
complex. Moreover, in order to capture the state information implicitly contained in the
iterative circuit it would be necessary to concretize specific state variables only at certain
time points, but not at others.
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Third, since the proposed methodology uses reachability analysis as a processing
phase of the IPC-based verification methodology it avoids two expensive computational
procedures of abstraction refinement methods:
1. the construction of an abstract model in predicate abstraction and
2. the state separation in counterexample-guided refinement.
Finally, the proposed methodology is only tailored towards RTL property checking of
SoC modules and interfaces while abstraction refinement is more generic with the cost of
more complex algorithms.
5.5.4 Comparison with BMC-based Methods
In this work, protocol compliance properties are handled by a variant of BMC. In order
to prove the properties, the approximated set of reachable states are also used. However,
since the properties are formulated based on the main-FSM, the proposed methodology
is more effective than the generic methodology in [GGW+03, CNQ04] because of two
reasons:
1. IPC only checks simpler SAT-instances than induction based property checking
does.
2. The proposed reachability analysis can find more essential reachability constraints.
5.6 Experimental Results
This section will elaborate the evaluation of the proposed verification methodology and
algorithms. For this purpose, the approach is applied in a number of verification projects.
The characteristics of these projects are reported in Section 5.6.1. The results obtained in
these verification projects will be described in Section 5.6.2 and 5.6.3. Furthermore, in
Sections 5.6.4 and 5.6.5 a comparison with several symbolic model checking and reacha-
bility analysis algorithms as implemented in VIS [BHSV+96] is presented.
5.6.1 Design Characteristics
In order to evaluate the overall methodology experiments were conducted on four indus-
trial design projects and on three public domain designs. The benchmark suite consists of
two industrial implementations for a memory controller (denoted by fcdp1 and fcdp2), an
industrial AHB master (ahb-master) and an industrial bus bridge converting from BVCI
to AHB (bvci2ahb). The open core designs implement a Peripheral Component Inter-
connect (PCI) target (pci-target), an ahb-master (open-ahb) and an SDRAM controller
(SDRAM). Table 5.1 reports design characteristics. Ordered by columns, the number of
latches, the size of the main-FSM (number of states/number of transitions) and the num-
ber of sub-FSMs are reported.
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Design #latches #main-states #main-transitions #sub-FSMs
fcdp1 498 38 103 460
fcdp2 646 38 103 611
ahb-master 3373 14 54 1117
bvci2ahb 145 10 20 119
pci-target 220 6 24 120
open-ahb 450 9 24 390
SDRAM 110 9 24 78
Table 5.1: Characteristics of experimental designs
5.6.2 Performance Measurements for TBT Traversal
Design CPU-time Memory #SAT #SAT #blocking #Image
partition traversal var. clauses clauses comp.
fcdp1 0:00:05 0:05:59 20
1043 508 4 2
2410 2877 36955 275
2044 1786 177 36
fcdp2 0:00:13 0:16:26 25
1077 570 177 1
4738 7038 38998 265
2831 2933 2943 34
ahb-master 0:00:10 1:05:01 54
680 630 4 3
1720 3567 229511 578
1226 1570 458 13
bvci2ahb 0:00:00 0:13:38 18
338 221 8 4
508 1050 327703 54
431 291 3330 9
pci-target 0:00:00 0:03:42 17
1770 1522 177 1
2620 4685 9222 4109
2235 3727 880 291
open-ahb 0:00:01 0:44:25 19
645 707 16 8
1192 2058 165394 536
745 980 1694 18
SDRAM 0:00:00 0:03:57 17
385 247 1 1
3329 5385 16280 11897
1338 1691 320 227
Table 5.2: Performance of SAT-based implementation of TBT algorithm
In the preprocessing phase of the proposed verification flow, the approximative TBT
traversal algorithm was used to analyze the above designs. The performance data on the
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SAT-based implementation of the TBT traversal algorithm is shown in Table 5.2.
The table is organized as follows. The table reports CPU times (hh:mm:ss), separated
into the time spent in the decomposition and in the traversal phase in columns 2− 3. The
peak memory consumption (MB)is reported in column 4. The remaining columns of the
table contain machine-independent data for the individual traversals of the sub-FSMs k.
The table always reports the minimum, maximum and the average value over all sub-FSM
traversals for:
• the number of variables and clauses required to represent the constrained abstract
transition relations Tk,
• the number of blocking clauses generated during the traversal of the individual ma-
chine Mk,
• the number of image computations
5.6.3 Effect of Generated Reachability Constraints on IPC
The effect of the generated reachability constraints within the verification flow based on
IPC is studied in the sequel.
A Case Study with the Flash Memory Controller
As an example, let us focus on the first design (fcdp1) in Table 5.1 implementing an
AMBA-flavor protocol and representing a module of a telecommunication SoC devel-
oped by Infineon. During the design process of this new SoC the proposed verification
methodology was evaluated with respect to its productivity.
In order to prove the compliance of the module with the protocol specification and to
verify that all functional operations are correctly executed 25 properties were written. The
properties specify the behavior of the design during transitions between certain important
main-states. Note that, some of the main-states are not used as starting or ending state
of a transaction. As explained before, for verifying complex controllers of this kind it is
common practice to structure the verification process by following the main-states of a
design or using some related notions.
The responsible verification engineer spent about one week to understand the proto-
col, to analyze the main-FSM and to write the required properties following the property
template in Figure 4.3.
Unfortunately, all properties failed because of false negatives. Using the conventional
verification methodology, three more weeks were needed to manually inspect the source
code of the design in order to identify and prove valid invariants that are sufficient to
prove the developed properties. This effort results from the need to not only inspect the
main-FSM but also most sub-FSMs. This industrial experience demonstrates that property
checking based on Equation 4.12 has its pros and cons. On the one hand, the formulation
as an IPC problem makes it possible in the first place to handle industrial designs of this
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complexity. On the other hand, identifying the right invariant I can be quite difficult. This
has been measured to account for 75 percent of the verification costs of the flash memory
controller.
Main-state manually found automatically found
ilde 14 63
bm wr fifo 12 65
bm rd fifo 11 69
bm rd start 11 79
nf wr fifo 9 79
nf rd fifo 8 84
nf rd start 9 79
Total 74 655
Table 5.3: Number of reachability constraints in main-states found manually and auto-
matically for the flash memory controller
Table 5.3 quantifies the manual effort by counting the reachability constraints valid
in some main-states of the flash memory controller. Identifying these reachability con-
straints manually is a process of trial and error. As explained before, whenever a false neg-
ative occurs the verification engineer needs to inspect the source code of the design and
to identify reachability constraints to eliminate the false negative. Therefore, the number
of manually found reachability constraints in Table 5.3 is proportional to the number of
false negatives that have occurred and, thus, to the number of iterations in the non-shaded
part of Figure 5.10. In other words, the number of reachability constraints in column 2 of
Table 5.3 is proportional to the manual verification effort. By contrast, using the proposed
approach reachability constraints are automatically determined in a pre-processing phase.
In order to determine whether the proposed techniques in this paper are sufficient to re-
duce this effort the shaded part of the flow in Figure 5.10 was evaluated. For this purpose,
the manually identified invariants for the flash memory controller (fcdp1) were replaced
by the reachability constraints generated automatically by TBT traversal as described in
Section 5.4. In fact, all properties could still be proven without false negatives. This
means that it was sufficient to understand the design at a global level and to formulate
properties by only inspecting the main-FSM. The tedious process of manually inspecting
the source code of the design and the counterexamples (accounting to 3 person weeks in
the original flow) could be completely avoided.
As a next step of the evaluation the effect of the reachability constraints on the perfor-
mance of the property checker is measured. Table 5.4 reports the CPU times and memory
usage required by the property checker to prove the set of properties. Within the table
the properties are sorted by their starting states. Properties 1 − 12 have starting state
idle. Properties 13− 17 have starting state nf wr fifo. Properties 18− 19 have starting
states bm rd start and bm rd fifo. Properties 20− 23 have starting states nf rd start
and nf rd fifo. Properties 24 − 25 have starting state bm wr fifo. Note that some
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properties have two different starting states because they are combined from two differ-
ent properties. The length in terms of clock cycles and the size in terms of gates of the
properties are shown in columns 2 and 3. The CPU time and memory consumption are
shown in the other columns. It is apparent that the computational effort varies only little.
For the whole property set the CPU time as well as the memory requirement are com-
parable regardless of whether the manually or the automatically detected constraints are
used. Besides the usual variations that SAT techniques show when slightly modifying the
problem no serious performance differences could be observed.
Property Length Size CPU time Mem
(sec.) (MB)
manual auto manual auto
1 9 13977 0.37 0.38 66 70
2 4 570 0.03 0.01 69 70
3 4 832 0.03 0.58 142 70
4 6 5270 0.08 3.24 99 107
5 4 726 0.02 0.01 99 107
6 10 13269 0.27 0.32 99 107
7 20 54954 12.73 0.22 144 107
8 14 35145 0.81 0.07 145 107
9 23 51846 3.58 0.28 149 107
10 5 2136 0.08 14.07 111 113
11 13 31627 0.75 0.86 141 143
12 4 591 0.03 3.62 141 143
13 14 34181 2.44 0.1 153 143
14 12 22218 0.94 0.76 153 144
15 15 35673 1.03 0.02 217 144
16 19 51168 1.56 1.16 217 144
17 22 36358 1.48 0.86 217 144
18 9 12399 0.46 1.67 67 144
19 11 25424 1.41 3.77 99 164
20 11 18449 0.86 0.02 141 164
21 10 15783 0.6 2.94 141 164
22 16 31527 1.64 0.9 142 164
23 20 44425 3.18 1.26 142 164
24 11 17246 0.3 1.5 99 164
25 11 15195 0.23 1.38 99 164
Total 34.91 40 217 164
Table 5.4: CPU times and memory usages to prove properties of design fcdp1 using con-
straints generated manually and automatically
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An Example Property for the PCI Target
In order to make the experiments more transparent to the reader, experiments using a
public domain PCI target block are represented in this section. The PCI target block was
extracted from the PCI local bus in [Azi97]. To avoid the explosion problem of the state
space the creator of the benchmark has reduced the width of the address/data bus to 3.
In these experiments, the width of the address/data bus was re-expanded to 32 bits. This
makes the design more realistic although it is still quite small compared with the industrial
designs.
In the following, a specific example based on the PCI design is used to describe how
reachability constraints are added to the properties. A property has been written which
checks the turnaround cycle of the PCI protocol. The property states that if the PCI
target is in main-state idle and the bus command is read, then the next cycle must be
the turnaround cycle. This means that the PCI target does not drive the bus lines in this
cycle [SIG95]. The PCI target floats the bus lines by setting control signals OE TRDY ,
OE DEVSEL and OE AD to 0. Consequently, the property is formulated based on the
main-states as:
G
[
(main state ≡ idle ∧ ReadCmd ≡ 1)
→ X (OE TRDY ≡ 0 ∧ OE DEVSEL ≡ 0 ∧ OE AD ≡ 0)
] (5.7)
In ITL, the property is written as shown in Figure 5.11.
property turn around is
assume:
at t: main state ≡ idle;
at t: ReadCmd ≡ 1;
prove:
at t+1: OE TRDY ≡ 0;
at t+1: OE DEV SEL ≡ 0;
at t+1: OE AD ≡ 0;
end property;
Figure 5.11: Property for the turn-around cycle of PCI protocol
The IPC-based property checker fails to prove this property. There are many false
counterexamples. One of them is that the values of OE TRDY , OE DEVSEL and OE AD
are 1 when the main-state is idle. Therefore, to avoid this false negative the following
reachability constraint needs to be added to the property.
(main state ≡ idle →
OE TRDY ≡ 0 ∧ OE DEVSEL ≡ 0 ∧ OE AD ≡ 0)
(5.8)
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Instead of identifying these values manually we performed our TBT algorithm to au-
tomatically identify reachability constraints and added them to the properties. Thus, the
property is strengthen as shown in Figure 5.12. This modified property can now be proven
without any false negative. Also for the PCI block all false negatives could be eliminated
using the generated constraints.
property turn around is
assume:
at t: main state ≡ idle;
at t: ReadCmd ≡ 1;
at t: constraints at idle;
prove:
at t+1: OE TRDY ≡ 0;
at t+1: OE DEV SEL ≡ 0;
at t+1: OE AD ≡ 0;
end property;
Figure 5.12: Strengthened property for the turn-around cycle of PCI protocol
Other Designs
To complete the evaluation and to check whether the approach is also viable for a broader
range of communication IP blocks, sets of representative properties were developed for
all other designs in the benchmark suite. Without constraints the property checker al-
ways reports false negatives when using the trivial invariant I = 1. Table 5.5 reports
the results for proving the properties with the automatically identified invariants. In this
experiment, the invariants were identified by the BDD-based implementation of the TBT
traversal [NTW+08]. For each design, the table shows the number of properties in column
2, the lengths of the properties(minimum/maximum) in terms of clock cycles in column
3 and CPU time and peak memory consumption for proving the property set in columns
5, 6. All experiments confirm the experience with the flash memory controller (fcdp1) that
the constraints generated by TBT traversal are sufficient to completely avoid false neg-
atives for the respective property sets. Consequently, the verification effort was reduced
dramatically.
5.6.4 Comparison with Other Model Checking Techniques Using Ap-
proximation or Abstraction
In this section, the results of a comparison between the proposed approach and the large
set of model checking techniques implemented in VIS (version 2.1) [BHSV+96] are pre-
sented.
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Design number of length of IPC time IPC peak
properties properties memory
fcdp1 25 23/4 0:00:39 218
fcdp2 25 4/23 0:00:56 95
ahb-master 7 7/23 0:07:00 1301
bvci2ahb 12 2/8 0:00:16 350
pci-target 4 2/4 0:00:27 59
open-ahb 15 2/7 0:00:01 143
SDRAM 2 8/13 0:00:01 69
Table 5.5: Proving set of properties
As a first step of this comparison a representative property for each design is selected.
This property was manually converted to VIS CTL and checked with abstraction and
refinement and other model checking techniques provided by VIS. Except for the property
on the small designs PCI target and bvci2ahb all the model checking runs were aborted
due to memory-out or time-out. The results for this comparison are reported in Table 5.6.
In detail, three abstraction/refinement algorithms, traditional model checking algorithms
such as breath first search, high density reachability analysis, and two approximative
model checking algorithms are applied to verify the properties. For the algorithms that
terminated within a timeout limit of 5 hours and with a memory limit of 2GB, CPU-
time and memory requirement are reported. Timeout and out-of-memory are indicated
by TO and MO, respectively. Table 5.6 clearly shows that the problem complexity of the
verification task is beyond the capacity of the generic methods provided by VIS.
In the table the first column refers to the applied techniques as follows:
• AR(1), AR(2), AR(3) denotes the abstraction/refinement algorithms grab test [WLJ+06],
iterative model check [JMH00] and check invariant -A3.
• The breadth-first-search algorithm check invariant -A0 is identified by the abbrevi-
ation BFS.
• HD is the abbreviation for the VIS implementation of the High Density Reachability
Analysis algorithm [RS95].
• The model checking algorithms check invariant -A2 based on approximative reach-
ability analysis techniques [CHM+96a, CHM+96b, MKSS99] are listed with the
same mnemonics as used in the citations under MBM, RFBF, TFBF, TMBM, LMBL,
TLMBM.
• Finally, the approximative model checking algorithm approximate model check is
denoted as ACTL mc.
The presented results clearly show that the generic algorithms in VIS are outperformed
by TBT. Even for the far simpler problem of checking the invariant generated by TBT all
generic techniques fail for some larger industrial benchmarks.
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Design fcdp1 fcdp2 ahb-master bvci2ahb
Method Time Mem Time Mem Time Mem Time Mem
(hh:mm:ss) (MB) (hh:mm:ss) (MB) (hh:mm:ss) (MB) (hh:mm:ss) (MB)
TBT 0:06:04 50 0:16:39 92 1:05:11 92 0:13:38 36
+IPC < 1sec 76 < 1sec 73 02:25 619 < 1sec 52
AR (1) - MO - MO - MO - MO
AR (2) - MO - MO TO - TO -
AR (3) - MO - MO - MO - MO
BFS - MO - MO - MO 0:09:38 729
HD - MO - MO TO - TO -
MBM - MO - MO false negative false negative
RFBF - MO - MO false negative false negative
TFBF - MO - MO false negative false negative
TMBM - MO - MO false negative false negative
LMBM - MO - MO false negative false negative
TLMBM - MO - MO false negative false negative
ACTL mc - MO - MO TO - TO -
Design pci-target open-ahb SDRAM
Method Time Mem Time Mem Time Mem
(hh:mm:ss) (MB) (hh:mm:ss) (MB) (hh:mm:ss) (MB)
TBT 0:03:42 55 0:44:26 50 0:03:57 40
+IPC < 1sec 50 < 1sec 52 < 1sec 48
AR (1) 0:00:06 752 - MO - MO
AR (2) TO - TO - 0:41:51 75
AR (3) 0:00:04 603 - MO - MO
BFS - MO - MO 0:00:15 65
HD - MO - MO 0:00:27 70
MBM false negative false negative false negative
RFBF false negative false negative false negative
TFBF false negative false negative false negative
TMBM false negative false negative false negative
LMBM false negative false negative false negative
TLMBM false negative false negative false negative
ACTL mc 1:03:52 83 TO - 2:29:02 78
Table 5.6: Comparison techniques implemented in VIS and (SAT-based) TBT/IPC for
proving a representative property
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5.6.5 Comparison with Other Approximative Reachability Analysis
Algorithms
When it comes to determining reachability constraints from scratch rather than proving
given candidates for invariants the approximative FSM traversal techniques described
in [CHM+96a,CHM+96b,MKSS99] can be considered. In a last experiment, the generic
approximative FSM traversal algorithms as implemented in VIS are applied to the flash
memory controller (fcdp1). It was studied whether the generated constraints are sufficient
to prove the properties. The results of the study are reported in Table 5.7.
Main-state necessary with VIS VIS with
constraints sub-FSMs TBT sub-FSMs
ilde 14 3 12
bm wr fifo 12 2 9
bm rd fifo 11 3 9
bm rd start 11 2 9
nf wr fifo 9 2 7
nf rd fifo 8 3 6
nf rd start 9 3 7
Total 74 18 59
Table 5.7: Number of necessary reachability constraints that can be identified by VIS for
the flash memory controller
For each main-state of the design, the number of reachability constraints manually
detected by the verification engineer is reported in the second column of Table 5.7. A
post-processing has been applied to ensure that no constraint can be removed without
introducing a false negative for some of the properties.
Column 3 presents how many of these constraints could be generated with the approx-
imative algorithms in VIS using the respective decomposition into sub-FSMs. In order to
again simplify the problem for VIS, the sub-FSM decomposition generated by TBT was
provided to the VIS algorithms. Column 4 of the table reports how many of the necessary
constraints could be found in this experiment.
In both cases VIS generates a number of additional constraints not listed above. How-
ever, in both cases even the complete set of constraints generated by VIS was not sufficient
to eliminate false negatives when proving the properties for the design. In other words,
the approximative FSM traversal algorithms in VIS are generic approximative algorithms
and are not able to identify suitable constraints as they are needed to prove the properties.
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Reuse Methodology for Protocol
Compliance Verification
This chapter will present a way to increase the productivity of the specification phase in
the IPC-based flow based on reuse concepts. In the first section, the previous work on
specifying and verifying protocol compliance will be briefly reviewed. In that section, the
idea behind the proposed methodology is also introduced. The second section will define
a finite state transition structure (FST) called recorder which is key in our reuse method-
ology. It also will describe a systematic procedure for designing the recorder as well as
for specifying the bus protocol. In Section 6.3, the overall verification methodology is
presented. In the last section, the proposed approach is experimentally evaluated.
6.1 Introduction
In communication verification, it is verified that the communication interface of an IP
block complies with a standard protocol. In contrast to properties for verifying design-
specific functionality, the properties for verifying protocol compliance can, in principle,
be formulated independently of the particular design under verification so that they can be
re-used for other designs as well. It is therefore beneficial to distinguish between design-
specific and protocol-specific verification tasks. However, linking design-independent
properties to a design in a way such that usability and tractability of the verification is not
compromised is not an easy problem.
This chapter presents a new methodology for formally specifying communication-on-
chip bus protocols and for verifying protocol compliance of communication blocks in
System-on-Chip (SoC) designs. In this methodology, the bus protocol is specified in a
design-independent way by a set of protocol compliance properties based on a generic
recorder finite state transition system (FST). The proposed methodology clearly differ-
entiates between design-specific and protocol-specific aspects of the overall verification
task and exploits the nature of typical SoC protocol specifications and implementations. In
this way, the proposed methodology contributes to reaching two important goals: firstly,
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it reduces the algorithmic complexity of automatically determining the reachability in-
formation needed to avoid false negatives. Secondly, it incorporates re-use concepts to
further increase industrial productivity when verifying SoC interfaces.
6.1.1 Related Work
In the past, several approaches for formal property compliance verification have been
proposed. Each consists of a style or language for property specification as well as cor-
responding proof methods. A set of compliance properties can either be specified in
a monitor circuit as in [SDJ00, YHY+05, HCY03] or in a standard property specification
language such as PSL [Acc04]. Besides these formal approaches there also exists a wealth
of non-formal verification IPs for checking protocol compliance by simulation.
A monitor circuit is implemented in a hardware description language (HDL) and is
added to the system bus in oder to observe the bus behavior. When a bus participant vi-
olates the protocol specification the monitor will trigger an error output that corresponds
to the failing participant. Protocol compliance can be verified by using a standard model
checker to verify that the error output is never triggered. Since the monitor is a syn-
thesizable design written in an HDL it can be easily applied in practice. Monitor style
specification has been used successfully to verify the compliance of PCI protocol imple-
mentations as well as an Intel Itanium Processor Bus Protocol.
In [SDJ00] the monitor consists of a set of properties in an implication style of the form
past condition → current state, where past condition is the set of constant values
of the bus signals in the past. The set of properties is extracted from the rules in the
protocol specification. This type of properties covers local, unconnected behaviors of the
protocol. Although this monitor style can be used to check some compliance aspects of
the protocol it cannot describe the complete behavior of the protocol because it does not
store enough “history” of the bus behavior. A complex protocol such as AMBA AHB in
which single transactions may include long sequences on the bus is difficult to specify
using this approach.
In [YHY+05], a specification FSM is used as the monitor to check the protocol com-
pliance of the design. The specification FSM includes two specific states dc and vio.
When the design under verification violates the protocol specification the specification
FSM goes to state vio. When an input sequence which is not supported by the device
under verification (DUV) appears the specification FSM goes to state dc. The compliance
of the design with the specification FSM is checked using a branch-and-bound algorithm.
The algorithm calculates all possible pairs of design states and specification states and
checks that the states dc and vio are not contained in any state pair. Due to complexity the
branch-and-bound algorithm can be applied only to FSMs with a small number of states.
The protocol can be also specified in generalized symbolic trajectory evaluation (GSTE)
assertion graphs. The assertion graph can be used to automatically generate a monitor as
proposed in [HCY03]. The experiments in [HCY03] are promising, however, they also
show that the generated monitors can become very large. The resulting verification model
may exceed the capacity of the formal checker.
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Recently, several standards for property specification languages have been proposed.
These languages can be used to specify the protocol specification as assertions in the
design. The design assertions can be verified dynamically by simulation or by static
analysis methods. As an example, the partial specification of the AMBA AHB protocol
is described in [Dea03].
The set of properties written in standard property languages can also be translated
into a monitor. In [MAB06], the properties specified in PSL are split into primitive parts.
These parts are translated into primitive digital components and then combined into a
monitor. Then, a theorem prover is used to prove that the monitor never asserts its error
output when connected to the DUV.
Although many different protocol compliance verification methodologies have been
proposed, to the author’s best knowledge, there are no systematic design principles to
construct a standard set of properties, neither in property languages nor in monitors, that
can completely capture the protocol behavior and still be generic and independent of a
specific design.
6.1.2 Contribution of this Chapter
This chapter proposes a novel protocol compliance verification methodology which uses
a recorder to remember previous bus states. The recorder is very similar to a monitor in
the sense that it watches the behavior of the bus signals. However, it doesn’t check the
correctness of the bus behavior (it does not have a monitor output and no error states).
It is merely used to formulate a set of compliance properties. It can be combined easily
with IPC and is constructed in such a way that only little manual intervention is needed
to compute invariants of sufficient strength without a full-blown reachability analysis.
The recorder is specified in an HDL to record important states of the bus. It is con-
nected with the design using only protocol-specific signals. Additionally, a set of compli-
ance properties is formulated in ITL. The properties are based on the recorder which is
independent of the design implementation. Both, the recorder and the set of compliance
properties only need to be developed once for a particular bus protocol and can be re-used
on any design implementing the same protocol. As opposed to previous works, monitors
are not used to check the protocol compliance but the recorder is used as a basis and guid-
ance for formulating implementation-independent properties. Splitting the specification
into a recorder and a property set allows for an intuitive way of describing a protocol be-
havior. Moreover, it provides a natural partitioning of the verification problem that can be
effectively exploited by the proof algorithms and which leads us to a simplified reacha-
bility analysis for IPC. In this way, all reachability information needed to cover long-term
dependencies in the control behavior of the module can be obtained. And hence, complex
properties related to the data path of the communication module can be proven.
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6.2 Recorder-FST and ITL Properties
In protocol specification documents such as that for the AMBA bus [ARM99], the concept
of bus states is often used. A bus state represents the history of the bus behavior. It
represents sufficient information to determine all possible current behaviors. For example,
in the AHB bus protocol, a new transaction is started with bus signal HTRANS=2 only if
the bus state is IDLE. In another example, a burst transaction is continued with bus signal
HTRANS=3 only if the bus state is “in-the-middle-of-a-burst-transaction”. Consequently,
the bus behavior can often be described in the format ”if the bus state is IDLE, a data
or IDLE transaction can be started with HTRANS=2 or HTRANS=0, respectively”. The
bus states, therefore, are essential to describe the bus behavior. The bus states are usually
identified and specified before properties for the bus protocol are written. However, it is
hard to specify bus states using only bus signals because a bus state represents information
on the history of the bus behavior. In order to specify that the bus is in bus state IDLE, all
possible prior sequences of the signal values on the bus leading the bus to state IDLE need
to be specified. A recorder can be used to store bus history in recorder states.
In order to specify the bus states, not all bus signals need to be considered. The bus
states can be expressed in a subset of the bus control signals. Usually, the other signals are
needed to communicate data. Their behavior is determined by the control signals of the
bus. For example, in the case of the AHB bus, the signals HTRANS, HGRANT , HRESP,
HREADY and HBURST are sufficient to determine the bus states. The other signals such
as HSIZE , HWRITE , HADDR, etc., do not need to be considered in the recorder.
Consequently, the formal specification of the bus protocol can be partitioned into two
parts:
1. The recorder, for identification of the bus states (also called recorder states in the
sequel) based on the history of the bus signals;
2. The set of properties, checking the protocol-compliant behavior of the design with
respect to possible transitions between bus states and the absence of unexpected
transitions. This includes both control-related and data-related behavior.
In the following, the concept of the recorder will be defined and elaborated using
an example of the AHB protocol. Then, a systematic (manual) synthesis procedure for
such a recorder will be described. The procedure is an intuitive, top-down approach that
constructs first a bus state-related “skeleton” in the form of a non-deterministic FST. The
non-deterministic FST is then extended using auxiliary FSTs to yield the final recorder.
6.2.1 Recorder-FST
Consider a bus with a set of control signals Xˆ = {x1, . . . , xn}. These control signals have
a finite Boolean or natural domain and encode an alphabet Σ = {σ0, . . . , σm} of m bus
symbols. The control-related bus behavior can be considered as a bus language L ⊂ Σ∗.
The recorder, which is related to the bus language, is defined as follows:
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Definition 6.1. (Recorder FST) Given the bus with set of bus symbols Σ, the recorder of a
bus is a labeled, incompletely specified, finite state transition structure (FST) (Σ, S, s0, δ, L),
where
1. Σ is the set of input symbols (bus symbols),
2. S is the set of recorder states,
3. s0 is the initial state,
4. δ : S × Σ 7→ S is the incompletely specified transition function,
5. L : S 7→ 2Σ is the labeling function.
The labeling function assigns to each state s ∈ S the input symbols L(s) that can oc-
cur in the bus according to the specification when the recorder is in state s. The transition
function δ(s, σ) is defined for every state s and for every input symbol σ ∈ L(s) possible
in that state s, and undefined otherwise. 2
Note that the recorder has only a single initial state. The synthesis procedure starts
with a set of bus symbols corresponding to an initial idle condition of the bus. This set
labels the starting state of the recorder.
Definition 6.1 can be illustrated with the AHB protocol as an example. In this proto-
col, there are some control signals HTRANS, HGRANT , HRESP, HBURST , that encode
the alphabet Σ of bus symbols. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 describe a recorder for the AHB proto-
col as it will be constructed by the proposed synthesis procedure introduced later in this
section. To keep things simple, a small part of the recorder – the one concerned with the
INCR4 burst transaction is presented.
state si label Σi = L(si) comment
s0 Σ0 = (htrans ≡ 0 ∨ htrans ≡ 2) ∧ (hresp ≡ 0) bus is idle
s1 Σ1 = (htrans ≡ 3 ∨ htrans ≡ 1) ∧ (hburst ≡ 3) in first phase of
an INCR4 transaction
s2 Σ2 = (htrans ≡ 3 ∨ htrans ≡ 1) ∧ (hburst ≡ 3) in second phase of
an INCR4 transaction
s3 Σ3 = (htrans ≡ 3 ∨ htrans ≡ 1) ∧ (hburst ≡ 3) in third phase of
an INCR4 transaction
s4 Σ4 = (htrans ≡ 0 ∨ htrans ≡ 2) in fourth phase of
an INCR4 transaction
. . . . . . . . .
Table 6.1: Example recorder states for AHB protocol
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Table 6.1 shows some states of the recorder and their labels. Since the set of bus sym-
bols, Σ, can be quite large sets of such symbols are represented by characteristic functions,
i.e., predicates on bus control variables that evaluate to true iff a variable assignment en-
codes an element from the set. For simplicity, set and characteristic function notations are
used interchangeably. The meaning is always obvious from the context. In Table 6.1, the
label L(si) of each state si is given by the characteristic Boolean function Σi. As stated
above, the label of a state is the set of those bus symbols that are expected to occur in that
state. For example, when the recorder is in state s0 (the bus is idle), there are two possible
transactions: Either a NONSEQ, i.e., burst, transaction can be started with HTRANS=2, or
the IDLE transaction is continued with HTRANS=0. In both cases, the slave is expected
to respond with OKAY, i.e., HRESP=0. The other bus signals may have arbitrary values.
Hence, the set of symbols that may appear on the bus when the recorder is in its ini-
tial state s0 is represented by the function Σ0 = (htrans ≡ 0 ∨ htrans ≡ 2) ∧ (hresp ≡ 0).
When the recorder is in any one of the states s1, s2, s3, the INCR4 transaction is continued
with HTRANS=3 (i.e., SEQ), or HTRANS=1 (i.e., BUSY). Therefore, the three differ-
ent states s1, s2, s3 are all labeled with the same set of bus symbols as characterized by
Σ1 = Σ2 = Σ3 = (htrans ≡ 3 ∨ htrans ≡ 1) ∧ (hburst ≡ 3).
current next
state si triggering condition Σi,j ⊆ Σi state sj
s0 Σ0,0 = (htrans ≡ 0) ∧ hgrant ∧ (hresp ≡ 0) s0
Σ0,1 = (htrans ≡ 2) ∧ hgrant ∧ (hresp ≡ 0) ∧ (hburst ≡ 3) s1
. . . . . .
s1 Σ1,2 = (htrans ≡ 3) ∧ hgrant ∧ (hresp ≡ 0) ∧ (hburst ≡ 3) s2
. . . . . .
s2 Σ2,3 = (htrans ≡ 3) ∧ hgrant ∧ (hresp ≡ 0) ∧ (hburst ≡ 3) s3
. . . . . .
s3 Σ3,4 = (htrans ≡ 3) ∧ hgrant ∧ (hresp ≡ 0) ∧ (hburst ≡ 3) s4
. . . . . .
s4 Σ4,0 = (htrans ≡ 0) ∧ hgrant ∧ (hresp ≡ 0) s0
Σ4,1 = (htrans ≡ 2) ∧ hgrant ∧ (hresp ≡ 0) ∧ (hburst ≡ 3) s1
. . . . . .
Table 6.2: Example state transition table for AHB protocol
Table 6.2 presents the state transition table of the recorder. The middle column shows
the triggering conditions under which the recorder moves from a current state si to a
next state sj . For example, from state s0, the recorder can go to state s1 when an INCR4
burst is started and the master is still granted, i.e, when HBURST =3 (i.e., INCR4) and
HGRANT =1. The triggering condition, Σ0,1 = (htrans ≡ 3) ∧ hgrant ∧ (hresp ≡
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Figure 6.1: Extracted part of the recorder for AHB protocol
0) ∧ (hburst ≡ 3), represents the set of symbols that make the recorder transition from
s0 to s1. Figure 6.1 shows the corresponding (partial) state transition diagram of the
recorder consisting of the recorder states in Table 6.1. In the figure, the recorder states are
labeled with the set of symbols L(si) and the state transitions are marked with triggering
conditions Σi,j .
Lemma 6.1. For any possible word w = σ0σ1 . . . σt ∈ L, there exists a sequence of
recorder states (s0, . . . , st) such that δ(si, σi) = si+1 for 0 ≤ i < t.
Proof. Lemma 6.1 is proven by an inductive proof as follows:
1. Induction base: Consider a word w = σ0. By the definition of the labeling function,
σ0 ∈ L(s0). Thus, the transition function is defined, i.e.,
∃s1 ∈ S : δ(s0, σ0) = s1
Therefore, the word w corresponds to the state sequence (s0, s1).
2. Induction step: Consider a word w = σ0σ1 . . . σk−1 being recognized by the recorder.
It means that there exists a sequence of states s0, s1, . . . , sk such that si+1 = δ(si, σi)
for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1. Let σk be a bus symbol that can occur when the recorder is in
state sk. Similar as for the base step, σk ∈ L(sk), thus δ(sk, σk) = sk+1. Therefore,
the word w′ = wσk corresponds to sequence of states (s0, s1, . . . , sk, sk+1).
Lemma 6.1 states that for every word of the bus language, there exists a corresponding
path in the STG of the recorder FST. Note that forbidden words (words not in L) are not
handled by the recorder. It is not the task of the recorder to recognize forbidden words,
it only needs to make defined transitions for correct words. The ITL properties being
represented in Section 6.2.2 are used to check that only allowed symbols appear on the
bus.
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The labeling function plays an important role in building the state transition graph
(STG) of the recorder. Basically, the set Σs labeling a recorder state s describes a certain
“situation” on the bus that may occur in several different states. The labeling alone is not
sufficient to describe the state of the bus, since two different recorder states (bus states)
s1, s2 can be labeled by the same set of possible input symbols Σs1 = Σs2 . Obviously,
however, such states occur in a similar context. We can partition the state transition graph
of the recorder by the labels. All recorder states with the same label are in a common
block of the partition.
This idea is used for a systematic synthesis of the recorder which consists of two steps.
• In a first phase, only the individual “situations” that the bus can be in are consid-
ered. In other words, sets of allowed bus symbols that will be used as labels in
our recorder are identified. In addition, the possible transitions between the labels
are determined. This leads to a non-deterministic FST which controls the overall
behavior of the recorder. This FST is called the main-FST of the recorder.
• In a second step, we add details in the form of additional sub-FSTs communicating
with the main-FST to remove the non-determinism. This step yields the recorder.
The main-FST and its recorder are constructed such that the main-FST satisfies the
following definition:
Definition 6.2. (Recorder Main-FST) The main-FST of a recorder (Σ, S, s0, δ, L) is an
incompletely specified non-deterministic FST (Σ, Sˆ, sˆ0, δˆ), where
• Σ is the set of input symbols (bus symbols),
• Sˆ = {Σs ∈ 2
Σ|∃s ∈ S : L(s) = Σs} is the set of main-states,
• sˆ0 = Σ0 is the initial main-state,
• δˆ : Sˆ × Σ 7→ 2Sˆ is the incompletely specified main transition function.
A main-state is a set of symbols that is the label of at least one recorder state. The
main transition function δˆ is incompletely specified. It is defined for every state sˆ and for
every symbol σ ∈ sˆ allowed in that state. More specifically, the main transition function
is related to the recorder in the following way:
δˆ(sˆi, σ) = {sˆj ∈ Sˆ|∃s, s
′ ∈ S : L(s) = sˆi ∧ L(s
′) = sˆj ∧ δ(s, σk) = s
′}
2
Figure 6.2 shows the labeled state transition graph of the main-FST for the recorder
in Figure 6.1. In the figure, the three main-states are sets of bus symbols Σ0,Σ1 and Σ2.
A main-state may correspond to several recorder states, as is the case in the example: Σ1
corresponds to recorder states s1, s2 and s3. The edges between pairs of main-states are
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Figure 6.2: Extracted part of the main-FST of the recorder
labeled with the characteristic function of the set of bus symbols triggering the transition
between the states. The example also shows non-determinism: two outgoing transitions
from main-state Σ1 are labeled with the same set of triggering bus symbols Σ1,2. When
refining state Σ1 into recorder states s1, s2 and s3, this non-determinism is removed.
The procedure to construct the main-FST is shown in Figure 6.3. It is a systematic
procedure to derive the state transition graph of the main-FST from the protocol speci-
fication document. It successively identifies the main-states Sˆ and the main-transitions.
The procedure is illustrated by means of the example shown in Figure 6.2. The starting
point of the procedure is the main-state Σ0 which represents the situation when the bus
is idle. For this main-state, all possible next main-states are determined as sets of bus
symbols that result from applying every symbol σ ∈ Σ0 to the bus. (This is done, e.g., by
evaluating the protocol specification document.) In the example, the set Σ1 is one of the
sets found, constituting one new main-state. The transition between the current main-state
and a newly-identified next main-state under the input symbol σ is represented by updat-
ing the transition function accordingly: δˆ(Σ0, σ) = ∆. This process is repeated for every
newly-identified main-state. In the example, applying all input symbols σ ∈ Σ1 to the
bus leads to two possible next main-states: Σ1 and Σ2. The transition function δˆ(Σ1, σ) is
updated for every bus symbol accordingly. Afterwards, the procedure is repeated for the
new main-state Σ2.
In the second phase, the main-FST is extended such that the resulting recorder can
fully describe the bus behavior. This is done by adding auxiliary sub-FSTs to the system
in order to remove non-determinism. The state set of the recorder is encoded by the state
variables of the main-FST and the sub-FSTs, i.e.,
S ⊆ Sˆ × S˜1 × S˜2 × . . .
where the S˜i are the state sets of the sub-FSTs.
This step is illustrated using the running example of the AHB bus recorder. After
having identified the main-FST as shown in Figure 6.3, we need to add details in order
to remove the non-determinism in main-state Σ1. The STG in Figure 6.2 corresponds to
an INCR4 burst transaction which consists of 4 consecutive data transfers (as shown in
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Figure 6.3: Constructing the main-FST of the recorder
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Figure 6.1). Of these transfer cycles, 3 are identical with respect to the bus signals. These
cycles are represented by Σ1, which is a label for 3 consecutive recorder states (s1, s2
and s3 in Fig. 6.1). To implement these three states, we add a sub-FST implementing a
counter cnt with the state set S˜ = {1, 2, 3}. The state set of the recorder now includes
three distinct states s1 = (Σ1, 1), s2 = (Σ1, 2) and s3 = (Σ1, 3), all labeled with the bus
symbol set Σ1.
6.2.2 ITL Properties
This section describes the second step in the process of formally specifying protocol-
compliant behavior: formulating properties for the design based on the recorder. In order
to construct a set of design-independent properties, only the bus signals and the state
variables of the recorder are referred to in the properties. The bus signals are used to
specify the correctness of the input/output behavior of the design with respect to the bus.
The state variables of the recorder are used to specify the history of the bus signals.
In the following, the control and data bus signals are denoted by Xˆ and X¯ . The set
of bus signals is the union of both, i.e., X = Xˆ ∪ X¯ . In addition, V , Vˆ and V˜ are
used to denote the state variables of the recorder, of the main-FST and of the sub-FSTs,
respectively.
The properties are constructed following the template as introduced in Chapter 4.
They describe:
1. the control-related and data-related behavior of the bus signals and
2. the state sequences of the recorder.
Since the recorder is constructed by extending a main-FST, the latter, obviously, con-
trols the overall behavior of the recorder. The main state variables describe the general
context of the bus signals and its states correspond to “important steps” in a bus trans-
action. Hence, the main states are used to define the starting assumption and ending
commitment of the property in Equation 4.6.
Because the recorder does not depend on a concrete implementation, properties can
also refer to signals of sub-FSTs of the recorder to further specify the bus transactions.
This does not violate the property template.
Suppose that the transaction to be described corresponds to a sequence of recorder
main-states (sˆ1, . . . , sˆn+1), the starting assumption and ending commitment can be deter-
mined as follows:
as(V, Xˆ) = (Vˆ ≡ sˆ1) ∧ a˜s(V˜ ) (6.1)
In Equation 6.1, the starting assumption is composed from two conditions: (Vˆ ≡ sˆ1)
states that the recorder should start in state sˆ1 with starting assumptions about sub-FSTs
of the recorder given by a˜s(V˜ ).
Additionally the bus signals Xˆ should be selected from the set Σ1,2, triggering a state
transition from sˆ1 to sˆ2 and initiating the bus transaction to be checked by the property. It
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implies that the input condition at time point 0 is defined as follows:
a0(X) = Σ1,2(Xˆ) (6.2)
For the remaining time points, the bus symbols triggering intermediate state transitions
on the path (sˆ2, . . . , sˆn+1) are partially constrained by environment conditions aj(Xˆ).
These conditions are used to constrain the behavior of the other bus participants rather
than the design under verification. (Therefore, they are also not a part of the commitment
to be checked.)
The commitment c is composed of a series of intermediate commitments cj(X) and an
ending commitment ce. The intermediate commitments cj represent the intended behavior
of the bus signals. We can distinguish between control-related behavior as represented by
the labels Σj of recorder states and data-related behavior, cj(X¯), as follows:
cj(X) = Σj ∧ cj(X¯) (6.3)
Note that it is crucial that the commitments cj(X) include Σj . Remember that the
recorder is incompletely specified. Its behavior is left undefined for inputs that do not
comply with the protocol specification. The recorder does not check protocol compliance
of the design; this needs to be done with the properties by adding the constraints Σj to the
commitments cj(X).
Finally, the ending commitment, ce, is composed from conditions on the ending recorder
main-state sˆn+1 and ending states of the sub-FSTs of the recorder, as given by ce(V˜ ) in
Equation. 6.4.
In ITL, the property can be stated as shown in Figure 6.4.
ce(V ) = (Vˆ ≡ sˆn+1) ∧ ce(V˜ ) (6.4)
In the assumption part, the property specifies that
• at the beginning of the transaction, the main-FST of the recorder is in state sˆ1, i.e.,
the main-state variables take the values of the state code of sˆ1 (line 2),
• at the beginning, the sub-FSTs are constrained by a˜s(V˜ ) (line 3),
• at the beginning, the bus control signals Xˆ initiate the transaction with the triggering
condition Σ1,2 ⊆ Σ1 (line 4),
• during the transaction, the bus control signals Xˆ fulfill the environment constraints
described by a1, . . . , an−1 (lines 5 to 7).
In the commitment part, the property requires that
• during the transaction, the bus behavior of the data signals X¯ is as specified by the
constraints c0, . . . , cn−1 at time points t, t + 1, . . . , t + n− 1, respectively (lines 9,
10 and 13),
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property protocol behavior;
1: assume:
2: at t: Vˆ ≡ sˆ1;
3: at t: a˜s(V˜ );
4: at t: Σ1,2(Xˆ);
5: at t+1: a1(Xˆ);
6: at ...;
7: at t+n-1: an−1(Xˆ);
8: prove:
9: at t: c0(X¯);
10: at t+1: c1(X¯);
11: at t+1: Σ1;
12: at ...;
13: at t+n-1: cn−1(X¯);
14: at t+n-1: Σn−1;
15: at t+n: Vˆ ≡ sˆn+1;
16: at t+n: ce(V˜ );
end property;
Figure 6.4: Protocol compliance property template based on the recorder
• during the transaction, the bus behavior of the control signals Xˆ is as specified by
the constraints Σ1, . . . , Σn−1 at time points t + 1, . . . , t + n− 1 (lines 11 and 14),
• finally, the main-FST ends up in main-state sˆn+1 (line 15), and
• the sub-FSTs fulfill their ending condition ce(V˜ ) (line 16).
This property template for protocol compliance is illustrated using the AHB example.
Let us formulate a property for one phase in the INCR4 transaction of the AHB protocol,
where we are “right in the middle” of the actual burst transfer. The main-FST of the
recorder makes a transition from its main-state sˆ2 back to sˆ2. This is expressed by the
property in Figure 6.5.
Line 3 shows the starting assumption for the states of the sub-FSTs: the counter has
not yet reached its final value. The set of bus symbols that trigger the main-transition
sˆ2 → sˆ2 is represented by its characteristic function (line 4). Lines 6 and 7 specify the
behavior of a data signal, HADDR. (Note that a is a symbolic value linking the expressions
of lines 5 and 7; the property is not bound to a specific value of HADDR). The intended
bus behavior is specified in the commitment part. Under the assumptions, the recorder
should end in main-state sˆ2 and the value of the counter should have been incremented
(lines 9 and 10). The constraint in line 8 checks that when the recorder is in state sˆ2,
the bus control signals Xˆ indeed only take values from Σ2. This check verifies that the
recorder is only “fed” with allowed bus symbols when reaching state sˆ2.
99
Chapter 6. Reuse Methodology for Protocol Compliance Verification
property protocol behavior;
1: assume:
2: at t: Vˆ ≡ sˆ2;
3: at t: cnt < 3;
4: at t: (htrans ≡ 3) ∧ hgrant ∧ (hresp ≡ 0) ∧ (hburst ≡ 3);
5: prove:
6: at t: haddr ≡ a;
7: at t+1: haddr ≡ a + (1 << hsize);
8: at t+1: (htrans ≡ 3 ∨ htrans ≡ 1) ∧ (hburst = 3);
9: at t+1: Vˆ ≡ sˆ2;
10: at t+1: cnt ≡ cnt + 1;
end property;
Figure 6.5: Property for middle phase of INCR4 transaction
Up to this point, the method for specifying bus behavior using the recorder and a set
of ITL properties has been presented. By splitting the specification process into these two
steps and by defining the recorder formally, the formal specification can be constructed in
a systematic way. This helps to reduce the manual effort of formal specification, which is
essential in any verification methodology.
6.3 Methodology
In the previous section, the specification model of the bus protocol has been presented.
This section proposes a methodology to verify the specification model against designs
implementing the protocol.
System under Verification
design recorder
bus
XiXi Xo
Xo
Xdata
I/O
Figure 6.6: Connecting the design with the recorder
First, a combined DUV is created by connecting the recorder with the design imple-
menting the protocol as shown in Figure 6.6. In the figure, the design is connected with
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the bus signals X via its bus inputs Xi and its bus outputs Xo, i.e., Xi ∪ Xo = X . The
recorder is connected via only the control signals Xˆ = Xˆi ∪ Xˆo, where Xˆi ∈ Xi and
Xˆo ∈ Xo. Note that the recorder only reads the control signals from the bus.
The set of compliance properties is verified against the combined DUV. Many verifi-
cation techniques are available that may be considered to solve this problem. For example,
induction-based BMC [SSS00] and abstraction/refinement [CCK+02] are promising can-
didates since they are less susceptible to the state explosion problem than conventional
symbolic model checking.
However, in the case of industry-strength protocol compliance verification these tech-
niques also may suffer from complexity problems. Let us conceptually analyze the ap-
plication of these two techniques to prove the example property shown in Figure 6.5.
To prove this property abstraction refinement approaches should consider an abstraction
model that consists of at least the signals appearing in the property, namely, Haddr, cnt,
Vˆ . Unfortunately, this abstract model is already beyond the ability of model checking
techniques in abstraction/refinement approaches. Moreover, in our observation, this ab-
straction model still needs to be refined to prove the property, thus, further increasing the
computational complexity. In k-induction-based BMC, an iterative model consisting of
k time-frames of the design is analyzed using SAT. However, since a bus transaction is
often very long the considered behaviors of the communication modules often span over
many cycles. Therefore, k is often large and unknown. This prevents induction-based
BMC from proving the property.
As presented in Chapters 4 and 5, the IPC-based verification flow can be used to verify
the property set. IPC leads to an efficient computational model that can be handled by a
SAT-Solver even for large designs. On the other hand, IPC may fail for communication
modules due to long-term state dependencies. Hence, the properties need to be strengthen
with invariants to eliminate false negatives.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, a “good” invariant I is essential for an IPC-based method-
ology. Obviously, an exact reachability analysis is not feasible, otherwise the properties
could be proven using traditional symbolic model checking. In Chapter 5, an invariant I
can often be determined for IPC by traversing many small abstract models of the DUV.
However, in the situation considered here, the properties are formulated based on the
main-states of the recorder which is constructed in terms of only the bus control signals.
Therefore, only reachability constraints related to bus control signals are needed. In the
experiments of this work, these reachability constraints can be identified by traversing
only a single abstract model consisting of state variables that relate to the bus control sig-
nals. This, however, makes the abstract model tractable for symbolic traversal algorithms.
The verification methodology for protocol compliance checking is extended from the
proposed IPC verification methodology flow proposed in Chapter 5. It is presented in
Figure 6.7. First, the designer or verification engineer constructs the protocol specifi-
cation consisting of the recorder and a property set in a systematic way as proposed in
Section 6.2. Next, the recorder is connected with the communication module to create the
extended DUV as shown in Figure 6.6. Symbolic FSM-traversal is then used to identify
the reachable states of the abstract model whose latches are listed manually by the veri-
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Figure 6.7: Protocol compliance verification methodology
fication engineer. Finally, the set of reachable states in the abstract model is used as an
invariant for IPC.
The proposed methodology consists of two manual processes:
1. specification of the recorder circuit and the property set and
2. identification of the latches for the abstract model.
Note that the first task is design-independent. The recorder and the property set are
generic and need to be constructed only once for each standard protocol. Moreover, based
on the construction procedure proposed in Section 6.2, they can be constructed in an
efficient way.
Only the second task is design-specific and needs to be completed for each imple-
mentation. In the IPC-based methodology based on operational properties it is standard
practice to identify a set of important control states that are used as starting and ending
states in the properties. Since the abstract model contains only state variables that relate
to the bus control signals only a small portion of the design needs to be inspected by the
verification engineer to identify these state variables. Normally, the verification engineer
needs to consider design state variables that are:
• in the cone of influence of the bus control signals,
• the important control state variables of the design.
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These important design state variables are then combined with the state variables of the
recorder to compose the abstract model for reachability analysis.
6.4 Experiments
The proposed methodology was applied to verify three industrial and one public domain
AHB-master designs.
6.4.1 Recorders
The recorder is constructed to verify protocol compliance of masters in the AHB proto-
col as described in Section 6.2. It has been pointed out that it is beneficial to design a
recorder that only reads the bus control signals as opposed to designing a monitor which
also checks the correctness of transactions and, thus, also relates to the data path of the
communication module. By separating the generic protocol specification in a recorder and
in a set of properties we preserve the natural distinction between control and data path.
In order to measure the effects of distinguishing between control-related and data-related
bus behaviors the proposed recorder has been extended to a full monitor, i.e., an error
output was added such that the control- and data-related behavior are not only specified
but also checked. In the following, Ctrl is used to denote the results from the recorder
version and CtrlData is used to denote the results from the monitor version of our DUV.
The size of the recorder and the monitor are reported in Table 6.3. The table shows the
number of lines of code, the number of inputs, the number of state variables, the number
of main-states and the number of main-transitions for the first version Ctrl, and for the
second version CtrlData in columns 2 and 3, respectively.
Ctrl CtrlData
LOCs 583 666
no. of inputs 11 47
no. of latches 15 51
no. of gates 3647 13923
no. of main-states 39 39
no. of main-transitions 163 163
Table 6.3: The size of the recorder for the AHB protocol
The recorder or monitor are connected with the designs to form a DUV. Since we use
a recorder and a monitor, 8 different designs under verification are considered.
6.4.2 Properties
The behavior of the bus corresponding to the idle, single and the incrementing burst trans-
fer is specified in the template presented in section 6.2.2. When the properties are checked
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against the DUV, a SAT-instance is constructed. For each property the size of the decision
problem resulting from the property and its cone of influence in the DUV is measured. For
each property, Table 6.4 shows the property length n in terms of clock cycles, the number
of signals and the number of gates (2-input NAND equivalents) for each instance. The
results in columns Ctrl refer to the property sets being checked against the recorder, col-
umn CtrlData shows the results for the monitor solution. The last row in the table shows
the maximum number of signals and gates occurring in the property sets.
Property length Ctrl CtrlData
Signals Gates Signals Gates
nogrant nogrant 2 28 1227 100 1486
nogrant grant idle 2 28 2163 100 2431
idle nohready idle 2 191 1323 191 1321
idle idlegrant idle 2 22 1165 22 1171
idle idlenogrant nogrant 2 22 737 22 742
idle singlegrantokay idle 10 815 18117 922 65211
idle singlegrantretry idle 11 752 19524 895 72691
idle singlegrantretrynogrant 11 752 18355 895 71457
idle singlegranterror idle 10 744 17874 851 64838
idle singlenograntgrant idle 11 121 17099 517 70299
idle singlenograntnogrant 11 121 15935 517 69069
idle burstgrantokay 10 857 23187 929 81094
idle burstgrantretrygrant 11 794 24011 938 87106
idle burstgrantretrynogrant 19 891 38249 1323 151120
idle burstgranterror 10 825 23208 897 81105
idle burstnograntokay 19 671 34282 1355 150713
idle burstnograntretry 19 639 33523 1323 146563
idle burstnogranterror 11 574 19276 934 74855
trans burstgrantokay 10 861 23375 933 81040
trans burstgrantretrygrant 11 798 24155 942 87016
trans burstgrantretrynogrant 19 895 38541 1327 151177
trans burstgranterror 10 829 23398 901 81061
trans burstnograntokay 19 675 34649 1359 150859
trans burstnograntretry 19 643 33821 1327 146647
trans burstnogranterror 11 578 19263 938 74607
trans busygrant 2 253 1413 325 4027
trans busynograntgrant 10 341 15994 701 69442
trans nohready trans 2 290 791 326 1464
Max 895 38541 1359 151177
Table 6.4: The size of the properties for the AHB protocol
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6.4.3 Verifying Compliance Based on a Recorder using IPC and Reach-
ability Analysis
Reachability Analysis
The BDD-based implementation of the TBT traversal algorithm [NTW+08] is used to
identify reachability constraints. However, since the abstract model is fairly small any
conventional reachability analysis algorithm can be used here as well. As described in
Section 6.3 the abstract model is created by code inspection identifying a set of impor-
tant control state bits of the design. They are provided to TBT-traversal as a sub-FSM.
The TBT-algorithm then traverses this sub-FSM together with the recorder to identify the
reachability constraints. The reachability constraints are used to strengthen the properties
as described in Chapter 5.
The results are shown in Table 6.5 which is organized as follows. For each design the
results are reported for 2 DUVs:
• the DUV that consists of the design and the recorder (denoted by +Ctrl)
• the DUV consisting of the design and the monitor (denoted by +CtrlData). The
DUV sizes in terms of the number of latches and the number of gates are reported
in column 2.
In column TBT the CPU time and memory consumption of TBT are shown when it
traverses the abstract model.
Design no. of latches no. of gates TBT IPC
CPU Mem CPU Mem
(sec) (MB) (sec) (MB)
fcdp-ahb+Ctrl 661 20366 2069 294 27 149
fcdp-ahb+CtrlData 697 29157 6557 301 36 188
ahb-master+Ctrl 3388 109421 70 136 293 530
ahb-master+CtrlData 3429 119674 102 138 6109 6897
bvci2ahb+Ctrl 161 6838 300 138 256 480
bvci2ahb+CtrlData 197 17239 410 119 609 963
open-ahb+Ctrl 466 15656 578 488 194 489
open-ahb+CtrlData 502 25896 462 390 130 169
Table 6.5: CPU times and memory usages for traversing abstract models and for proving
properties
Verifying Properties Using IPC
After the reachability constraints are identified, the IPC tool is used to verify the set of
properties. Table 6.5 shows the total CPU-time and the peak memory usages needed by
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the IPC tool to prove the set of properties. Column IPC in Table 6.5 shows the total CPU-
time and the peak memory usages needed by the IPC tool to prove the set of properties.
As shown in Tables 6.5 the algorithms spent less time and memory for the Ctrl than
for the CtrlData recorder in 3 designs. The 4th design is an exception due to a confirmed
bug in the design. While the monitor directly reveals this bug several recorder properties
are proven to hold before the failing property is processed.
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Summary and Future Work
7.1 Summary
Since an increasing number of functionalities is integrated into present-day SoC designs,
SoC designs are usually constructed with a block-based methodology. Consequently,
when SoC designs which are specified in RTL are verified it is possible to pursue an
overall verification strategy commonly referred to as correctness by integration. This
means that the overall verification task is divided into local and global sub-tasks. The
local sub-tasks consist in the verification of the individual SoC modules. The global
task is to verify the global behavior of the entire chip. The global verification problem
can be simplified drastically if the individual modules have been verified before-hand.
If their correctness is already guaranteed chip-level verification can actually concentrate
on the global system behavior and is relieved from hunting bugs in local modules. When
verifying the individual SoC modules it is beneficial to distinguish between computational
modules such as processors and hardware accelerators and communication modules which
implement the interfaces between these modules. If both, correctness of computation and
correctness of communication are guaranteed by verifying all SoC modules at the RTL it
is envisioned that chip-level verification can move from the RTL to the next higher level
of abstraction.
In recent years, formal property checking has become adopted successfully in industry
and is used increasingly to solve the local verification tasks described in the above sce-
nario. This success results from property checking formulations that are well adapted to
specific methodologies. In particular, assertion checking and property checking method-
ologies based on Bounded Model Checking (BMC) [BCCZ99] or related techniques have
matured tremendously during the last decade and are well supported by industrial method-
ologies. This is particularly true for formal property checking of computational SoC
modules.
This work is based on a SAT-based formulation of property checking called Interval
Property Checking (IPC). IPC originates in the Siemens company and is in industrial use
since the mid 1990s [One09]. IPC handles a special type of safety properties, that specify
operations in intervals between abstract starting and ending states. This paves the way for
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extremely efficient proving procedures.
However, there are still two problems in the IPC-based verification methodology
flow that reduce the productivity of the methodology and sometimes hamper adoption
of IPC. First, IPC may return false counterexamples since its computational bounded cir-
cuit model only captures local reachability information, i.e., long-term dependencies may
be missed. If this happens, the properties need to be strengthened with reachability in-
variants in order to rule out the spurious counterexamples. Identifying strong enough
invariants is a laborious manual task. Second, a set of properties needs to be formulated
manually for each individual design to be verified. This set, however, isn’t re-usable for
different designs.
This work exploits special features of communication modules in SoCs to solve these
problems and to improve the productivity of the IPC methodology flow.
7.1.1 Approximate TBT FSM Traversal for IPC Verification Flow
The first problem in the IPC methodology flow especially applies to communication mod-
ules as their state machines have to cope with long transactions. These transactions may
span over long time intervals and impose non-trivial reachability constraints on the state
variables of communication modules.
As presented in Chapter 4, properties for a communication module are unbounded
safety properties. These properties specify the behavior of the module by relating inputs,
internal signals and outputs of the design within a finite number of clock cycles. Thus,
they can be proven with a SAT-based property checker starting from an arbitrary state, pro-
vided that a sufficient invariant can be calculated. This invariant should contain enough
reachability information to eliminate potential false negatives. Furthermore, Chapter 4 il-
lustrates an important observation that communication modules often consist of a central,
abstract FSM, namely a main-FSM. The main-FSM controls the overall behavior of the
design and is also used to formulate the properties.
For the purpose of identifying reachability information, Chapter 5 presents the approx-
imate FSM traversal algorithm called TBT traversal. This algorithm uses the main-FSM
of the design to decompose both, the state space and the transition relation of the design.
These decompositions turn out to be the key and make the approach tractable for large
industrial designs.
The approach has been used in “real-life” industrial verification projects. The pro-
posed methodology has shown to be very successful in reducing the manual effort for
setting up property sets for communication modules.
7.1.2 Re-usable Properties and Generic Recorder
Communication modules often implement a standard bus protocol that is used as the com-
munication infrastructure for SoC designs. Consequently, a set of properties can be con-
structed independently of the design. A module fulfilling the property set does not violate
the protocol standard and can be integrated into the system.
108
7.2. Future Work
Chapter 6 presented a method to formulate a design-independent set of properties
for protocol compliance verification. The property set is formulated based on a generic
recorder FST.
The recorder FST remembers the bus status as its states. The recorder is constructed in
two phases. In the first phase, a non-deterministic main-FST of the recorder is built using
a manual, systematic procedure. This procedure identifies states of the main-FST as bus
symbols that can occur in the bus and the transitions among bus symbols. In the second
phase, the main-FST is extended by a set of sub-FSTs to remove its non-deterministic
transitions. The recorder is, then, connected with a design via bus signals to create a
design under verification (DUV).
The properties specify the bus transactions, where each transaction starts from a
recorder state to another recorder state. The properties are formulated using the tem-
plate presented in Chapter 4, where the main states are the states of the recorder. The
properties are checked against the DUV using IPC with strengthening invariants that can
be identified by traversing a small abstract model of the DUV.
The re-usable recorder and property set are important integral parts of the overall
correctness by integration verification strategy. The proposed methodology in Chapter 6
provides two benefits:
1. It incorporates a re-use concept to reduce the manual effort to construct the protocol
compliance properties in the IPC verification flow. Hence, it helps to increase the
productivity of the flow.
2. It simplifies the problem of identifying invariants for IPC.
7.2 Future Work
This thesis has concentrated on improving the productivity of the industrial IPC-based
verification flow for communication modules in SoC designs. In the flow, it attempts to
replace the manual step of identifying reachability invariants with an approximate FSM
traversal algorithm and the manual step of constructing a property set by a generic, re-
usable recorder and a set of properties. The following sections outline ideas for future
research.
7.2.1 Identifying Reachability Invariants
Identifying Main-FSMs
The main-FSM of a design is the key element of the proposed work. It is used not only in
the property template but also in the approximate FSM traversal. In this work, it is sup-
posed to be extracted manually or automatically by analyzing the RTL description of the
design syntactically. However the design may have several important state variables, e.g.,
separate flags, that form its main-FSM. Those main-state-variables are not necessarily
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obvious in the RTL description. In this case, the semantic functional dependency among
latches of the design can be used to extract the main-FSM. A first attempt [TNW+07] has
succeeded in extracting the correct main-FSM for some designs. More attempts should
be made to further increase the exactness of the method for other designs.
In addition, properties can be analyzed to identify the important state variables. The
starting condition of properties often consist of the important state variables that can be
used as the main state variables.
Backward TBT
In the proposed methodology, the approximate TBT traversal is used as preprocessing
phase for the IPC checker. It is independent from properties to be checked by the IPC
checker. It is interesting to investigate whether TBT can be used with respect to a property
to be checked. This means that the TBT traversal is only used by the IPC checker when-
ever it needs reachability invariants. Moreover, it is worth to examine how to analyze the
counterexamples being produced by the IPC checker to identify suitable sub-FSMs that
need to be traversed to identify the reachability information.
A first possible idea is to use a backward TBT traversal algorithm. The backward
traversal is used to check whether the starting states of the counterexamples are reachable
or not. An exact backward FSM traversal is usually infeasible for large designs. However,
the first SAT-based implementation of an approximate backward TBT algorithm is fast
to determine that a counterexample is unreachable. This is elaborated by the following
example.
Let us consider a design and a sequence of main-states (sˆ1, sˆ2, . . . sˆn). The design
consists of a counter cnt that is set to 0 whenever the main-FSM takes transition (sˆ1, sˆ2).
When the main-FSM goes through the state sequences (sˆ2, . . . , sˆn), the counter does not
change its value. Hence, at main-state sˆn the counter should be 0. However, when IPC
checks the property starting from main-state sˆn, it produces a counterexample. At the
starting state of the counterexample, the counter equals to an arbitrary value 6= 0. When
the counter and the main-FSM are traversed by backward TBT the preimage computation
under the constraints of main-transition (sˆ1, sˆ2) will return an empty set of states. Hence,
the backward traversal can reach its fixed-point and finish quickly.
In preliminary experiments, unreachable counterexamples are used to update the in-
variant I. The property is then checked again by the IPC checker. However, this requires
a large amount of iterations of the IPC checker and decreases the performance of the IPC
checker.
Future work may examine how to identify the sub-FSMs from the results of the back-
ward traversal and use the forward reachability analysis on these sub-FSMs. It may be
possible to use proof analysis techniques in [GGYA03]. In the above example, the preim-
age computation under the constraint of the main-transition (sˆ1, sˆ2) is an unsatisfiable
instance. Hence, the proof of this UNSAT instance can be analyzed to identify the UN-
SAT cores which will consist of the state variables of the counter.
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7.2.2 Applying Approximate FSM Traversal in Abstraction Refine-
ment
In [WLJ+06], Wang et.al. proposed to use approximate reachability constraints in an
abstraction refinement framework. In this method, the approximate set of reachable states
is calculated in a preprocessing phase and then is used as additional constraints in pseudo
inputs of the abstract model whenever the property is checked.
Inspired by this idea, it is possible to develop a tighter integration of approximate
reachability analysis and abstraction refinement. Future work will examine how to exploit
the sub-FSM decomposition based on the abstract FSM to prevent the abstract model from
growing too large. The basic idea is illustrated in Figure 7.1. When a list of state variables
to be refined is suggested by the refinement procedure, the abstract model is not extended
by these state variables. Instead, the list is decomposed into sub-FSMs by the technique
presented in Section 5.2.1. Each sub-FSM is traversed together with the abstract model
to compute the approximate set of reachable states. This set is then used to constrain
the abstract model in the next run of the model checking algorithm. The abstract model
is extended only if the approximate set of reachable states can not help to eliminate the
spurious counterexample.
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Figure 7.1: Integrating approximate FSM traversal into abstraction refinement
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Zusammenfassung (in Deutsch)
Der Entwurf eines System-on-Chip (SoC) muss heutzutage angesichts der hohen Komple-
xita¨ten stark modular und in einer Top-Down-Vorgehensweise erfolgen. Die eigentliche
Implementierung der Komponenten wird dabei auf der Register-Transfer-Ebene mittels
Hardwarebeschreibungssprachen wie VHDL oder Verilog vollzogen. Die einzelnen Mo-
dule werden dann zu einem Gesamtsystem zusammengesetzt (system integration). Auch
bei der Verifikation heutiger Systeme muss ein modularer Ansatz gewa¨hlt werden, da eine
Simulation des Gesamtsystems entweder nicht mit vertretbarem Zeitaufwand mo¨glich ist
oder nicht die gewu¨nschte Qualita¨t liefern kann. Man teilt das Verifikationsproblem daher
in lokale und globale Verifikationsaufgaben auf. Die ¨Uberpru¨fung eines Moduls dieses
Systems stellt eine lokale Verifikationsaufgabe dar. Die globale Verifikationsaufgabe be-
steht darin, das Verhalten des aus Modulen zusammengesetzten Systems zu u¨berpru¨fen.
Das globale Verifikationsproblem kann drastisch vereinfacht werden, wenn die Korrekt-
heit der Einzelmodule bereits garantiert wurde. Dann kann sich die Verifikation auf Chip-
Ebene auf das Zusammenspiel der Module konzentrieren und wird von der Fehlersuche
in den Modulen entlastet.
Es ist fu¨r die Lo¨sung des Verifikationsproblems sinnvoll, bei den SoC-Modulen zwi-
schen Berechnungsmodulen wie Prozessoren und Hardware-Beschleunigern und Kom-
munikationsmodulen, welche die Schnittstellen zwischen diesen Modulen darstellen, zu
unterscheiden. Sind durch die ¨Uberpru¨fung aller SoC-Module auf RT-Ebene sowohl die
korrekte Berechnung als auch die korrekte Kommunikation garantiert, ist es sogar vor-
stellbar, dass die Verifikation auf der Chip-Ebene statt auf der Register-Transfer-Ebene
auf der na¨chst ho¨heren Abstraktionsebene durchgefu¨hrt werden kann.
In den letzten Jahren ist die formale Eigenschaftspru¨fung erfolgreich in der Industrie
eingefu¨hrt worden und wird in zunehmendem Maße fu¨r die Modulverifikation verwen-
det. Der Erfolg resultiert zu einem großen Teil aus neuen Eigenschaftssprachen, die auf
eine spezifische Methodik zugeschnitten sind. Insbesondere in den vergangenen zehn Jah-
ren haben sich assertion checking, die auf Bounded Model Checking (BMC) basierende
Eigenschaftspru¨fung und a¨hnliche Techniken durch die Entwicklung neuer Berechnungs-
modelle und Algorithmenn außerordentlich weiterentwickelt. Daru¨berhinaus werden die-
se Techniken durch auf sie zugeschnittene neue Verifikationsmethodiken unterstu¨tzt. Dies
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gilt besonders fu¨r die formale Eigenschaftspru¨fung von SoC-Berechnungsmodulen.
Die vorliegende Arbeit basiert auf einer SAT-basierten Formulierung der Eigenschafts-
pru¨fung, die Interval Property Checking (IPC) genannt wird. IPC wurde von der Firma
Siemens entwickelt und wird industriell seit Mitte der neunziger Jahre verwendet [One09].
Mit IPC la¨sst sich eine bestimmte Klasse von Sicherheitseigenschaften beweisen, mit
denen sich das Verhalten eines Entwurfs in einem begrenzten Zeitintervall spezifizieren
la¨sst. Dabei wird ausgehend von einem abstrakten Anfangszustand der ¨Ubergang zu ei-
nem abstrakten Endzustand beschrieben. Die dardurch mo¨gliche Modellbildung erlaubt
die Anwendung von extrem leistungsfa¨higen Beweismethoden.
Auch bei der IPC-basierten Verifikationsmethodik gibt es jedoch noch einige Proble-
me, die ihre Erfolge schma¨lern und manchmal die Akzeptanz von IPC behindern. Zwei
dieser Probleme werden im Kern dieser Arbeit angegangen.
Zum Einen bedingt das der Eigenschaftspru¨fung zugrundeliegende Berechnungsmo-
dell, dass eventuell auftretende Gegenbeispiele nicht echt sind (sogenannte false negatives
oder false counterexamples). Die betrachteten Zusta¨nde des Systems sind vom Anfangs-
zustand nicht erreichbar, d.h., das Gegenbeispiel kann in einer richtig initialisierten Schal-
tung niemals beobachtet werden. Das Auftreten solcher falscher Gegenbeispiele resultiert
aus der Beschra¨nkung der zeitlichen Betrachtung auf endliche Zeitintervalle mit beliebi-
gem Anfangszeitpunkt. Diese Betrachtungsweise erfasst nur lokale Erreichbarkeitsinfor-
mationen, kann aber langfristige Abha¨ngigkeiten von Signalen u¨bersehen. In der Praxis
werden zu beweisende Eigenschaften ha¨ufig mit globaler Erreichbarkeitsinformation in
Form von Invarianten versta¨rkt, um das Auftreten von falschen Gegenbeispielen zu ver-
meiden. Das manuelle Ermitteln solcher Invarianten ist jedoch eine mu¨hsame und zeit-
raubende Arbeit, die vom Verifikationsingenieur geleistet werden muss.
Zum Anderen ist bereits die Aufgabe, fu¨r jeden Entwurf einen Satz spezifischer Ei-
genschaften aufzustellen, mit großem Aufwand verbunden. Im Allgemeinen ist ein Eigen-
schaftssatz spezifisch fu¨r das Design, fu¨r das er erstellt wurde, und nur selten fu¨r andere
Entwu¨rfe wiederverwendbar. In bestimmten Fa¨llen, (zum Beispiel bei Kommunikations-
modulen), ist eine Wiederverwendung bei entsprechender Aufbereitung der Verifikations-
inhalte jedoch denkbar, so dass sich der Aufwand fu¨r die Modulverifikation signifikant
verringern ließe.
Diese Arbeit stellt sich diesen Problemen. Die vorgestellten Lo¨sungsansa¨tze nutzen
dabei die besonderen Beschaffenheiten und Eigenschaften typischer Kommunikations-
module in Systems-on-Chips aus.
8.1 Approximative TBT FSM-Traversierung fu¨r IPC
Das Problem der falschen Gegenbeispiele tritt bei IPC selten bei Berechnungsmodulen,
dafu¨r umso ha¨ufiger bei Kommunikationsmodulen auf. Dies liegt daran, dass die beteilig-
ten Zustandsmaschinen lange Transaktionen verarbeiten mu¨ssen. Solche Transaktionen
ko¨nnen sich u¨ber große Zeitintervalle erstrecken und es ko¨nnen daher zwischen den Zu-
standsvariablen der Kommunikationsmodule Beziehungen bestehen, die sich nur durch
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nichttriviale Erreichbarkeitsbedingungen ausdru¨cken lassen.
Wie in Kapitel 4 dargestellt wird, handelt es sich bei IPC-Eigenschaften um unbe-
schra¨nkte Sicherheitseigenschaften, die auf Zeitintervallen formuliert sind. Diese Eigen-
schaften spezifizieren das Verhalten des Moduls, indem sie die logischen Werte der Ein-
gangssignale und Ausgangssignale und der internen Signale innerhalb einer begrenzten
Anzahl von Taktzyklen angeben. So ko¨nnen sie, ausgehend von einem beliebigen Zustand
der Schaltung, mit einem SAT-basierten Eigenschaftspru¨fer bewiesen werden, sofern eine
ausreichende Invariante berechnet werden kann. Diese Invariante sollte genu¨gend Erreich-
barkeitsinformation enthalten, um mo¨gliche falsche Gegenbeispiele auszuschließen. Wei-
terhin wird in Kapitel 4 die wichtige Beobachtung getroffen, dass Kommunikationsmodu-
le ha¨ufig eine zentrale, abstrakte Zustandsmaschine aufweisen. Dieser zentrale Automat
wird in dieser Arbeit als main-FSM bezeichnet. Die main-FSM steuert das Gesamtverhal-
ten des Entwurfs. Daru¨berhinaus wird sie fu¨r Formulierung der Eigenschaften verwendet.
Um Erreichbarkeitsinformation zu identifizieren, stellt Kapitel 5 einen approximati-
ven FSM-Traversierungsalgorithmus vor. Dieser Algorithmus verwendet die main-FSM
des Entwurfs, um sowohl den Zustandsraum als auch die ¨Ubergangsrelation des Entwurfs
zu partitionieren. Daher wird der Algorithmus auch Transition-by-Transition-Traversierung
(TBT-Traversierung) einer FSM genannt. Die in TBT angewendeten Dekompositionen
sind der Schlu¨ssel, um eine geeignete Approximation des erreichbaren Zustandsraums
fu¨r große industrielle Entwu¨rfe zu ermo¨glichen.
Die berechneten Approximationen sind erfolgreich zur Verifikation industrieller Schal-
tungsentwu¨rfe eingesetzt worden. Das vorgeschlagene Verfahren ist geeignet den manuel-
len Aufwand beim Erstellen von Eigenschaftssa¨tzen fu¨r Kommunikationsmodule zu ver-
ringern.
Dieser Beitrag der Arbeit zum Verifikationsablauf soll kurz anhand von Abbildung 8.1
erla¨utert werden. TBT wird als Vorverarbeitungsschritt verwendet, um eine Invariante I
fu¨r IPC zu identifizieren. TBT analysiert den Entwurf und seine main-FSM, um Mengen
erreichbarer Zusta¨nde zu berechnen, die den Zusta¨nden der main-FSM entsprechen. Die
charakteristischen Funktionen dieser Mengen werden dann als zusa¨tzliche Vorraussetzung
in den Eigenschaften verwendet. Letzten Endes ist es das Ziel des gea¨nderten Ablaufs,
falsche Gegenbeispiele vollsta¨ndig zu vermeiden. Damit beschra¨nkt sich die manuelle
Inspektion des Quellcodes eines Entwurfs auf die Identifikation der main-FSM. Das zeit-
aufwa¨ndige manuelle Bestimmen von Erreichbarkeitsbedingungen entfa¨llt – dieser Schritt
kann aus dem Verifikationsablauf entfernt werden.
8.2 Wiederverwendbare Eigenschaften und generischer
Recorder
Kommunikationsmodule in SoCs implementieren fu¨r gewo¨hnlich ein Standardbusproto-
koll, das als Kommunikationsinfrastruktur verwendet wird. Daher kann unabha¨ngig vom
konkreten Entwurf ein Satz von Eigenschaften aufgestellt werden, der garantiert, dass ein
Modul, das die spezifizierten Eigenschaften erfu¨llt, den Protokollstandard nicht verletzt.
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Abbildung 8.1: IPC-basierter Verifikationsablauf mit TBT-Traversierung
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Auf diese Weise zertifizierte Module ko¨nnen daher gefahrlos in das System integriert
werden – sie halten sich an den Kommunikationsstandard.
In Kapitel 6 wird eine Methodik zur Erstellung von entwurfsunabha¨ngigen Eigen-
schaftssa¨tzen fu¨r die Protokollverifikation dargestellt. Diese Eigentschaftssa¨tze werden je-
weils auf Basis eines generischen Halbautomaten, einer sogenannten Recorder-FST (FST
= finite state transition structure) formuliert. Die Aufgabe der Recorder-FST ist nicht,
Verletzungen des Busprotokolls festzustellen. Sie beobachtet lediglich wa¨hrend des Be-
triebs der Schaltung den Bus und stellt in jedem Zeitpunkt den jeweiligen Bus-Zustand
fest. Das Soll-Verhalten des Entwurfs wird in IPC-Eigenschaften beschrieben, die sich
dann auf den Buszustand beziehen ko¨nnen.
Die Recorder-FST wird in zwei Phasen entworfen:
1. In der ersten Phase wird eine nichtdeterministische main-FST des Recorders unter
Verwendung eines manuellen, systematischen Verfahrens gebildet. Dieses Verfah-
ren identifiziert Zusta¨nde der main-FST als Bussymbole, die auf den Steuersignalen
des Buses u¨bermittelt werden.
2. In der zweiten Phase wird die main-FST um sub-FSTs erweitert, mit denen nichtde-
terministische ¨Uberga¨nge entfernt werden. So erha¨lt man einen deterministischen
Gesamtautomaten, die Recorder-FST.
Sowohl der Recorder als auch der zu verifizierende Schaltungsentwurf werden mit den
Bussignalen verbunden und bilden ein gemeinsames Verifikationsmodell (engl. design
under verification, DUV).
Das Soll-Verhalten dieses DUV wa¨hrend des ¨Ubergangs zwischen jeweils zwei Re-
corderzusta¨nden wird dann mit dazu spezifizierten generischen Eigenschaften u¨berpru¨ft.
Diese Eigenschaften werden unter Verwendung eines Templates formuliert, das in Kapi-
tel 4 vorgestellt wird.
Die Eigenschaften werden fu¨r das DUV mittels IPC u¨berpru¨ft. IPC wird dabei durch
Invarianten unterstu¨tzt, die identifiziert werden ko¨nnen, indem man ein kleines abstraktes
Modell des DUV traversiert. Der wiederverwendbare Recorder und der dazugeho¨rige ge-
nerische Eigenschaftssatz bilden einen wichtigen und wesentlichen Beitrag zur gesamten
correctness-by-integration-Strategie.
Das vorgeschlagene Verfahren in Kapitel 6 hat zwei Vorteile:
1. Aufgrund der Wiederverwendbarkeit verringert sich der mannuelle Aufwand, der
zum Aufstellen der Eigenschaften beno¨tigt wird. Dies erho¨ht die Produktivita¨t der
Verifikation erheblich.
2. Die Bestimmung von geeigneten Invarianten fu¨r IPC wird automatisiert.
Der in Abbildung 8.2 dargestellte Verifikationsablauf fasst den Beitrag der Arbeit in
Kapitel 6 zusammen. Vorab konstruiert der Designer oder der Verifikationsingenieur sy-
stematisch die Protokollspezifikation, die aus dem Recorder und einem Eigenschaftssatz
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besteht, wie sie in Abschnitt 6.2 vorgeschlagen werden. Anschließend wird der Recor-
der mit dem Kommunikationsmodul verbunden, um das erweiterte DUV zu erstellen.
Symbolische FSM-Traversierung wird verwendet, um die erreichbaren Zusta¨nde eines
geeigneten abstrakten Modells zu identifizieren, dessen Zustandsvariablen zuvor manuell
vom Verifikationsingenieur ermittelt wurden. Schließlich wird diese Menge erreichbarer
Zusta¨nde des abstrakten Modells als Invariante benutzt, damit IPC die generischen Eigen-
schaften fu¨r das konkrete DUV pru¨fen kann.
Abbildung 8.2: Methodik zur Verifikation von Protokollimplementierungen
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